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 Foreword 
 
 
It is an honour and privilege to be invited to write the opening words 
of this collection of essays which already represents the sixth edition of 
An Exercise in World Making. It offers a diversity of perspectives from 
the 2010-2011 batch of MA students of this institute, the International 
Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam. As Rector 
of this institute, I am proud of this collection of student essays.  
 
In a world that has been shaken to the core by the recent financial 
crisis and where climate change, environmental degradation, issues of 
food security and of human security are of major public concern and 
could potentially have a huge impact on the global order, it is refreshing 
to examine the contributions in this book, all of which offer valuable 
insights into these global issues and related matters of concern, such as 
gender, poverty and - not least - governance.   
 
These essays also illustrate how a diverse student body originating 
from more than fifty countries, and with diverse professional and 
educational backgrounds, critically explores current practices and 
theories of international development and arrives at new and promising 
insights for the future. In the essays, every student, each in their own 
way, clearly demonstrates the relevance of the study of political, 
economic and social developments in Africa, Asia, Latin America, North 
Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, in addition to new 
developments in North-South and South-South relationships. 
Altogether, these essays represent a choice of ISS‘ interests.  
 
This collection could also be considered as representing, or rather 
heralding, the beginning of yet another addition to - and thus 
viii An EXERCISE IN WORLDMAKING 
enhancement of - the ISS global network of innovation and knowledge 
production in international development. The 2010-2011 student batch 
will soon become our next batch of alumni. They will fly out around the 
globe and continue to pursue their ambitions with respect to 
international development in a variety of professional positions. But they 
will also remain in touch with the institute, feedback on our activities and 
collaborate with ISS‘ staff to shape our future work.  
 
Students form the core of ISS, the centre of our knowledge 
community in global issues of international development, social justice 
and equity. All of them have their personal ambitions to fulfill and 
combine that in a meaningful way with duties to science and society. 
They learn not to take any statement as truth before they themselves 
have examined it from every possible angle. In other words: they 
challenge their teachers and push us forward. Students are the future of 
ISS and this collection of essays bears witness to that. 
 
 
Professor Leo de Haan 
Rector 
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1 
Introduction 
JOHN CAMERON 
 
 
 
It is an honour and a privilege to be asked to write an introduction to 
this excellent collection of essays by the 2010/2011 ‗batch‘ of ISS 
students. I am sure the process of selecting these papers was 
extraordinarily demanding and there were many other candidates who 
were reluctantly not included. It was a pleasure to read the thirteen 
essays and I recommend them as a set to everyone who wishes to 
comprehend the scope of the current discourse on international 
development. 
I am not offering summaries of the essays here – the titles are self-
explanatory as guides to their contents. I decided to use this opportunity 
to offer some reflections on the state of the art in international 
development thinking that the essays stimulated.  
The topics covered reveal the great range of concerns that 
characterize the current international development discourse. The topics 
include some that can be seen as perennial such as ‗aid‘, poverty and land 
‗reform‘; others that entered the development discourse in the 1970s and 
1980s such as gender and political ecology; and those that have come 
into the discourse in the 1990s such as international migration, religion, 
rights and violence. To the credit of ISS and its students, the collection 
of essays demonstrates that no aspect of human life is excluded from the 
Masters‘ programme today. 
So what are the ingredients of the glue that binds these various 
elements together to create a unified discourse on international 
development?  
Analysis: all the papers display analytical strengths in terms of 
constructing well connected arguments leading to appropriate 
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conclusions. The writers have clear normative positions on the subjects 
they are addressing. But even when addressing very sensitive subjects 
such as corruption, piracy, post-conflict reparations, risky sexual 
practices, and religion, the writers seek to persuade readers by the 
strengths of their arguments and avoid polemics.  
Critical thought: all the essays engage with their subjects in a spirit 
of uncovering the deeper assumptions that underpin any element of 
complacency in more conventional positions on the issue. Eco-labelling 
is not a ‗solution‘ to unsustainable extraction of marine resources; anti-
poverty policy targeting is not necessarily efficient or effective; the 
struggle for women‘s rights has been a linear process of success after 
success from generation to generation.  
Evidence: contexts are described carefully in terms that give readers 
a strong sense of accurate evidence. Whether describing the structure of 
local government or tensions in a feminist movement, the writers 
convincingly invite readers into the context of the research, even if that 
context is totally outside the readers‘ experience. 
Exploring disciplinary frontiers: the international development 
discourse is essentially inter-disciplinary. All the essays explore frontiers 
between the conventional academic disciplines. Ethnographic insights 
are important in order to understand the performance of local 
government; sustaining marine resources and understanding the 
economic impact of oil reserves requires understanding of how 
institutions actually work; a conceptual framework drawn from ecology 
can help understand the cultural values of young people.  
Intersectionality: human identity is treated as multi-dimensional and 
complex. People are never presented as two dimensional cut-outs. 
People committing acts of piracy have families; people accused of war 
crimes need to be included in re-building processes; young people need 
jobs as well as education on lower risk sexual behaviour; people have 
ethnicity, gender, and generational aspects to their identities. 
Misrecognition: people make errors when speaking of the values, 
motivations and aspirations of ‗others‘, especially powerful people 
speaking of the less powerful. Such errors inevitably lead to unintended 
consequences which the essays forensically expose. ‗Aid donors‘ hamper 
sustainable development; an apparent single issue campaign against water 
privatisation is shown to be the tip of a much wider social movement; 
 1 Introduction 3 
 
having oil reserves carries a curse; giving people land titles can increase 
livelihood insecurity; well-meaning institution building fails to achieve 
either sustainable fishing or transitional justice; migrant domestic 
workers do not need ‗protection‘. 
Modesty: claims to have added to knowledge in the essays are 
appropriately moderate. Three thousand words essays cannot close 
discussion on the controversial issues that the essays address. In cases 
where institutions are still young (such as in sustaining marine resources, 
international criminal law, new local government or land titling 
structures), the essays acknowledge that it is too early to draw any firm 
conclusions about their future performance. In other cases, such as 
poverty targeting versus universal provision, further evidence is needed 
before any judgement between the alternatives in specific contexts is 
possible.  
Professionalism: professional and attractive presentation matter in 
convincing a reader that a subject has been addressed seriously. All the 
essays engage impressively with relevant academic literature in terms of 
citing and referencing. Lengths of sentences and paragraphs are 
sufficiently short for intelligibility and sufficiently long to avoid undue 
fragmentation. The divisions into sections give the reader moments to 
pause and reflect on the points made in the previous section. In some of 
the essays, diagrams and maps are used well to illustrate relationships. 
Respect: all the authors demonstrate admirable respect for the 
people who are the ultimate subjects of the essays. The current 
international development discourse has largely escaped a previous 
tendency to treat the majority of people as objects to be manipulated by 
a minority which ‗knows‘ better. This is perfectly reflected in the essays 
whether the subjects are people who work as domestic workers or fish or 
commit acts of piracy on the seas; farm the land; are recipients of ‗aid‘; 
struggle for justice and more open, accountable deliberative processes; 
have differing religious faiths; are trying to work out what to do with 
their sexual desires.  
As a final thought, the authors of the selected essays certainly have 
gained my respect and I congratulate them on their excellent work!  
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2 
Local Economic Development  
in Villa El Salvador 
JUAN CHAVEZ RAMIREZ 
(Peru) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
―Place matters in economic development‖ (Helmsing, 2005: 1) seems 
to be the new premise of the current theories of local and regional 
development. Authors like Cooke & Morgan (1998: 17), Porter (1998: 
78), Kitson et al. (2004: 991) and Helmsing (2007: 1) agree that certain 
set of factors, actors and interrelations are needed for the development 
process to happen, in terms of innovative capacity, competitive 
advantage, regional competitiveness or economic development. 
Helmsing (2003: 67) mentions two ―set of forces‖ that have changed 
the rules of the game in the last decades. The first are the structural 
adjustment policies that in the developing countries had several 
consequences. In the case of Peru, authors like Vincent (2010: 66) 
mentions the neoliberal turn of the country‘s policy framework 
leading to the decline of the welfare state. This gave place to a market-
driven paradigm with deep consequences in the local economy. The 
wager was that a free market would be more efficient, leading to 
economic growth and a better distribution of wealth. As we know, the 
history has been different. 
Under this paradigm, those who had a head start were able to 
consolidate their position in the global economy. This advantage is 
related to the second ―set of forces‖: technological innovations. 
Improvements in this area allowed some players to distance from their 
competitors, increasing the gap between the ―most developed‖ and the 
―least developed‖ countries. While the latter were waiting for the 
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markets to do their magic, the former were creating a strong 
institutional milieu, good business environment, stronger social capital, 
etc. 
The lessons learned were that the best way to develop was 
through a synergy between local actors within a governance 
framework in order to build a competitive advantage that enables the 
locality to produce, innovate and market a set of products that represent 
good value and therefore increasing the quality of life of the population 
(Helmsing, 2005: 5; J. Guimaraes, personal communication, 2011). 
This paper will exemplify some ideas that are present in the 
debates over local economic development, competitiveness and 
governance, through the analysis of a successful case of local 
economic development in Peru. Special attention will be given to the 
history and other wider processes, as the conditions for local economic 
development are considered to be path and context dependent. 
VILLA EL SALVADOR: A BRIEF HISTORY1 
The origin of Villa El Salvador (VES) is part of wider phenomenon of 
internal migration in Peru, which was a response of the population to the 
lack of opportunities in the rural areas.2 Before the 70‘s, the territory 
where VES is now located was a dessert called Hoyada Baja de 
Tablada de Lurín, where population, basic services and infrastructure 
were absent. The process of occupation was long and turbulent, with 
                                                 
1 Villa El Salvador (VES) is an urban district at the south of Lima province, 
Peru‘s capital. It is located at 30km from the city‘s centre and throughout the 
Panamericana highway, which go across the country‘s coastline and is one of 
the main roads of the country. In 2007, the population registered was around 
381,790 (5% of Lima province) and its population under the national poverty 
line is of 21% (INEI, 2007). Nowadays, the World Bank considers VES as a 
successful case of local economic development (World Bank, 2011). Other 
recognitions are the Award Príncipe de Asturias de la Concordia (1987) and 
others given by the United Nations and UNESCO. 
2 During the 60‘s, Lima was a recipient of a large number of migrants from the 
rural areas, attracted by the servi ces and opportunities that offered the ―big 
city‖. These migratory waves were the main forces that contributed to the 
expansion of Lima city, giving place to emergent districts like Comas (north 
cone), Lurigancho-Chosica (east cone) and VES (south cone). 
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several confrontations with the police and the public authorities. Finally, 
negotiation took place thanks to the intervention of the church 
(Municipality of VES, 2011). 
After initial tensions, the government authorities decided to 
support the settlers of VES. From an initial number of 80 families in 
the first mobilization in 1970, the scenario in 1971 was a group of 
9,000 families, strongly organized in order to resist the attempts of 
eviction by the police forces (Municipality of VES, 2011). Collective 
action together with the support of the church was critical to persuade 
the government to address the demands of these families and finally 
recognize the foundation of the district in May 1971. 
At this point, according to Favreau et al. (2002: 1), the central 
government played an important role by recognizing property rights to 
the new settlers and facilitating the transportation of materials for the 
first ―houses‖, which initially were mat huts. This stage was critical for 
the future of VES, because the central government, considered a 
reformist at that time, proposed a participative urban planning that 
included the participation of the church, political parties, left 
movements, professionals, civil society organization and the new settlers 
(ibid.). This initiative was somehow innovative considering the patterns 
of urban expansion of Lima, were the lack of planning have resulted 
in a very disorganized city that contrast widely with the grid- pattern of 
VES. 
The result of the planning process was a district organized in 1,300 
blocks, making up 110 residential units. Each unit has its own centre, 
with a small plaza, sport facilities, school and other communal 
facilities. This layout contrast with the other districts of Lima, 
characterized by a centralized design where all the governmental 
offices are clustered (Kliksberg, 1999: 91). This decentralized scheme 
favored the organization of associations, cooperation networks, 
collective action and the preservation of a sense of community. The 
settlers brought the latter from their places of origin, where 
communal organizations and collective action were common features. 
Based on this distribution, the residents established their own 
representative organizations called CUAVES, which means Autonomous 
Urban Community of Villa El Salvador. Additionally, sectorial 
committees were formed to address specific issues considered relevant 
for the local development process, like health, education, basic services, 
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production, commercialization, among others (Estatutos CUAVES, 
1973). The numerous needs suffered by the settlers, the participative 
tradition of their place of origin, the urban distribution, and the results 
obtained through collective action, strengthened the organization of 
VES and legitimized it as a vehicle for development. Klikberg (ibid.) 
offers a list of the main achievements of the collective action in VES: 
 60 communal houses, 64 schools and 32 libraries were built, 
 41 services centres (healthcare, nutrition units, drugstores), 
 Roads, 
 Forestation program of half million trees. 
The national decentralization process in 1983 meant the devolution of 
political powers to the local governments. Since this year, VES started 
to elect their own representatives, who shared the principles of 
cooperation and collective action that gave birth to VES. The first 
mayor of VES was Michel Azcueta, a leader that guided the settlement 
process of VES since its origins. This common ground, together with a 
clear sense of political will, permitted the organization of a mixed 
commission conformed by the newly elected authorities and the 
representatives of the CUAVES. 
In this commission, power was shared between both actors, mayor 
and CUAVES, as the former recognized the latter as a legitimate 
organization (Favreau, 2002: 2). 
It is important to acknowledge that VES had an organizational 
structure the emerged from the preexisting social capital and that was 
supported by the urban planning. The organization by residential units 
was a bottom-up structure that matched with the top-down structure 
promoted by the new decentralization process. In this sense, the 
mixed commission reinforced and empowered the existing authorities, 
now in a formal structure. The result was a configuration of 
governance where all local actors were involved in the planning, 
decision-making and implementation, according to the definition of 
Pieterse (2000: 4). 
One of the first achievements of this organization was an Integral 
Plan for the Development of Villa El Salvador, that in 1999 had it first 
10-year version with principles of strategic planning (Favreau, 2002: 2). 
For this, the municipality realized several workshops and consultation 
processes for the prioritization of projects and initiatives. These efforts 
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were innovative considering that the participatory budgeting in Peru was 
implemented in 2003. 
In parallel to this, VES started to gestate its industrial sector. In the 
initial design of VES there was an area for an Industrial Park, but it 
remained inoperative until 1986. This year, a group of small and micro 
entrepreneurs founded the Centre of Small Industries of Villa El 
Salvador (APEMIVES). This association was a kind of federation of 
smaller associations of metalworkers and carpenters that were previously 
organized in informal associations. Later that year, the APEMIVES, 
together with the CUAVES, the municipality, and the support of the 
United Nations, managed to receive the authorization from the central 
government to start the project of the Industrial Park (Municipality of 
VES, 2011; Favreau, 2002: 4). 
In 1987, the Autonomous Authority of the Industrial Park was 
founded (Municipality of VES, 2011). The members were 03 
representatives of the central government and 03 representatives of the 
locality (01 from the municipality, 01 from the CUAVES and 01 from 
the APEMIVES). Again, this ―mixed‖ organization was built also over 
the principles of governance, this time linking the public with the private 
sector. The main objectives of this association were to design projects 
to support the small and micro entrepreneurs through projects of 
infrastructure and technical assistance, including support for the 
marketing of local products and the developments of small productive 
units (Favreau, 2002: 5; Vázquez-Barquero, 2009: 5). 
The role of this association was not only lobbying the central 
authorities to obtain benefits, as is the reality of many civil society 
organizations in Peru that become extremely politicized, but 
supporting the economic activities of the small and micro 
entrepreneurs. Producers were able to commercialize their products, 
exchange information and purchase new equipment collectively. This 
allowed the local entrepreneurs to upgrade and add more value to their 
products. Together with the Industrial Park as a space for production 
and commercialization, this association permitted the local producers to 
upgrade in the value chain.  
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THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS 
Some of the literature about the success of VES does not mention the 
key role of the external actors. In fact, this is an important issue to 
consider if we try to use this case as a model to replicate in other 
localities. Since the first years of formation of VES, the presence of 
NGO‘s and international agencies has been permanent, following up the 
process of consolidation of the district and of the Industrial Park. 
Emblematic programs and organizations are: 
 City-to-city program (C2C) between the municipality of Amstelveen 
and the municipality of VES: this program started in 1997 and was a 
partnership between the mentioned municipalities. This program 
worked with the local authorities and also with civil society. With the 
former, the agenda was in terms of accountability, transparency, 
governance and management. This fostered an autoperception of the 
local government as an active player in local development. This meant 
the inclusion of the other stakeholders at the local level, in order to 
mobilize the resources available in the locality to tackle local 
demands3 (Bontenbal & van Lindert, 2008). This helped to build a 
sense of ownership in the population and of involvement in 
governing process of the district. The relationships of trust were also 
improved, facilitating the collective action and cooperation. The work 
with the civil society was in terms of empowerment and participation. 
Even though, the results in this branch have been ―modest‖ 
(Bontenbal & van Lindert, 2008: 476). 
 NGO DESCO: this is a Peruvian NGO that works in the southern 
cone of Lima since the 80‘s. They have had an important presence in 
the district for many years and have focused in local management at 
the municipal level, improvement of the residential infrastructure, and 
support to the industrial sector. In the latter, the efforts have been 
focused in the carpentry sector, basically in the acquisition, 
transformation and commercialization of wood and furniture. 
(DESCO, 2011) 
                                                 
3 Results of this program were initiatives to involve the community in service 
provision (waste collection), reforestation programs and an improved 
accountability through decentralized offices. 
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 CARE: according to Favreau (2002: 5) the organization gave support 
to the Industrial Park through the donation of machinery and 
equipment. 
The importance of the contributions given by these organizations 
was their approach to local development, as a process of many stages 
that requires the involvement of many actors. This has been evident 
since the initial stages of the formation of VES, like in the design of 
the district, where NGO‘s and governmental institutions (through the 
recognition of property rights) had an active role, resulting in fertile soil 
for future collective action. 
Later on, initiatives like the C2C program and the work of DESCO 
have been fundamental for building capacity at the local level. This 
ensured the inclusion of local actors in the governing process. 
Strengthening the actors of civil society while working with the local 
authorities to create the spaces for effective participation created a 
feedback loop based on results. Finally, when organizations were 
strong and local government responsive and enabled, support for the 
consolidation of the Industrial Park was given, resulting in success. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Several factors explain the success of VES in terms of local economic 
development. For analytical purposes, the analysis of this case will be 
based on the ―Bases of Regional Competitiveness‖ of Kitson et al. 
(2004: 995) and in the diagram of ―Innovative LED programs and 
competitiveness‖ of Helmsing (2010: 12). 
Kitson et al. (2004: 995) propose 06 capitals for regional 
competitiveness: productive, human, social-institutional, cultural, 
infrastructural, and knowledge. In terms of productive capital, the 
Industrial Park and the donations from international organizations 
played an important role for the equipping these enterprises. Besides 
that, the existence of credit institutions providing credit for small and 
micro entrepreneurs seems to be relevant. Even if they are not 
mentioned in the literature, it is possible to find them in the district. 
In terms of human capital, the first settlers of VES were from rural 
areas with previous knowledge in manual activities, like carpentry and 
metalwork. The fact that it did not require any specialized knowledge 
allowed many of the residents to engage in this activity. Nowadays, 
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carpentry represents almost 30% of the Industrial Park production, 
while metalwork have also a share of 29.5%. Later on, DESCO 
focused on the carpentry activity, helping to upgrade the production 
processes. 
In terms of social capital, the most important features are the 
governance structure, the solid grassroots organizations, the active 
business associations and the leadership. All of them have been largely 
mentioned in this paper but the latter needs more attention. Michel 
Azcueta was one of the first leaders of VES since the 70‘s and was the 
first mayor of VES in the 80‘s, being reelected twice. Many of the ideas 
that guided the process of consolidation and development of VES, 
since its design, inclusion of local actors, accountability, and 
transparency, were strongly coherent with his vision of district. The 
fact that he was leading the district in critical moments (foundation and 
first mayor) gave some kind of continuity to the process, that is 
difficult to achieve in other districts were authorities change each three 
years. In the case of VES, the local government and NGO‘s constitute 
also supporting institutions, building capacity and contributing in the 
upgrade of technology. 
In terms of cultural capital, Kliksberg (1999: 92) point that the 
settlers of VES came from a communal tradition where collective action 
and cooperation were fundamental for survival. In many communities 
of the Andes, public issues are discussed and solved with the 
participation of all members. At some extent, the fact that VES in its 
origins was a marginalized district allowed them to gestate their own 
organizational structures, adapting their cultural background to the new 
urban setting. This bottom- up process matched later on with the 
decentralization process, allowing the conformation of mixed 
commissions and ad hoc institutions according to governance principles. 
Again, the mayor and local leaders were fundamental for this. 
The infrastructural capital relies in the existence of three main 
issues. First is the existence of the Panamericana highway that is one of 
the most important roads in the country, connecting VES directly to 
Lima. This give the producers access to a huge market. Second is the 
Industrial Park itself, that is center of production and commercialization. 
Third is the basic infrastructure, like electricity, water and housing. 
The last one, knowledge and creative capital, is difficult to assess. In 
the case of VES there are improvements in the level of organization, 
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the upgrading of production processes and the improved quality of the 
production (like in furniture). These improvements seem to suggest the 
existence of this capital. In this issue, the existence of active business 
associations and the permanent support of NGO‘s like DESCO has 
been fundamental. 
Once recognized the existence of the mentioned capitals and 
stakeholders, it is important to observe how they interact at the local 
level. The existence of networks alone does not assure local 
development. As mentioned above, local development is a path and 
context dependent process, so how the capitals and actors interact is 
what determines the quality of the development process. 
Helmsing (2010: 12) describes the interactions between actors of 
local development in Latin America through the following diagram: 
Source: Helmsing 2010. 
 
According to the diagram, it can be observed that in these countries 
the interactions between actors based on hierarchies, like in the 
interaction between donors and local government, or between small 
entrepreneurs and business associations. Another feature is the absence 
of links between local government and the private sector. The 
autoperception that local authorities have regarding their role in the 
local economy is passive, limited to regulation. In the case of VES, both 
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actors are interconnected and the local government plays an active role, 
enabling and also strengthening the local industries. 
These differences can be observed in the next diagram: 
 
Source: based on Helmsing (2010), own elaboration4 
 
The existence of several links may result confusing, but actually 
that is one of the features of VES. As have been mentioned across the 
paper, there are several spaces for the interaction between actors. The 
participation of actors from different spheres (public, private and civil 
society) in commissions and associations ensures a permanent 
coordination. The spatial configuration also fosters the interaction 
between them and allows the emergence of these organizations, as well 
as collective action. 
To conclude, VES meets many of the criteria of local economic 
development and competitiveness, which explain largely its success. 
Despite the heavy external support that the district has received, it is 
possible to identify internal characteristics that have complemented the 
external efforts. It can be said that the foreign aid built over existing 
                                                 
4 The diagram was part of a presentation prepared for the course ―Promotion 
of Local Economic Development‖ (ISS, 2011). 
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social and cultural capital, which in many scenarios is the most difficult 
thing to build. Infrastructural, knowledge, productive, human and 
institutional capital can be built with a set of policies; but trust, networks 
and cooperation, seems to depend in other factors and other time frames 
(long-term). In the case of VES, a communal tradition based in 
cooperation and a strong leadership seems to have had a central role that 
sometimes seems to be overlooked. 
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Seagulls flock above. Swirling and perusing for opportunities to snatch 
scraps as fishermen lug boxes of their catch up to market stalls. Vendors 
quickly place the fish on ice to preserve their freshness as long as 
possible. In other settings, fish are dropped into tanks of water to keep 
them alive as customers browse the many varieties, or are put out in the 
sun and salted to dry. Others still, are packed into trucks and are 
transported to canneries and frozen food processors where they are then 
exported to global supermarket chains, to the dinner plates of families 
and restaurants around the world. 
The fish industry is a multibillion dollar industry. Wild seafood catch 
alone amounts to an estimated first- sale value of US$93.9 billion (FAO, 
2010: 23). Globally, fish provides more than 4.5 billion people with at 
least 15 percent of their animal protein intake (FAO, 2010: 21), and 
hundreds of millions of livelihoods depend on fisheries for their survival. 
Yet like any ―free‖, open access natural resource, the environmental 
costs have not been accounted for. Fish stocks around the world have 
suffered from Hardin‘s ―Tragedy of the Commons‖ where every fisher 
―seeks to maximize his gain‖ and ―is locked into a system that compels 
him to increase his herd (or catch) without limit - in a world that is 
limited‖ (Hardin, 1968: 1244). As a result, more than 80% of our fish 
stocks are either fully exploited or overexploited (FAO, 2010: 8), 
culminating in dire implications for the oceans‘ ecosystems and our own 
food security. 
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The case associated with the demise of fish populations revolves 
around more than mere overfishing. The top ten target species are 
indeed under severe risk of extinction, and this in itself has severe 
implications for the ecosystems those species are connected to. 
However, the fishing industry is also plagued by a myriad of externalities 
that create equally, if not more desperate situations for the ocean‘s 
health. Non-target species such as dolphins, turtles and other fish are 
often caught as by-catch; certain fishing practices such as bottom 
trawling and cyanide poisoning also create direct destruction to reefs and 
ocean habitats. Post-landing processes, such as canneries and shipping to 
consumer markets, also create their fair share of polluting and energy 
consuming practices. So there is much scope for improvement beyond 
simply decreasing demand for fish, which despite the warnings, has only 
gone up. 
Different fisheries management policies have come about locally and 
internationally to try and curb our overexplotiation. The UN Law of the 
Sea acts as a fundamental legal framework for oceans governance and 
includes the definition of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), the setting 
of national property rights to within 200 nautical miles of a country‘s 
coast (UN, 1982: Article 57) to enable sovereign management of the 
commons. 
FAO released a Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in 1995, 
giving guidelines to encourage fisheries to conduct more sustainable 
practices across the board (Cochrane & Doulman, 2005: 79). Numerous 
other agreements have also been signed around the world, however, the 
majority of these have acted solely as soft law and have had little effect 
on the state of fish stocks and fishing practices. The assumption is that if 
we were to manage our fisheries better and conduct more sustainable 
practices, stocks would start recovering and the oceans will no longer be 
at risk. But what are the best ways to achieve this and is it even possible? 
In 1996, WWF and Unilever got together to establish the Marine 
Stewardship Council (Gulbrandsen, 2008: 655). Their aim was to create a 
market-based policy instrument that would use the power of consumer 
demand to regulate unsustainable fishing practices. The Marine 
Stewardship Council is now an independent body that carries out a 
certification process to put a stamp of approval on the fishing practices 
of fisheries. Certified fisheries are then allowed to put the MSC eco-label 
on all their products to show that they have complied with strict 
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sustainable fishing requirements. To date, there are 118 certified fisheries 
and over 5000 labelled products on the shelves (MSC, 2010) worldwide. 
The MSC is the only internationally recognized fisheries eco-label to 
―encourage consumers to make the best environmental choice in 
seafood‖ (Cummins, 2004). 
While slowly establishing its legitimacy over the years, the MSC has 
received both praise and criticism along the way. There have been 
debates on the certification criteria, the effectiveness of the label in 
manipulating consumer demand, as well as its effectiveness in 
contributing to the conservation of fish stocks and marine ecosystems. 
In this essay, I will be critically reviewing 6 articles that revolve around 
eco-labelling‘s role in the management of fisheries, with an emphasis on 
the Marine Stewardship Council. These articles will bring out debates 
concerning MSC‘s approach, strengths and weaknesses, and its 
effectiveness in achieving what it sets out to do, i.e. improve fisheries‘ 
practices to safeguard seafood supplies for the future. One article will 
also touch on alternative mechanisms to protect fisheries and the 
circumstances necessary to achieve those aims. 
The 6 articles are as follows: 
1. The Emergence and Effectiveness of the Marine Stewardship Council 
/ Lars H. Gulbrandsen (2008) 
2. Private Certification vs. Public Certification in the International 
Environmental Arena / Patricia Moye (2010) 
3. Eco-labelling of Wild-Caught Seafood Products / Mikkel Thrane, 
Friederike Ziegler & Ulf Sonesson (2009) 
4. The Promise and Pitfalls of Marine Stewardship Council Certification: 
Maine Lobster as a Case Study / Wendy Goyert, Raphael Sagarin & 
John Annala (2010) 
5. Fixing Problems in Fisheries – Integrating ITQs, CBM And MPAs in 
Management / Mark Brady & Staffan Waldo (2009) 
6. Determinants of Demand for Green Products: An Application to 
Eco-Label Demand for Fish in Europe / Dorothée Brécard, 
Boubaker Hlaimi, Sterenn Lucas, Yves Perraudeau & Frédéric 
Salladarre (2009). 
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DEBATING THE MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL 
The first article by Gulbrandsen, begins by introducing the history of the 
Marine Stewardship Council. He discusses the conditions that were 
present when MSC came about. By 1996, eco-labelling had already 
started taking off. In the fisheries arena, single-species campaigns were 
on a roll and the well-known Dolphin-friendly tuna battle created the 
first marine fisheries eco-label. More followed, and a growing number of 
seafood ranking guides to inform consumers‘ choices were also on the 
rise. Yet many of these efforts were seen as ineffective as there were no 
standard settings or requirements, and vendors even went to the extent 
of mislabelling fish to hide the destructive practices behind them. 
Based on the success of the Forest Stewardship Council, WWF 
decided to partner with Unilever, the largest frozen food purchaser at the 
time, to establish a credible, high level certification standard that would 
create a direct link between fish production and fish trade (Gulbrandsen, 
2008: 655). MSC learnt from some of the mistakes of the FSC and 
became independent by 1998, always taking into consideration the 
interests of its stakeholders, but leaving the final decision to the Board of 
Trustees to avoid deadlock (Gulbrandsen, 2008: 655). It also responded 
to criticism by enhancing transparency and employing third-party 
certification bodies to assess fisheries under consideration, after the 
release of the FAO‘s eco-labelling guidelines in 2005 (Gulbrandsen, 
2008: 657). 
There are three main principles guiding the MSC: (Gulbrandsen, 
2008: 656) 
1) Fishing activity must be at a sustainable level 
2)  Fishing operations should be managed to maintain the structure, 
productivity, function and diversity of the ecosystem on which the 
fishery depends 
3)  The fishery must meet all the local, national and international laws 
and must have a management system that responds to the changing 
circumstances and maintains sustainability 
Critics have argued that some of these principles are too vague and 
invite inconsistencies in the certification process; Gulbrandsen is no 
exception. He highlights how a certain amount of flexibility is necessary 
since contexts are different and those principles will always be reflected 
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in a different way. However, he worries about whether this variability 
undermines the credibility of MSC as a certification body. Legitimacy is a 
serious challenge as it is crucial to obtain government, industry and 
consumer support. Many governments have criticized MSC for trying to 
govern beyond national jurisdiction, arguing that they have neither the 
experience, nor mandate to do so (Gulbrandsen, 2008: 657). This 
argument, however is challenged by Patricia Moye in my second article. 
She illustrates how a government-run certification scheme is no more 
reliable than a private scheme. Using the example of Marine Eco-Label 
Japan (MEL), Moye notes the existence of a strong link between the 
fishing industry, the government and MEL Japan in the certification 
process. This link implies that there is strong pressure coming from all 
three stakeholders. In all likelihood, the government has an interest in 
appearing sustainable, but would also want the fishing industry to thrive 
and contribute to GDP. Moye comments how ―one cannot help but 
wonder how much input industry groups have in the actual certification 
approval process‖ (Moye, 2010: 562). This poses doubts as to how 
trustworthy a certification scheme can really be when contrasting 
interests and unequal power dynamics are involved. The suspicion is 
further amplified by the fact that the state is not subject to the same 
pressures as a private scheme like MSC, which has to prove itself by 
providing transparency and acquiring independent third-party certifiers 
to validate their standards, none of which are provided by MEL. 
Accountability is absolutely necessary to prevent eco-labels from 
becoming ―self-defeating, in that they work against consumers‘ 
confidence and are vulnerable to persuasive attacks by activists‖ (Moye, 
2010: 562). 
But is MSC even setting the right standards and concerned about the 
right aspects of the supply chain? The third article by Thrane et al. deem 
MSC to be a step above single attribute schemes such as ―Dolphin-
friendly Tuna‖. Multiple attribute schemes look at different aspects of 
the fishing industry, such as by-catch and the effects on marine 
ecosystems. However, Thrane et al. question whether it is enough to 
focus only on the fishing stage as MSC does, or whether a certification 
scheme should also take into account the environmental impacts of the 
whole life cycle. 
They discuss six stages along the life cycle that could be considered 
(Thrane et al. 2009: 417): 
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1) Direct impact on the target species stock, influencing the 
surrounding marine ecosystem. 
2) Impacts on non-target species in terms of by-catch. 
3) Direct impacts on marine ecosystems such as using gear that 
damages the sea floor, or releases chemicals. 
4) Impacts related to fossil fuels emissions contributing to nutrient 
enrichment and acidification. 
5) Post-landing impacts in the processing industry, wholesale and 
transport processes; including energy consumption and water 
polluting activities. 
6) Consumer impacts relating to shopping, storing, cooling, food prep-
aration as well as disposal. 
They contrast and compare MSC to two other certification schemes 
that take more aspects of the life cycle into account – the Swedish 
―KRAV‖ label and the Danish Society of the Living Seas‘ proposed 
label. Mostly, they encourage MSC to gradually incorporate more 
considerations such as retail and post-landing production waste as well as 
energy consumption throughout the chain. Based on initiatives by the 
other two certification schemes, it was noted that many changes in 
fishing practice actually lead to a significant reduction in fuel and energy 
use, and as a result, a reduction in carbon emissions (Thrane et al. 2008: 
421). This could be more and more of interest to MSC as carbon 
labelling picks up in the coming years. France is already considering the 
introduction of compulsory carbon labelling rules on all products as early 
as 2012 (The Economist, 2011: 14), so there may be a day when MSC 
will have no choice but to include the carbon footprint of a product‘s life 
cycle. 
Having said that, Thrane et al. do recognize the issues with adopting 
additional environmental aspects to MSC‘s criteria. Including more 
criteria could make the certification process even more challenging and 
cumbersome than it already is, and would be harder to control and 
verify. The lengthy and costly certification process is already a 
discouraging factor for many fisheries considering MSC certification. 
The costs of certification range from ―US$20,000 for small community-
based fisheries to US$300,000 for large industrial fisheries‖ (Goyert et al. 
2010: 1104). Further expenses involve pre-assessment, annual audits, 
management expenses and the implementation of improvements 
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required by certification (Goyert et al. 2010: 1104), all of which highly 
discourage fishers who might not see any clear benefits from certifying. 
The MSC certification process usually takes about 12 months, but the 
Alaska pollock fishery for example took 4 years to complete the 
certification process (Gulbrandsen, 2008: 657)! Fisheries first have to 
apply voluntarily and go through a confidential pre-assessment to see if 
they meet the basic requirements of MSC standards. 
Less than half pass this stage and move on to full assessment which is 
available for public tracking. During this stage, a panel of experts uses 
comparisons and performance indicators to draft a preliminary report 
which is then reviewed by multiple stakeholders. A successful case is 
granted certification for 5 years, with annual audits to ensure 
performancee. When the certification expires, the whole fishery has to 
undergo a major reassessment all over again (Gulbrandsen, 2008: 656). 
This process acts as a major dilemma for MSC. On the one hand, the 
strength of its eco-label lies in its strict criteria, but at the same time, 
those same criteria deter fisheries from applying. Most fisheries cannot 
afford such a time consuming and costly process unless they are small 
enough to conduct the certification quickly and easily, or large enough to 
benefit from economies of scale. The fourth article by Goyert et al. 
assert that no matter how good the MSC criteria is, if fishermen are not 
interested and the criteria is not embedded in reality, the scheme simply 
cannot succeed. 
Their team conducted interviews to find out what fishermen in the 
Maine lobster fishery thought about getting MSC certified. ―Of the 59 
lobstermen interviewed, 51% showed definite or qualified support‖ 
while ―49% of fishermen interviewed did not support MSC, did not 
know if they supported MSC, or did not care‖ (Goyert et al. 2010: 1105). 
Many of the reasons revolved around costs, bureaucracy, losing 
certification in the future and not getting any real benefits from the 
certification. Goyert et al. argue that one way to overcome this obstacle 
is to fully inform fishermen about the certification process and its 
potential challenges and benefits (Goyert et al. 2010: 1108), but while 
this is necessary, it is doubtful to what extent this would actually alter 
attitudes. The issue of willingness runs deeper than just awareness. 
Gulbrandsen mentions how most certified fisheries are already in a 
position that requires few changes to become certified. Most of them are 
already ―highly selective of target species‖ and ―have stocks that occur 
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within known areas for which there are exclusive national access rights, 
tend to have limited access, are well regulated and enforced, and are 
often co-managed by governments, scientists, and fishers‖ (Gulbrandsen, 
2008: 658). Needless to say these are not conditions that are excessively 
common around the world. Most fishing zones are overpopulated, 
involve intense competition and have unclear property rights. 
The fifth article by Brady and Waldo focuses a great deal on the 
importance of property rights in making any conservation or 
management scheme work, including that of eco-labelling. They divide 
fishing rights into four categories: access and withdrawal; management; 
exclusion; and alienation (Brady & Waldo, 2009: 259). Access and 
withdrawal, implies some sort of boundary, where rights to enter and 
extract a physical resource are geographically defined. Management, is 
the ability to regulate the use of that defined area and make 
improvements; while Exclusion, is the right to determine who can or 
cannot access that area. Finally, Alienation, is the right to sell or lease an 
area (Brady & Waldo, 2009: 259). When these sorts of rights are clear, 
they argue that it makes it easier to then organize the rest accordingly. If 
fishermen have clear and secure withdrawal rights, they are more likely to 
accept long-term management actions that are costly in the short term 
(Brady & Waldo, 2009: 259). If they share management rights, they are 
more likely to believe the system will work, as they are the ones making 
the decisions as to what is to be done and how. This also helps boost 
compliance, since enforcement then becomes a matter of social control 
(Brady & Waldo, 2009: 263) rather than a matter of implementing 
expensive monitoring instruments. 
Transferring exclusion rights to a fishery from the state often also 
makes sense, since local fishers know the local situation better, including 
the abilities of individuals and the conditions of different areas (Brady & 
Waldo, 2009: 260). Exclusion is vital to a scheme like MSC, because if 
the actions of a fishery are to have any impact on the fish stock and 
marine ecosystem, they have to know that there are no outsiders 
interfering with their efforts. If all the fisheries around them are 
conducting destructive practices, there will be no sense to continue as 
they will doubt whether their undertaking makes any difference to the 
overall picture. To lay out the sustainable groundwork only to have it 
bulldozed by other fishers would feel as unjust as Sisiphus pushing his 
giant boulder up a hill only for it to roll down again. Well-defined rights 
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are fundamental for eco-labelling as they ―make it possible for fishers to 
extract the higher price that environmentally conscious consumers are 
willing to pay for fish‖ (Brady & Waldo, 2009: 261). But that same claim 
raises a critical question: Are consumers actually willing to pay for the 
fish? 
The sixth article by Brécard et al. presents a survey conducted in 5 
countries in Europe, to find out what the actual considerations of 
consumers are when purchasing seafood, and questions how effective an 
eco- label like MSC can really be. ―Eco-labels are an instrument used by 
firms and governments in order to raise awareness of the higher 
ecological quality of a given product‖ (Brécard et al. 2009: 116), but do 
they actually work? Are consumers aware of the significance of an eco-
label, and even if they are, do they care? The survey gave a mixture of 
results revealing several major issues with certification. To begin with, 
most people are not aware of the state of the world‘s fishing stocks, or 
the unsustainable practices associated with the fishing industry - most 
people ―reject green products because of their underestimation of the 
environmental consequences of their purchases‖(Brécard et al. 2009: 
121). Even when they consider a product with an eco-label, they are not 
sure what the label represents, and few are likely to do their own 
research to find out the details. It was also found that consumers 
assumed that higher priced eco-labelled products automatically meant 
they were more ecological, which is not always the case (Brécard et al. 
2009: 118). Both these findings demonstrate how the increase in eco-
labelling has nullified its own purpose by causing confusion to 
consumers who cannot tell one apart from another. They are unable to 
judge what an eco-label entails and how reliable it is, simply because 
there are too many. Furthermore, the malpractice of green washing by 
numerous companies has not helped in eliminating suspicion on the part 
of buyers. 
Labels aside, it is also important to be aware that although ―all 
consumers prefer the less polluting product‖, they ―differ in their 
willingness-to-pay for it‖ (Brécard et al. 2009: 117). The ecological 
impact of seafood holds a place of extremely low importance on the 
average consumer‘s list of concerns. Goyert et al‘s survey on consumers‘ 
considerations when buying lobster in Maine, revealed the following 
results: 
 
 3 Shopping for the Planet 25 
Source: Goyert et al., 2010: 1106 
 
 
Brécard et al.‘s results were similar. People focus on freshness and 
quality much more than ecological impact. Even when they were 
interested in the fish‘s origin, it was often more to do with whether the 
fish was from a certain area it is famous for. Furthermore, most 
consumers are only willing to pay slightly more for a fish when purely 
based on ecological reasons. Perhaps this is because the whole 
environmental movement is based around the concept of guilt, and 
buying an eco-label is only driven by the desire to feel a little better about 
the destruction human beings are inflicting on the planet. How many 
people are really willing to chip in more than a tiny contribution for that 
fuzzy ―warm glow‖ (Brécard et al. 2009: 116)? Furthermore, people also 
sometimes lie to appear more ―green‖. Surveys might show that people 
say they want ecologically friendly seafood, but their actions show 
otherwise. The 2008 Eurobarometer revealed that although 75% of 
Europeans said they were willing to pay ―a little bit more‖ for green 
products, only 17% had actually done so (Brécard et al. 2009: 115). 
Funnily enough, the Brécard et al. survey also revealed that the candidate 
most likely to care about an eco-label was a young, well-educated female. 
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So perhaps the MSC‘s solution lies in making sure that only young 
educated women shop for the household. 
The significance of these results lies in the fact that if consumers are 
not interested in covering part of the costs of certification, and are not 
necessarily driven to buy MSC products, why would fisheries even want 
to get certified in the first place? What new market is MSC offering 
fishermen as a benefit? There are two main areas on the consumer side 
that MSC has to master. First of all, MSC has the benefit of overriding 
other eco- labels with its international recognition. As previously 
mentioned, the overflow of eco-labels in the market already cause 
consumers much confusion. To make matters worse, different countries 
often create their own certification schemes to label products. This 
becomes complicated when a fishery wants to sell its catch to multiple 
countries as it then has to go through multiple certification schemes, all 
costs included. If MSC were to become the only legitimate label in the 
wild seafood industry, it might have a chance at becoming a clear stamp 
of approval for consumers. 
Second of all, ―consumer‖ demand is not as critical on the individual‘s 
behalf, as it is on the retailer‘s behalf. It is more important for MSC, 
when a supermarket or restaurant chain decides to take a leadership role 
and adopt MSC products for their whole supply. ―The fact that Wal-
Mart, one of the United States‘ largest supermarket chains, has signed on 
to the MSC is a huge success‖ (Moye, 2010: 547), and as a result, more 
will follow. A retailer worries less about a slight rise in price because they 
can transfer some of those costs to the buyer, and so MSC needs to 
focus on getting those actors on board. Hopefully, restaurants can also 
be attracted to adopting MSC as a model for business success. Seafood is 
often associated with fine dining, and so customers are more likely to 
loosen their purse strings a bit more when it comes to eating out. But 
does this mono-standard of sustainable consumption bring up the 
question of whether MSC could potentially start being perceived as a 
form of ―eco-imperialism‖? Would more and more demand from 
developed countries for certified products become a de facto barrier to 
trade for developing countries (Gulbrandsen, 2008: 658)? That is a 
question that goes beyond the breadth of this essay, but it does highlight 
the fact that as yet, MSC is mostly concerned with developed countries, 
an underlying affinity that is also present in much of the commentary in 
these articles. 
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A FUTILITARIAN APPROACH 
It comes as a surprise that the articles fail to address the basic way in 
which most of the world consumes seafood. Most of the articles focus 
on ways to improve MSC and tackle consumer demand, but 
Gulbrandsen is the only one who considers the fact that ―most of the 
seafood in developing countries is consumed locally, in markets with 
little or no interest in eco-labelling, fisheries certification probably has 
limited potential to spread among the fisheries in these 
countries.‖(Gulbrandsen, 2008: 658) Most seafood sold in open markets 
do not even have price tags attached to them, let alone an eco-label. ―In 
Europe and North America, more than two-thirds of fish used for 
human consumption is in frozen and canned forms‖ (FAO, 2010: 63), 
but in Asia, by far the largest consumer of seafood, fish is mostly 
purchased in its live form to guarantee freshness. A fish that is not 
processed, packaged and sent off to a bigger market is simply not 
compatible with labelling. 
Furthermore, interest has not even begun to make a dent in the Asian 
market, which has the biggest potential to incentivize fishers. Currently, 
MSC only has 4 certified Asian fisheries in Japan, Vietnam and the 
Maldives (MSC, 2010:14-15), and less than 5% of MSC products are 
marketed in Asia. 
Furthermore, the preconditions for implementing a certification 
scheme like MSC in terms of fisheries characteristics are uncommon. 
Brady and Waldo discuss the necessity of clear fishing rights, but how 
often are these rights organized in a clear manner? Fisheries are 
particularly difficult industry to understand. For one, it is an invisible 
trade, where one cannot easily assess the state of stocks or 
environmental degradation simply because marine ecosystems are 
underwater. Furthermore, fish are mobile. Pelagics in particular, such as 
tuna and sardines, migrate over great distances and do not permanently 
fall under anyone‘s jurisdiction. Even when fish are located in a 
particular area, it is often debatable as to who the fish belongs to. The 
question of ownership is a great source of conflict because fish are 
simply not ―owned‖ until they are caught, and even then, it can be 
argued that a fishermen only has ―possession‖ of the catch on board 
(Bromley, 2005: 218). Conflicts of ownership extend to the level of 
nation states and has possibly become more intense due to the creation 
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of Exclusive Economic Zones. Where does one‘s 200 nautical miles of 
EEZ end and the other‘s 200 nautical miles finish? This tension is clearly 
visible between neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Greece who 
share much of the Aegean, but jurisdiction can be taken to another 
extreme such as in the situation between West Timor and Australia, 
where Timorese fishermen suspected of entering Australian waters are 
taken into custody for months or years at a time for illegal poaching 
(Balint, 2005). It is not possible to put up a fence the way one would 
around their garden, and hence the issue of well- defined rights is often 
not even on the table for discussion. 
Sources: The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, FAO 2010: 31 
 
 
The articles also fail to bring up the problem of causation. One might 
argue that MSC and other methods of fisheries management such as 
ITQs (Individual Transferable Quota), TACs (Total Allowable Catch) 
and MPAs (Marine Protected Areas) as mentioned by Brady and Waldo, 
are simply tackling the symptoms rather than the causes of the problem. 
Explanations such as population growth and bad fishing practices often 
confuse ―the first cause (origin) of an occurrence with the final cause 
(purpose) of an occurrence‖ (Bromley, 1999: 96). Population growth for 
example, is an earlier circumstance that leads to overfishing, but it is not 
the intention of population growth to cause destruction to marine 
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ecosystems. Another common stated cause of overfishing, is that 
―resource users are ‗greedy‘ and ‗shortsighted‘ as a natural condition‖ 
(Wilen 2006: 530). ―In this view of the world, if the objective of 
management is sustainable fisheries, the aim of policy must be to control 
and restrain the immutable bad behaviour of users‖ (Wilen, 2006: 530), 
much in the way a certification scheme does. So what then could be the 
final cause? 
Wilen argues that fishermen‘s fundamental decision-making 
incentives are distorted by insecure harvest privileges so that they 
compete wastefully with each other for increased quantities of fish 
(Wilen, 2006: 530). The issue of ownership once again comes into play, 
but more importantly every appropriator has to benefit from 
improvements in a system in order to contribute to it. ―Without a fair, 
orderly and efficient method of allocating resource units, local 
appropriators have little motivation to contribute to the continued 
provision of the resource system‖ (Ostrom, 1990: 33). But are property 
rights the only issue? What is unique about the condition of fisheries 
when it comes to food production? Fishing, is one of the oldest forms of 
food provision, and arguably the only major form of commercial 
sustenance-based hunting. Hunting is a special form of food production 
because unlike farming, ―food production from the sea does not require 
payment for the facilities‖ (Bromley, 2005: 223). A farm has input costs 
such as fertilizers, seeds, rent and machinery. By comparison, a fishing 
permit and a fishing vessel provides a means of reaping, but not the 
responsibility of sowing and ensuring continuous productivity. The 
determinants of productivity are provided instead by the health of 
ecosystems, by biomass, ocean environment and solar energy, all of 
which are free to resource users. 
So how do we tackle this issue of a free natural resource and create a 
culture of taking care of the ocean rather than just taking from it? An 
economist might simply argue to stop giving out fishing quotas for free, 
and propose that fisheries are charged a tax on their catch which is then 
used to help in conservation projects. A policy maker might work out a 
better way to organize access privileges and strictly enforced fishing 
allowances. NGOs might revert to community-based management and 
conduct training programs to increase awareness and capability. This 
does not necessarily mean that existing policies do not offer any value. In 
lack of a panacea, there is a role for fishing quotas, seasonal regulations, 
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marine reserves and even eco-labels, such as the Marine Stewardship 
Council; but it is highly suggestive, that all those pieces of the puzzle 
need to be made to work together. Brady and Waldo call for a ―multi-
disciplinary approach‖ by integrating different management fixes (Brady 
& Waldo, 2009: 263), Gulbrandsen suggests governments help enable 
fisheries to meet better sustainability criteria by providing support, 
linking them to niche markets and organizing regulatory frameworks 
(Gulbrandsen, 2008: 658), so that they are eligible for certification 
schemes such as MSC. It is also important to constantly evaluate the 
effectiveness of all management initiatives. MSC itself has admitted to 
only being able to claim one clear biodiversity improvement as a result of 
its certification - ―the reduction in endangered seabird by-catch in the 
South Georgia Patagonian toothfish fishery‖ (Ward, 2008: 175), and this 
is not absolutely provable to be the sole result of MSC certification. The 
inability to isolate and measure direct causes and effects of policy 
instruments is even more reason why many different ideas and methods 
should be taken into account and used together in a way to enhance 
rather than defeat each other. Furthermore, these methods must be 
constantly adaptable to new information and aware of issues of equity to 
ensure a reasonable distribution of rights and wealth. This is particularly 
challenging, not only because it involves dynamism and respecting 
diversity, but also because time and money is often diverted to 
implementing, monitoring and enforcing instruments rather than 
evaluating end results and social impacts. 
Currently, there are more fisheries operating illegally and unreportedly 
than there are fisheries operating sustainably. Certification schemes such 
as MSC have yet to make any meaningful impact in the fishing industry, 
and it cannot be responsible for the preconditions necessary to make the 
scheme applicable to more fisheries, such as better laws, monitoring and 
well-defined fishing rights. Its aim is not to be a universal cure and by no 
means should it be the sole policy instrument in curbing the decline of 
our fish stocks. Action must be taken on the part of governments, 
industry and civil society, perhaps in ways that have not previously been 
considered. It is the responsibility of all actors to take part, as well-
considered initiatives are absolutely vital for the future of the fishing 
industry and the survival of life in our oceans. It is not only the delight 
of seafood dining at stake, but the livelihoods of millions of people and 
the marine ecosystems that we depend on for our food, air and water. 
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The ICC: a criminal court or 
mechanism for transitional justice?  
Reparations for victims of 
international criminal crimes:  
the ICC‟s biggest challenge 
CLARA ANGELICA GARCIA OROZCO 
(Colombia) 
 
 
 
In post-conflict situations where there has been gross violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law, reparations for victims 
play a pivotal role in ―satisfying victims-survivors‘ expectations of justice 
and redressing the serious harm caused them by structural injustices and 
political violence ―(Laplante & Theidon, 2007: 234). Indeed, reparations 
acknowledge and recognize the individual‘s suffering and place it within 
a new officially sanctioned history of trauma (Hamber & Wilson, 2002: 
5). Additionally, reparations labels responsibility and redirects the blame 
towards perpetrators relieving the moral ambiguity and guilt survivors 
often feel (op. cit.: 5). However, reparations for victims of international 
crimes has been treated as a subject of secondary importance in 
international law (Zegveld, 2010: 80). While, the punishment of 
individuals has received most of the attention, victim‘s rights and 
interests have been on the other hand ignored.  
The statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) made a huge 
step towards acknowledging victims‘ rights to reparations; however as 
Judge E. Odio Beni once mentioned ―Making [the reparations] 
provisions a reality for the thousands of victims remains [the Court‘s] 
biggest challenge.‖ (Clemens Nathan Research Centre and The Redress 
Trust 2007: 10). Thus, and taking into account that at least 1,200 victims 
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have filed applications for participation, how is the ICC going to handle 
the large number of victims appearing before it? (Zegveld, 2010: 93-96). 
Will the ICC in designing and implementing reparations play a role of a 
transnational justice mechanisms or will it conform itself in only being a 
criminal court? The purpose of the preset essay will be to explore some 
of the different discussions made by academics and NGOs concerning 
this issue and to highlight the different approaches that have been 
proposed. Hence, I will first, illustrate the current state of the right to 
reparation under international law, specifically under international 
criminal law, I will then mention some of the difficulties the ICC faces 
concerning reparations and the different approaches taken by some 
scholars and NGOs. Finally, I will assert why it is my belief that the ICC 
notwithstanding its current limitations, should consider itself as a 
mechanism of transitional justice and work its way in achieving this goal.  
THE RIGHT TO REPARATION FOR INDIVIDUALS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW  
Human Rights Law has been the primary field of international law where 
the right to reparation is recognized for individuals. In effect, many 
human rights treaties1 provide remedies for individuals that suffered 
harm for actions and omissions of state authorities (op. cit.: 82-83). 
However, individuals exercise these rights against a state and not against 
individuals.  
Under International Humanitarian Law states have been reluctant to 
recognize a right for victims to claim reparations (op. cit.: 83). 
Nevertheless, according to Zegveld a number of rules refer explicitly to 
concepts such as ‗rights‘, ‗entitlements‘ or ‗benefits‘ (op. cit.: 83).2 
Additionally, it has been asserted that Article 3 of the 1907 Hague 
Convention IV respecting the Laws and Customs of War provides a 
basis for claims brought by individuals when it states that: ―a belligerent 
party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the 
                                                 
1 See Article 63 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 14 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
2 See Articles 42 and 62 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, 1929 and Articles 7 and 8 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions, 1949. 
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case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for 
all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces‖ 
(Zegveld, 2010: 84). 
Notwithstanding the above, it is now widely accepted that individuals 
have the right to reparation under International Humanitarian Law. In 
effect, the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 2005 the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. According to the 
Resolution the principles do not create a right to reparation but 
acknowledges existing rights to reparation (UN. G.A Res. 60/147, 2006: 
3). Additionally, the international crimes that are under the jurisdiction of 
the ICC are considered gross violations of human rights and 
International Humanitarian Law, thus they are covered under by the 
Basic Principles (Clemens Nathan Research Centre and The Redress 
Trust –summarizing a presentation by Professor Theo Van Boven- 2007: 
17). Moreover, the Resolution mentions besides compensation, other 
forms of reparation such as: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction and guarantees of non repetition. 
Consequently, individuals who can be internationally criminally 
responsible of committing international crimes are also liable for the 
harm they have caused (Zegveld, 2010: 85). Hence, the right to 
reparation under international law can be exercised against an individual 
and by another individual. However, among the international criminal 
tribunals; only the ICC (Article 75 of the Statute) provides a full legal 
remedy. Under the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) there was only a provision concerning restitution of 
property and the possibility of victims to demand reparation was said to 
be through national courts (Security Council Resolution 827, 1993 and 
Security Council Resolution 977, 1995 of 25 and Article 106 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence of both tribunals 2010). The Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) on the other hand, 
provides some sort of remedies for victims but not as comprehensive as 
the ones provided by the ICC (Zegveld, 2010: 91). Finally, the statute of 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon leaves open the possibility for victims to 
bring an action for compensation in a Lebanese or other national court 
(S/RES/1757 2007: 21).  
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Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the judges of the tribunals 
recognized that justice required compensation and even suggested to the 
United Nations to create a special mechanism for reparations that will 
function alongside the tribunals (Secretary General, United Nations, 
2004: 19).  
THE ICC ITS REPARATION SCHEME, DIFFICULTIES AND LIMITATIONS  
Concerning the ICC, there were many objections by the drafters of the 
Statute regarding the reparations provision under Article 75 (American 
University, Washington College of Law, 2010: 23). Article 75 of the 
Rome Statute states that ―[t]he Court shall establish principles relating to 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation.‖ In effect, some opponents stressed 
that the provision will distract the court from its primary responsibility 
which is: to prosecute. Additionally, they were concerned about the issue 
that some judges were from different legal traditions and that in some 
domestic legal regimes reparations are not recognized by criminal law – 
there‘s a division between in criminal and civil law (op. cit.: 16). 
Nevertheless, a consensus emerged among the drafters of the statute that 
―[a] court whose exclusive focus was purely retributive would lack a 
dimension needed to deliver justice in a wider sense‖ and there was need 
to recognize that victims of international crimes not only had an interest 
in the prosecution of offenders ―but also an interest in restorative justice, 
whether in the form of compensation or restitution or otherwise‖ (ibid.).  
If we take into consideration that the ICC was meant also to have an 
impact in restorative justice this means that reparations will have a wider 
role and should besides compensation pursue recognition, civic trust, 
and social solidarity. But how can the ICC achieve all these goals? What 
are the discussions concerning this issue? Additionally, it is worth 
highlighting that even though reparations can constitute closure and final 
acceptance of loss it can also create some difficulties to survivors 
(Hamber and Wilson, 2002: 14). For example, some of the Madres of the 
Plaza de Mayo in Argentina were opposed to monetary reparations, since 
to accept reparation was for them to acknowledge death (ibid.). In 
addition, although reparations may well be necessary they will never be 
sufficient since ―resolution depends on how individuals personally 
engage in 'trauma work' at their own idiosyncratic pace‖ (op. cit.: 
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15).Hence, one has to bear in mind the complexities, difficulties and 
challenges inherent in designing and implementing reparations.  
Under the Statute of the ICC the Court may order individual 
reparations, collective reparations or some combination of the two 
(American University, Washington College of Law, 2010: 23). 
Additionally, though reparations are ordered against a convicted person 
the Court may order an award through the Trust Fund for Victims 
(TFV) (ibid.). It should be noted that the TFV was establish for the 
benefit of victims of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court 
and it has both, ― a function in the legal reparations scheme of the ICC 
as well as a humanitarian role, each of which tasks should be well 
distinguished‖ (Zegveld, 2010: 88).  
However, many details concerning the reparations scheme of the ICC 
were left unclear and article 75 of the statute mandates the Court to 
establish principles relating to reparations (American University, 
Washington College of Law, 2010: 23) Nonetheless, until present there‘s 
no public information about their development. In effect, many 
organizations and academics have recommended the ICC to ―proactively 
develop the principles…outside of the context of any single case and 
prior to the issuance of its first reparations award‖ (American University, 
Washington College of Law, 2010: 28; Wierda and Greiff, 2004: 11). 
Moreover, academics and NGO have expressed their concern about the 
capability of the Court in dealing with the design and implementation of 
reparations. In effect considerations of costs and administrative capacity 
have been mentioned as limitations for the ICC to overcome this 
challenge (Wierda and Greiff, 2004: 7; Zegveld, 2010: 93, American 
University, Washington College of Law, 2010: 29). Hence, in the 
following paragraphs some of the different approaches adopted by 
academics and NGO‘s concerning this issue will be explored.  
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO HOW THE ICC SHOULD IMPLEMENT 
REPARATIONS 
According to Greiff and Weirda due to the ICC‘s structure, purpose and 
nature, the Court will be only able to distribute reparations for a small 
number of victims (Wierda and Greiff, 2004: 7). Additionally, they assert 
that even if the ICC tries to do so it will create differences between the 
victims that reach the Court and those who do not but have received 
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some benefits from the Trust Fund. Thus, they propose that the Trust 
Fund which works under less narrow designed legal principles, designs 
and implements reparations programs which should have a wider goal 
than ensuring compensation (ibid.). Additionally, they consider that the 
TFV is more able to fully recognize victim‘s status by achieving victim‘s 
participation in the process (op. cit.: 2), consequently, they suggest that 
the TFV assumes ―the primary role in designs of reparations under the 
Rome regime‖ (op. cit.: 14).  
Others, such as Zegveld have express that taking into account the 
large number of victims that will approach the Court; the ICC could 
accept class actions (Zegveld, 2010: 93.) However, and by acknowledging 
that group litigation would limit the choices and options of individual 
victims Zegveld proposes separating criminal proceedings form civil 
proceedings as the correct formula (op. cit.: 97). For this author, in order 
to provide greater redress for victims of international crimes the creation 
of an international civil court may turn out to be a better alternative (Op. 
cit.: 111). According to Zegveld, this possibility will enable the ICC to 
concentrate on prosecution – its primary concern – and will overcome 
the limitation that the judges elected to be members of the Court would 
more probably not know how to deal with civil claims (op. cit.: 110).  
Additionally, others have expressed their concern about the omission 
of symbolic reparations (satisfaction) in the Statute (American 
University, Washington College of Law, 2010: 43; Mégret, 2008: 3) For 
Mégret, the absence of such form of reparations in the ICC context has 
its roots in the ―difficulty of transferring a regime of reparations devised 
for state responsibility, to the situation of individuals who have 
committed international crimes‖ (Mégret, 2010 : 3) However, he asserts 
that the not mentioning of symbolic reparations was more an omission 
than a exclusion and that individuals are not excluded under the Basic 
Principles for providing symbolic reparations, since the Principles start 
with a general affirmation of a right to remedies without conscribing it to 
any particular subject (op. cit.: 10-11). Moreover, for this author there‘s 
no invasion of individuals‘ conscience if the Court tries to encourage 
―offenders to learn the value of the rights they have violated by asking 
them to acknowledge and repudiate their crimes‖ (op. cit.: 12). 
Acknowledging that the Court can also ask for symbolic measures in 
a sense is acknowledging that the court can play a ―restorative‖ role (op. 
cit.: 13). Thus, the use of symbolic reparations by the Court will make it 
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resemble more a transitional mechanism. As Mégret mentioned ―What is 
at stake, behind the idea of symbolic reparations is more than simply 
adding another modality of reparation; it is changing the way in which a 
jurisdiction like the ICC thinks about reparations (op. cit.: 15). Hence, 
going beyond traditional compensation, the ICC and the Trust Fund will 
think of themselves ―not only as cogs in the machinery of international 
criminal law, but also as actors of transitional justice‖ (op. cit.: 16).  
On the other hand, others have expressed their concern about who 
will be the institution entitled to enforce reparations. For the Wierda and 
Greiff, since reparations represent the recognition of past wrong and the 
willingness to do things differently in the future, reparations should be 
―understood as coming in the name of a party that has standing in a 
conflict with whom relations need to be repaired‖. Hence, the ICC could 
have a role in defining principles or granting orders but its enforceability 
should be left to national courts. For these authors, ―any remedial 
actions taken by national courts will do more to bring a measure of 
recognition to victims than a program implemented exclusively by the 
ICC‖ (Wierda and Greiff, 2004: 8).  
Moreover, the debates concerning the ICC reparation scheme are not 
only about who will be the one responsible for repairing or the kinds of 
reparations that should be determined but also how these reparations are 
designed. Thus, for the American University ―determining the best 
combinations of the various forms of reparation should not occur in a 
vacuum (American University, Washington College of Law, 2010: 7). In 
effect, academics and NGO‘s agree that in determining what form and 
combination of reparations is more appropriate, victims and other 
stakeholders should be consulted. (op. cit.: 6)  
Consequently, it has been stressed that participation of victims in 
designing and implementing reparations programs are essential for 
ensuring that reparations are effective and meaningful (Correa et al. 
2009: 7). In addition, some authors have expressed that ―the very 
process of consultation with victims regarding their needs and desires in 
respect of reparations can contribute to victims healing‖ (ibid.).  
However, it should be noted that participation has many limitations 
and difficulties in practice. Since an homogenous community is very 
unlikely to exist, victim‘s heterogeneity should not be ignored and 
representation of victims should be ample as possible (op. cit.: 8 
).Additionally, if one takes into account that the Basic principles 
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mentions that ―individual circumstances‖ should be taking into 
consideration when determining reparations, the gender approach should 
also be contemplated. Nevertheless, there is little general understanding 
of what mainstreaming gender in reparations programs may require 
(Rubio-Marín, 2006: 23). Hence, the need to take into account the 
differential consequences suffered by many women (It should also be 
mentioned men and children), should lead to individualized 
determinations concerning the different forms of reparations (Shelton 
2010: 450) Consequently, Rubio-Marín has asserted that that the voices 
of women should be included in the reparations process (Rubio-Marín, 
2006: 28). He even goes further by stating that reparations can ―help to 
either reinforce or subvert some of the pre-existing structural gender 
inequalities that are commonly built into the social tissue of civil society 
resulting in women‘s systematic discrimination‖ (op. cit.: 25). In effect, 
the need of adopting a gender- sensitive approach to reparations 
programs is now one of the issues being discussed in the process of 
updating the Report of the United Nations on ―the rule of law and 
transitional justice conflict and post-conflict societies‖ (ICTJ, News, 
March 2011) . 
Is the Court capable of conducting consultations in order to design 
and implement reparations? Some have stressed that it is not. Weirda 
and Greiff, for example have explicitly mentioned that the Trust Fund 
should carry the task of consultations (Weirda and Greiff, 2004: 11). In 
similar sense the American University has suggested that in applying 
Rule 92 (2) of the Statute, the Trial Chamber who has complete 
discretion as to determine who are the experts in assisting the Court in 
processing and determining the reparations award, should consider 
appointing the TFV (American University, Washington College of Law, 
2010: 8).  
CONCLUSION 
The acknowledgment, respect and guarantee of the right to reparation of 
victims of international criminal crimes are essential for achieving justice 
and peace. Indeed, ―justice does not focus only on perpetrators but also 
on those who have suffered at their hands (Secretary General, United 
Nations 2004: 2). Nevertheless, this right can not only been satisfied by 
only offering monetary compensations. On the contrary, adopting a 
victim‘s central approach implies enquiring about the appropriate remedy 
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and the taking into account individual circumstances. In order to provide 
full and effective reparation the different forms of reparations should be 
borne in mind – restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction 
and guarantees of non-repetition (UN. G.A Res. 60/147). As expressed 
by Simpson, ―… credible approaches to reparation have the potential of 
a critical peace dividend which could contribute substantially to civic 
trust and to the durability of peace building‖ (Simpson, 2008: 77). 
The Statute of the ICC recognized for the first time the right to 
reparation for victims of international crimes against individual 
perpetrators. In effect, The Pre-Trail Chamber I in one of its first 
decisions stated that ―The reparations scheme provided for in the Statute 
is not only one of its unique features. It is also a key feature. In the 
Chamber‘s opinion, the success of the Court is, to some extent, linked to 
the success of its reparation system‖ (ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo 2006, Parra. 136)  
Thus, the ICC is faced with a huge challenge in delivering reparations. 
Expectations are high and many academic and NGOs, as it was 
mentioned above, consider the ICC as not only having a retributive but a 
restorative role. Hence, I do agree with Mégret when he states that going 
beyond traditional compensation, the ICC and the Trust Fund will think 
of themselves ―not only as cogs in the machinery of international 
criminal law, but also as actors of transitional justice ―(Mégret, 2006 : 
16).  
The ICC should not be considered as just one criminal court 
institution, it is more. It comprises a complex mechanism set in place to 
achieve justice in its broader sense (accountability for perpetrators and 
reparations for victims). When one refers to the ICC is not only 
refereeing to the Court as such, but the TFV, the Security Council, 
NGOs, the international community as a whole, and off course, the 
victims of gross violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law. All of them connect and give meaning to a broader 
notion of the International Criminal Court. Thus, even though, the 
Court has at present many limitations and is not seen by many as capable 
of providing adequate, effective and prompt reparations, it should, with 
the help of all the relevant stakeholders work its way towards achieving 
this goal. It is not an issue of matching expectations but of working and 
putting in place the reparations system provided in the Statute.  
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Until present the ICC has not made any determination about 
reparations for victims based on the fact that there‘s has not been any 
conviction. However, the ICC has the task of establishing principles 
regarding reparations and as suggested by the American University, this 
should be done before any determination of reparation takes place 
(American University, Washington College of Law, 2010: 28). Indeed, as 
was mentioned above, designing and implementing reparations is not an 
essay task. Many academics and NGOs have made several proposals as 
how the issue of reparations should be handled. Nevertheless, 
determining which one is the right way to go falls outside the purpose of 
this essay. On the contrary, what I Intended was to highlight the 
different discussions around this issue and to assert that if one wants 
reparations to be ―conflict-sensitive‖, meaning that reparations must be 
conceived in a way that facilitates reconciliation, rather than increasing 
divisiveness (op. cit.: 8) and make come true the restorative function of 
the ICC, the Court should, as the American Institute recommended, 
proactively develop the principles mentioned in Article 75 of the Statute.  
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Conventional wisdom supports the proposition that increased tenurial 
security and stable private property rights in favor of small-holder 
farmers are the prime catalysts for rural development. Dekker, for 
example, has stated that ―property rights that provide longer-term 
security will increase the demand for long-term investment and thereby 
establish the basis for an increase in farmers‘ assets‖ (2003: 83). The 
imagery of a farmer holding a document evidencing title and ownership 
of a parcel of land that he or she had once worked on as a tenant is a 
moving one indeed, and agrarian activists see in that imagery the 
culmination of a hard-fought struggle. With valid cause, certainly – in 
countries with unfinished land reform processes like the Philippines, 
land acquisition and subsequent redistribution are resisted at every turn, 
in many cases with violence routinely deployed, such that when a land 
title in the name of a former landowner is cancelled and re-registered in 
the name of the farmer-beneficiary, it is heralded as a major 
achievement.  
This paper argues that the seductive appeal of land registration in 
favor of small-holder farmers has obscured many of its attendant issues. 
It will look in particular at the case of the Philippines after the passage of 
Republic Act 9700, more popularly known as the Comprehensive 
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Agrarian Reform Program Extension and Reforms Law (from hereon, 
CARPER Law), in 2009 and offers the analysis that the current policy 
setting of the Philippines puts an inordinate emphasis on formal land 
tenure security, while only haphazardly addressing patterns and practices 
that bear more heavily on farmers‘ actual and material control over the 
land.  
In essence, the following question shall be answered: under what 
conditions shall a policy framework promoting individual land tenure 
lead to pro-poor rural development? 
REPUBLIC ACT 9700: A BRIEF BACKGROUND 
In 2008, funding for land acquisition and distribution was set to expire, 
and while the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 did not 
come with an expiration date, termination of funding to compensate 
landowners effectively meant that no new acquisitions could be made. 
The balance of undistributed landholdings – 1.3 million hectares, in total 
– presented a serious problem, especially when many of these 
landholdings were in agrarian hotspots and distribution was stymied 
because of fierce landowner resistance. Farmers and land rights activists 
also feared that the failure to pass a new law would be construed as the 
absence of any legal basis for the continued assertion of farmers‘ rights, 
and so came together to campaign for the passage of a new agrarian 
reform law. Activists supportive of state-sponsored land reform also 
shared a common belief that the conjuncture presented an opportunity 
to insert new reforms based on historical lessons from the ground. 
After a contentious legislative process, R.A. 9700 was signed by then 
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. It gave agrarian reform fresh 
funding for a new five-year term, extended the mandate for acquisition 
and distribution, and incorporated a panoply of reforms, including the 
indefeasibility of the Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (also known 
as CLOAs or land titles given under to agrarian reform beneficiaries), the 
elimination of the Voluntary Land Transfer method, which has often 
been used by landowners to retain ownership of the land via dummy 
beneficiaries, the granting of usufructuary rights to potential farmer-
beneficiaries, as well gender-related provisions that recognize the rights 
of female farmers. Walden Bello, an international activist and current 
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Member of the Philippine Congress as representative of AKBAYAN 
Partylist, had said:  
―I believe that given the balance of forces in the country today, those who 
voted for CARPER made the right choice. This was the best piece of 
agrarian reform legislation we could come up with at this historical 
juncture, given the correlation of class power.‖ (2009) 
Indeed, given the size of undistributed landholdings, an agrarian 
reform law is still better than not having a law at all, and many of the 
reforms in the new law are truly articulations of grassroots demands and 
responses to historical inequities. Land laws though are not neutral 
instruments (Borras & Franco, 2008: 1), and must be examined against 
the contextual backdrop and policy contours on which it operates. I look 
at three dimensions that impact on and must be considered during any 
analysis of tenure policy. I argue that the state predisposition towards 
these three dimensions determine the degree to which individual land 
tenure policy can lead to – or indeed, detract from – pro-poor rural 
development. These are: (1) redistribution, (2) collective tenure and (3) 
land commodification and agri-business.  
LAND REDISTRIBUTION: INDEFEASIBLE INDIVIDUAL LAND TITLES – BUT 
FOR WHOM? 
I argue that provisions establishing title indefeasibility only become 
meaningful when coupled with a genuinely transformative redistribution 
policy. I argue further that the current policy embodied in the new 
agrarian law, CARPER, may not lead to effective redistribution, and 
quite possibly, lead to land reconcentration. 
 An absolute, non-negotiable requirement of a genuine and 
transformative land reform policy is landowner non-interference in 
beneficiary selection. This means that under no circumstance must the 
previous landowner be involved in the process of the screening of 
agrarian reform beneficiaries. I explain this point further by referring to 
two particular provisions in CARPER – the provision on indefeasibility 
of title, and the provision on the attestation clause.  
Much to-do has been made about a provision in CARPER that reads 
as follows: 
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―… Provided that the Emancipation Patents, the Certificates of Land 
Ownership Award, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform 
program shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible after one (1) year from 
its registration with the Office of the Registry of Deeds, subject to the 
conditions, limitations and qualifications of this Act, the Property 
Registration Decree, and other pertinent laws. the Emancipation Patents 
or the Certificates of Land Ownership Award being titles brought under 
the operation of the Torrens System, are conferred with the same 
indefeasibility and security afforded to all titles under the said system …‖ 
This has been lauded as one of the landmark achievements of 
CARPER, as it addresses several cases of titles being cancelled and the 
land in question reverting back to the original holder or sold to another 
person. It is an amendment that was fought for and won by agrarian 
advocates in the Philippines.  
And yet, buried inside the legal text is another amendment that reads 
as follows: 
―Provided, finally, as mandated by the Constitution, R.A. No. 6657 and 
R.A. no. 3844, only farmers (tenants or lessees) and agricultural 
farmworkers actually tilling the lands, as certified under oath by the 
Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) and attested by the 
landowner, are the qualified beneficiaries1.‖ 
Making landowner attestation a prerequisite to qualify beneficiaries is 
not simply a problem of adding another tedious step in the process of 
land acquisition and distribution; rather, it reworks the entire paradigm 
of agrarian reform – a social justice measure founded on the theory that 
the police power of the State is superior to and can operate independent 
of adverse private interests. It ignores the class tensions and the 
imbalance of power relations between landowner and tenant. In fact, 
before the passage of RA 9700, never in the history of agrarian reform 
law has the landowner been privy to the process of beneficiary selection. 
The logic behind this is simple: when we make one crucial step of the 
process dependent on an entity whose interest is precisely to stop the 
process, the process itself is held hostage and there is much havoc to be 
wrought.  
                                                 
1 Sec 7, of RA 6657 as amended by RA 9700. 
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Combined together with the provision on indefeasibility, the net 
result is a policy regime wherein land titles and private property rights are 
secure, but they are only secure for a privileged subset – those who are 
considered legitimate by the landowner. In a situation wherein the 
landowner either (1) attests only friendly beneficiaries who would be 
amenable to any ―arrangement‖ offered by the former, or (2) uses 
attestation as leverage against genuine farmer beneficiaries to compel 
them to agree to – for instance – a corporate farming scheme, an 
indefeasibility clause may in fact be a case of rendering indefeasible that 
which must be defeated, irreversibly legitimizing that which in truth 
should be declared illegitimate. 
 In Negros Occidental, a province in Central Philippines known for 
being an agrarian reform hotspot, the landowner corporation had moved 
to exclude potential farmer beneficiaries on the ground that they were 
allegedly not its tenants. After the titles had been distributed to the 
―legitimate tenants‖, they claimed indefeasibility of title to repel 
inclusion-exclusion proceedings (proceedings to re-examine the list of 
beneficiaries to remove spurious names, and to add names of qualified 
farmers who were inadvertently omitted).  
Another point that has to be made is that even for those who had 
been granted titles and these titles have attained indefeasibility, their 
security of tenure – in a real and operational sense, i.e., true capacity to 
exercise control and management over their landholding – may be 
vulnerable. The fact that they would not have been beneficiaries but for 
the attestation of the landowner creates a nexus between the two parties, 
or reinforces the nexus that had been there as a result of generations of 
tenancy. It is precisely this nexus that agrarian reform should seek to cut, 
and not strengthen. With this connection, and taking to account the 
asymmetric power relations, it becomes easier to trap the beneficiaries 
into arrangements that will ultimately result into loss of effective control 
of the landholding. 
The mischief therefore of looking at land tenure security policy 
independent of the other policies, politics and forces that surround it 
becomes apparent. It is difficult to imagine anything more tragic than a 
policy measure fought for and celebrated by activists, social movements 
and people‘s organizations mutating into another form of parliamentary 
enclosure – enclosing and protecting the rights of a few, while excluding 
the vast defenseless majority.  
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INDIVIDUAL LAND TENURE AND COLLECTIVE LAND TENURE: CO-EQUAL OR 
HIERARCHICAL? 
Another demonstrable feature of CARPER is an explicit bias towards 
individual property rights, rather than collective land tenure. The law lays 
down several conditions for collective ownership such as that ―the 
potential beneficiaries are currently not farming individual parcels but 
collectively work on large contiguous areas‖ (Section 25, c.) or that ―the 
farm consists of multiple crops being farmed in an integrated manner or 
includes non-crop production areas that are necessary for the viability of 
farm operations, such as packing plants, storage areas, dikes, and other 
similar facilities that cannot be subdivided or assigned to individual 
farmers‖ (Section 25, d.) The law likewise requires that ―with regard to 
existing collective certificates of land ownership award, the DAR should 
immediately undertake the parcelization of said Certificates of Land 
Ownership Award, particularly those that do not exhibit the conditions 
for collective ownership outlined above.‖ (Section 25) 
It must be emphasized that these set of provisions espousing 
individual titling was not in the old agrarian reform law even in 
embryonic form, was not pushed by agrarian advocates, certainly not by 
the landowner bloc, and could not even be said to be legislative 
articulations of executive policies (e.g., memorandum circulars of the 
Department of Agrarian Reform) or of jurisprudence. How then has 
such a key policy measure managed to find its way into a law where 
practically every word, every provision was a veritable battleground 
between stakeholders from all sides? 
CARPER establishes a clear policy of ―parcelization‖ into individual 
titles of collective tenure arrangements – thereby looking at such 
collective tenure arrangements as either (1) inferior to, or (2) only a step 
towards the ―ideal‖ individual title systems. What this point to is the fact 
that the primacy of individual titling over collective titling has remained 
largely uncontested and uninterrogated in the Philippine policy 
framework, reflecting perhaps the orthodox belief that individual 
property rights provide more security and stability. Indeed, aside from 
ancestral domain and lands under stewardship, government is doing 
away with any form of collective arrangement – perceived to be a mass 
of ―messy‖ and ―illegible‖ (Scott, 1998: 24) relations that do not arrange 
itself nicely into the rubik‘s cube of the free market.  
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Even the ways in which these arrangements are framed reveal certain 
biases. Collective tenure are often described as ―traditional‖ and 
―indigenous‖, thus flagging a need to transition to more modern (read: 
Western) type of arrangements. Dekker is illustrative of this thinking, to 
wit: 
―To establish legitimate ownership rights to land in Eastern European or 
Central Asian countries, often a ―Western style‖ legal system is imported. 
It is not likely that such a system would evolve over time because of the 
understandable wish to establish a market economy as quickly as possible. 
But in order to be appreciated and understood in the local situation, it is 
necessary to translate the legal concept as nearly as possible in the local 
language and social context, and to train local legal specialists.‖ (2003: 62) 
The premise of this statement is not difficult to see: that a Western 
style system is more superior and is ―universally desired‖, that a market 
economy en pronto is an ―understandable wish‖, and that the imported 
legal concept must be translated into (rather than adjust to or defer to) 
the local context and vernacular. The error of such a premise has been 
well-documented, indeed even in the Philippines, where Borras (2005: 
41) has written at length about the failures of the World Bank 
experiment on Market-Led Agrarian Reform. 
INDIVIDUAL TITLING AS PRECURSOR TO LAND COMMODIFICATION 
In truth, the legal logic of land ownership includes the right to dispose 
of, or in any manner, transact the property. To be able to sell or lease or 
mortgage, one must first own the thing which is to be sold or leased or 
mortgaged. The sale, lease or mortgage that follows is presumed to be 
the product of rational deliberation, of a negotiation between two equals 
who will both benefit, and with the end towards the maximization of 
profit and individual welfare. That assumes however, that the 
transactions that take place are sterile, and devoid of asymmetric 
information and other factors that tend to prejudice one party – the 
weaker party – to the transaction. Too, this assumes that the decision to 
sell, mortgage or lease was not done under any pressure or duress. That 
these options may actually be beneficial for the farmer is an oft-repeated 
theme, with the World Bank being its prime proponent. To quote the 
Bank itself in its report: ―Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can It 
Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?‖  
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―Third, if payments for land are made or if advantageous opportunities 
exist for non-agricultural employment, small farmers, especially those with 
limited management skills or access to capital, may increase their welfare 
by renting their land to an investor. A land rental payment can be 
computed that, for a given (exogenous) wage rate, would leave a small 
landowner indifferent between self-cultivation and renting out the land 
and working for wages on a large farm.‖ (2010: 25) 
What the World Bank appears to suggest is that not only would it be 
beneficial for farmers to rent out or sell their land, it might also be to 
their interests if they are transformed as wage labor provided 
―advantageous opportunities‖ are made available to them. I argue that, in 
rural areas, this assumes too much.  
An illustrative example is a case in Biliran, an impoverished province 
in the Visayas region of the Philippines, where the farmers were all 
holders of Certificate of Land Ownership Awards. Drowning in debt 
and with no support services coming from the government, they eagerly 
accepted an offer made by a biofuels corporation to lease their lands for 
less than 100 euros per hectare, per year, for ten years. They were paid 
the money upfront and jatropha production sites were set up. 
Unfortunately, within days, the news of new money had spread, and loan 
sharks swooped down on the recipients of cash, eager to settle old debts. 
In the end, the farmers end up with no land, no cash, no resources – 
only paper titles that have, according to the letter of the law, acquired 
indefeasibility. 
This example, one among many examples not only in the Philippines, 
but also in the world, throws into question the entire paradigm 
articulated most famously by De Soto (2000), who argued essentially that 
land property rights should be embodied in formalized titles so that they 
may be standardized instruments of exchange in the market place. I 
argue that formalized titles, without first addressing asymmetric power 
relations and how these relations impact on transactions, will only lead to 
land reconcentration and the deepening of rural poverty.  
In the Philippines, efforts to push for a law allowing the use of 
farmland as collateral have not abated. Under current law, farmers may 
only sell or collateralize their land after ten years from receipt of title. 
There have been several moves to amend this law and allow the use of 
farmland as collateral – the former President herself, Gloria Macapagal 
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Arroyo pushed this in her state of the nation address. This, she had said, 
will reinvigorate the agriculture sector and allow farmers access to credit. 
A Filipino lawyer who works for the Dutch Development Bank in The 
Hague had intimated that development organizations are often 
―frustrated at the Philippines‖ for its ―unreasonable‖ restrictions on 
agricultural lands, and are pushing actively for more liberalized policies, 
as if the policies are not liberal enough as they were.  
The ultimate end of this of course, is a thoroughly market-mediated 
system where considerations of equity are subservient to the efficiency of 
the global corporate enterprise. In this regard, individual titles are not 
ends, but are means towards achieving a free market model where the 
commodification of land and the integration of peasants into the global 
value chain plays a crucial, if not central, role. In many instances, 
contrary to orthodox assertions, the integration into the global value 
chain will not better the lives of farmers; rather it will lead to further 
proletariatization and marginalization. Central to this argument is the 
understanding that farmers falling into the cracks of a market-mediated 
system is not a tragic accident of the system, it serves a functional 
purpose. It provides for the system a desperate mass of individuals 
willing to (1) provide cheap farm labor to corporate farming enterprises, 
and (2) free up agricultural lands through a panoply of one-sided lease/ 
leaseback arrangements to temporarily relieve themselves from the yoke 
of poverty. 
In such a situation, individual titles are not a way out of poverty, but a 
cynical mechanism that will facilitate easier and smoother integration 
into the corporate enterprise. 
CONCLUSION 
Now therefore it must be asked: are there conditions, and if so what are 
these, in which individual land registration can lead to genuine pro-poor 
development?  
Cotula & Vermeulen (2010: 912-913) have argued that improved land 
rights, even when ―combined with enhanced ability to exert these rights‖ 
alone do not necessarily lead to better outcomes for the farmers; rather, 
issues of consultation and consent must be dealt with in more genuine 
and committed ways. Borras & Franco agree, and added an important 
critical point : 
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―Secure property rights should not a priori, only or always, mean private 
property rights; in many parts of the world, an inductive approach is 
needed that is based on a deep understanding of the societies where 
intervention is targeted and makes ―socially legitimate occupation and use 
rights, as they are currently held and practiced, the point of departure for 
both their recognition in law and for the design of institutional 
frameworks for mediating competing claims and administering land.‖ 
(2010: 518) 
Taking off from these two insights, this paper wishes to add to the 
discourse by specifying the conditions under which secure property 
rights can lead to pro-poor development.  
First, pro-poor development under an individual titling system may be 
possible if there is genuine redistribution where secure property rights 
are used to preserve the gains of agrarian reform and prevent land 
reconsolidation by the landed elite. Here, titling is the culmination of a 
zero-sum game. Beneficiaries are genuine beneficiaries selected through 
an equitable process with no landowner intervention, and titling will not 
be merely granting imprimatur to a shoddy process, and be used as a 
mechanism to privilege some at the expense of others. 
Second, titling may be useful and beneficial when it is but one 
component of an integrated rural development framework that 
accommodates and respects other tenurial systems (collective, 
customary). It is but an option in a plethora of options and benefits shall 
not be conferred or denied on the basis of whether a land has been titled 
or not. 
Third, and most importantly, a titling system should be an end in 
itself, and not a means to facilitate land commodification or assist the 
grinding wheels of the corporate project. The tragedy of allowing people 
to own land so that it would be easier for them to lose it could well be 
the global capitalist enterprise‘s best sleight of hand.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper will explore the achievements of the International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in 
the September of 1994, and its relevance in understanding and 
transforming HIV risks and vulnerabilities among young people in the 
Pacific Island Country (PIC) of Vanuatu. It will proceed in three 
sections. Firstly, this paper will offer a brief critical review of the 
achievements of the ICPD, as articulated in the Programme of Action 
(PoA). Secondly, this paper will elaborate on constructivist perspectives 
of ‗being young‘ and ‗being sexual‘ – given that these perspectives are 
fundamental to the epistemological shift championed by the ‗Cairo 
Consensus‘, and thus critical to how the Consensus is interpreted here. 
Thirdly and finally, this paper will turn its attention to a specific context 
and cohort: young people in Vanuatu. Given that young people are 
situated at the nexus of a global AIDS pandemic, and that 59% of 
Vanuatu‘s population is under 24 (VYPP, 2008: 14), Vanuatu‘s civil and 
state leadership face an urgent need for holistic analysis of young 
people‘s HIV risks and vulnerabilities – if they are to go beyond 
individual-level approaches and instead tackle the socio-structural factors 
which underpin them. Thus informed by Cairo‘s PoA, this paper will 
illustrate the relevance of an ecological framework in achieving such a 
holistic analysis. Briefly sketched, this analysis will highlight an urgent 
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need to upscale participatory programming that reflects young people‘s 
complex social realities – and permit a closing call for multi-sectoral and 
community-wide commitment to transforming barriers to young 
people‘s health.  
THE CAIRO CONSENSUS 
In hailing the ICPD a ‗landmark‘ and ‗ground-breaking event‘, its 
advocates recognise the ‗Cairo Consensus‘ as a radical departure from 
the ―demographic target setting and virtual exclusion of women‘s voices‖ 
which characterised the preceding population conferences at Bucharest 
in 1974 and Mexico City in 1984 (Dixon-Mueller & Germain, 2000: 70). 
While most certainly ―representing a political victory for women‖ (op. 
cit.: 69), the ICPD‘s Programme of Action (PoA) – or Cairo Consensus 
– articulates principles for a holistic and multi-disciplinary approach to 
people-centred development (and distancing from population control), 
and as such has an equity-oriented universal reach which seeks to 
empower females and males of all ages – including the diverse social 
category of ‗youth‘.  
The most pertinent achievements of the Cairo Consensus, for the 
purposes of this paper, will be summarised as three-fold (as interrelated 
rather than discrete). Firstly, the ICPD‘s core success lies undoubtedly in 
the introduction of concepts such as gender, empowerment and 
women‘s health into mainstream population policy discourses (Sen & 
Batliwila, 2000: 15), and in thus placing a human-rights oriented 
approach to reproductive health (encompassing sexual health) at the 
heart of the development agenda (Dixon-Mueller & Germain, 2000: 70). 
Secondly, and by extension, the Cairo Consensus signalled a move 
towards integrating HIV services with sexual and reproductive health 
programming. While this may appear obvious, various political agendas 
continuously vie to separate one from the other – in turn undermining 
efficacy of service provision (ShareNet, 2004: 6). Thirdly, and perhaps 
implicit in the above, the Cairo Consensus shifted attention from 
impersonal, demographic number-crunching to an emphasis on the 
social ecology in which sexual and reproductive practices are embedded 
– as shaped, constrained or enabled. That is to say, it emphasised the 
analysis and transformation of environments in which people live, rather 
than seeing people as the locus of problems themselves. 
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The ICPD is not without its critics – who maintain, for instance, that 
in directing attention to women and men‘s rights, the ICPD detracts 
attention (and thus resources) from the urgently unsustainable nature of 
high population growth rates facing many societies and their 
governments. In acknowledging this critical perspective, this paper notes 
that the considerable ‗global population challenge‘ serves to underwrite 
the necessity of principled guidelines for just and sustainable 
development – as testified by thousands of women subjected to 
involuntary and un-anaesthetised sterilisation in the name of population 
control (Dhanraj, 1991) – and an expanding of what Dixon-Mueller and 
Germaine call the ‗demographic imagination‘ (2000). In acknowledging 
the inextricable links between reproductive health, sustainable 
environment and economic development, Dixon-Mueller and Germaine 
argue that the ‗demographic imagination‘ must make space for a holistic 
conceptualisation of population and development. This is precisely the 
remit of the Cairo Consensus. 
Other critics highlight a disjuncture between rhetoric and reality – 
questioning if a ‗paradigm shift‘ within international policy can reflect 
and transform realities on the ground. Indeed, the State of World 
Population Report 2010 refers to a ‗slowing of progress‘ in productive 
health, mired by ―persistent inequalities that must be overcome to attain 
universal access to reproductive health care‖ (UNFPA, 2010: 93). This 
paper views a ‗post-OPC era‘ as one characterised by the challenge of 
transforming Cairo‘s policy into practice for women and men in diverse 
environments, and with the value derived from a set of progressive and 
internationally endorsed principles and targets. Moreover, it contends 
that Cairo‘s key concepts are crucial for this task precisely because of 
their real-world grounding. These concepts have been ―derived from 
realities of women‘s lives worldwide; have grown organically from the 
theorising… and because they have been found useful… at field and 
policy levels‖ (Sen & Batliwala, 2000:15). 
A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON BEING YOUNG AND SEXUAL 
In expressing a need to analyse and transform the social environment in 
which young people‘s sexual health is compromised, the Cairo 
Consensus expresses a feminist constructivist perspective of what it 
means to be young and to be sexual. The Consensus defends, among 
other things, a young person‘s right ―to have a healthy and pleasurable 
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sexual life free of disease, violence, disability, fear and unnecessary pain 
or death associated with sexuality and reproduction‖ (Dixon-Mueller & 
Germain, 2005: p.71).1 This speaks directly to a young person‘s right to 
freedom from HIV risk and vulnerability. Fulfilment of sexual health 
depends partly on access to sexual health care… 
―The purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations, 
and not merely counselling and care related to reproduction and sexually 
transmitted diseases.‖ (art 7.2).  
In recognition of governmental responsibilities to provide this health 
care, a section of the PoA specifically bids governments …  
―To promote to the fullest extent the health, well-being and potential of all 
children, adolescents and youth as representing the world's future human 
resources.‖2 (art 6.7) 
Moreover, the PoA makes specific reference to young people‘s 
reproductive health… 
―To meet the special needs of adolescents and youth… (including) high 
quality reproductive health services.‖3 (art 6.7b)  
Note that for the PoA, reproductive health is defined as encompassing 
sexual health (7.2). Furthermore, HIV services are explicitly deemed 
integral components of reproductive and sexual health services (art 7.32). 
Thus, Cairo‘s PoA bids governments to ensure young people have access 
to HIV services which are integrated with reproductive and sexual health 
(RSH) care.  
If we are to consider the implications of these principles for a specific 
case (eg: HIV risk and vulnerability among ni-Vanuatu youth) we must 
begin by conceptualising the heterogeneity of youth and the multiplicities 
                                                 
1 Thus articulated, the inextricable relations between HIV and sexual wellbeing 
are indeed obvious, yet the respective spheres had long been disassociated for 
political reasons 
2 It is noteworthy that when government is identified as a duty-bearer, the value 
of meet-ing the duty is articulated in economic terms 
3 It is noteworthy that young people‘s sexual health is subsumed here under 
reproductive health – an implication being that parties to the PoA conceptualise 
young people as asexual. 
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of meaning sex may have in their lives – and thus infuse our 
understanding of the ‗Cairo Consensus‘ with the complexities entailed in 
localising it. While ‗youth‘ is popularly conceived as a life-phase between 
childhood and adulthood (and needn‘t be so), no universal markers 
signal the onset and finale of youth nor define its contours. For instance, 
the UN recognises youth as 15–24, but a country‘s national youth policy 
may extend to individuals aged 30 or 35,4 for instance. ‗Youth‘, then, is 
not a necessary, normative age-based phenomena or unified realm of 
human experience. Rather, ―(y)outh is a social construction with social 
meaning‖ (Jones, 2009: 1) and as such, is ―differently constituted and 
configured in time and place‖ (Christensen et al 2006:10). What it means 
to be young is contextually forged by a host of socio-cultural, economic 
and political forces permeated by gender norms – not the least of which 
is the agency of young people themselves to ―negotiate, resist and shape 
the meaning of youth‖ within the prevailing power relations of their 
worlds (Wyn & Woodman, 2006: 497). Thus a constructivist perspective 
urges policy makers to go beyond age-based demarcations as demanded 
by logisticians, and to instead strive ―to understand the constitution and 
dynamics of youth by positioning it within the social contexts and 
situations that it is actualised in‖ (Christiansen et al. 2006: 11).5 
Indeed, the challenge to policy makers articulated above (by 
constructivist perspectives on youth) is analogous to that posed by 
constructivist perspectives of sex and sexuality. In challenging the 
dominant ‗demographic imagination‘ in Cairo, the ICPD challenged an 
essentialist conception of sex pervasive in Western development 
discourses. This conception is based upon naturalist assumptions of sex 
                                                 
4 For instance, the National Youth Policies of Uganda and Ghana, respectively. 
5 It is also worth noting that, when it comes to young people‘s sexual and 
reproductive wellbeing, the Cairo PoA is not an isolated document. For 
instance, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art. 24) 
affirms that children (aged up to 18) have a right to attain the highest standards 
of health and health care – including family planning education and services. 
This was elaborated in 2003 to oblige states to ―provide adolescents with access 
to sexual and reproductive information, including on… the pre-vention of 
HIV/AIDS and prevention and treatment of STIs‖(). Meanwhile, an example 
of regional standards pertaining to the RSH of Pacific youth can be found in 
The Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States, among others (Africa). 
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as a ‗unified domain of human experience‘ and ‗natural force‘ which can 
be taken for granted. According to Correa and Jolly (2008), an apparent 
silence on the subject of sex in development discourses in fact speaks of 
an unexamined assumption that sex is a natural, individual and 
fundamentally heterosexual preference and behaviour. This assumption 
privileges one conceptualisation of what it means to be sexual, and 
obscures the ―distortions of choice and desire that result from cultural 
constructs such as gender and sexual norms‖ (op. cit.: 24). In turn, it 
obscures the power relations inextricably linked to gender and sexual 
relations – and becomes a silently pervasive hegemonic ideology. By 
establishing sex and sexuality as predetermined phenomena, this 
hegemony leaves little recourse for social change, democracy or self-
determination (op. cit.: 23). Thus, the Cairo call for reproductive and 
sexual health and rights was a call to counter the dominant ‗demographic 
imagination‘ with constructivist perspectives of sex and sexuality. 
It is further interesting to note that essentialist notions of sex underlie 
biomedical approaches to HIV (op. cit.: 22), and lurk behind binary 
representations of youth as ‗makers and breakers‘ (Comaroff & 
Comaroff, 2005: 20). That is, youth as the embodiment of a hopeful 
future (with restrained, civilised sexual appetites) or harbingers of 
danger, deviance and disorder (with unrestrained, turbulent sexualities). 
Such representations obscure the heterogeneity of young people and 
their sexuality as they navigate between various poles, amidst a 
multiplicity of socio-structural forces. 
HIV & YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE PACIFIC: AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Thus informed by a social constructivist perspective, a compelling 
feature of the Cairo Consensus is its attention to analysing and 
transforming the wider social environment in which young people‘s 
sexuality is embedded – including their vulnerability to HIV (Dixon-
Mueller & Germain, 2000: 70). One analytical tool designed to permit 
such investigation is an ecological model – as articulated in Ricardo et al. 
20056 – which depicts ‗multiple levels‘ of environmental factors with the 
                                                 
6 Vulnerability is conceptualised here as exposure to risk of HIV, or exposure 
to risk-enhancing factors which impact upon young people, and which arise 
from wider socio-cultural conditions and political economy. To conceptualise 
of… 
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subject in the centre. From the centre working outwards, we see the 
interpersonal, the structural (including broader society), and the socio-
cultural (including gender norms) – all of which exist in perpetual 
interaction. By situating the individual in the centre, an ecological 
framework offers a youth-centred approach to representing a young 
person‘s agentive engagement in co-constructing their worlds. 
Meanwhile, it mitigates an over-emphasis upon agency (which may 
implicitly blame young people for risks arising from socio-structural 
forces) by acknowledging the wider processes which shape, enable and 
constrain an individual‘s health seeking behaviours. This schema is 
designed to highlight the ―nexus of individual and social context‖, and to 
enable us to trace how vulnerabilities are formed through social 
processes. An inherent failing of this schema is an implicit suggestion 
that each ‗level‘ is discrete, self-contained and prescribed – when in fact 
they are inextricably interwoven and organically inter-generative. For 
instance, gender norms belong to Ricardo‘s ‗outer‘ socio-cultural sphere, 
but permeate all aspects of the model as a leading social factor 
underlying sexual behaviours (Ricardo et al. 2005: 65). 
To proceed, this paper will employ Ricardo‘s ecological model to 
briefly illustrate the ways in which young people‘s sexuality (including 
HIV risk and vulnerabilities) are embedded in wider socio-cultural 
circumstances and political economy – in turn demanding an integrated 
and participatory model of sexual and reproductive health. It will focus 
upon young people in the Pacific Island Country (PIC) of Vanuatu, 
where people under 24 comprise 59% of the population (VYPP, 2008: 
14). A recent report entitled Understanding HIV Risk and Vulnerability 
among Vanuatu Youth7 indicates condom usage at 41% among young 
                                                                                                                   
 …vulnerability entirely at an individual-level can be to situate the problem in 
the person – or to imply that vulnerabilities are constituted by a set of (or lack 
of) personal attrib-utes, or an absence of agency (Hollomotz, 2007). 
7 This paper was released in May 2011 by UNICEF and the Vanuatu Ministry 
of Health. The report‘s data was generated through purposive sampling of 
sexually active young people in 2 provinces of Vanuatu. Rather than targeting a 
cross-section of society as a whole, this study selected a cross-section of most at 
risk adolescents and young people (MARA/YP), especially vulnerable 
adolescents and young people (EVA/YP), as well as mainstream youth. The 
terms are used in accordance with interna-tional standards (UN definitions). 
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people aged 15–24,8 with forced sex reported by 60% of females and 
28% of males. Meanwhile, a range of factors (including endemic STIs,9 
low condom usage and highly mobile populations) signal that HIV 
prevalence will rapidly spread should it become established (McMillan & 
Worth, 2011: 314). Given that young people account for a significant 
percentage of new HIV infections globally, ni-Vanuatu aged 15–24 have 
been identified as a target audience for HIV prevention (McMillan & 
Worth, 2011: 313). Nonetheless, for the aforementioned surveillance 
data to yield meaningful policy insights, it must be considered in the 
wider socio-cultural context from which it derived. The following is a 
brief sketch of how such an analysis may be done, allowing space for 
discussion.  
Sociocultural Sphere 
An analysis of the socio-cultural sphere which shapes the lives of young 
Ni-Vanuatu must entail an exploration of socio-cultural gender norms – 
as they are ―among the strongest underlying social factors that influence 
sexual behaviours‖ and permeate all aspects of the ecological model 
(Ricardo et al. 2005 65). For instance, young ni-Vanuatu are socialised in 
a patriarchal and hierarchical social order wherein women are 
traditionally considered inferior to male kin and partners, and have 
―limited bargaining power over when and how they have sex‖ – 
including whether the sex is protected (Zenner & Russel, 2005). 
Similarly, cultural taboos on sex, as enforced by male leadership, serve to 
impede HIV awareness among women and young people, especially in 
rural areas (VYPP, 2008). Gender norms are not static, however, but are 
shifting and contested. According to a UN Commission on HIV in the 
Pacific, ―young people are at the forefront of rapid social changes‖ (as 
articulated below) which undermine traditional norms and manifest in 
new sexual behaviours (UN, 2009: 42).  
                                                 
8 Participants indicated condom usage during last high risk sex – that is, with 
non-monogamous partner 
9 Region wide, chlamydia is believed that chlamydia affects approximately 20% 
of women (UNDP, 2009) 
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Structural Sphere 
An analysis of the structural sphere may scrutinise health care, social 
policy and economic opportunity; acknowledging that ―(f)or young 
people, economic disempowerment has important implications for their 
sexual behaviour‖ (Ricardo et al. 2005: 67) and that poverty is closely 
associated with increased exposure to risk of HIV (UNDP, 2009). 
Indeed, a distinctive backdrop of rapid socio-economic change 
characterises the lives of Vanuatu‘s post-independence generation(s).10 
This has entailed entry into the global market economy; rapid migration 
and urbanisation; a shift away from traditional rural, subsistence 
livelihoods and kastom;11 the weakening of extended family networks; and 
shifting of traditional authority (VYPP, 2008; McMillan & Worth, 2011). 
With strains on education provision and health services, growing 
numbers of urban-dwelling young people face unemployment, 
impoverishment and poverty of opportunity (UNDP, 2009).  
Interpersonal Sphere 
Relations with family, peers and sexual partners, as well as chief and 
pastors, are all essential foci for analysis in the interpersonal sphere. Of 
all external factors, these relations can have a substantial impact on 
young people‘s sexuality. For instance, as a primary social institution, the 
family plays a powerful role in socialising young people in gender norms 
(eg: men as decision-makers) which may later be expressed in intimate 
relationships (eg: men deciding upon condom use for safe sex) (Ricardo 
et al 2005: 69). This reflects the permeation of the socio-cultural realm 
throughout the ecological model. Meanwhile, multiple studies show 
friends and peers as primary sources of sex information for ni-Vanuatu 
youth, who thus exert a direct influence on behaviours and attitudes 
surrounding sex, including condom use (UNDP, 2009: 17). Indeed, the 
Vanuatu Young People‘s Project (VYPP) observes ―great scope for peer 
counselling and peer education (VYPP, 2008: 60). 
                                                 
10 Vanuatu achieved independence in 1989 from the colonial rule of a British-
French Con-dominium. 
11 Kastom (in Bislama) is commonly translated as ‗custom‘, and is a term 
imbued with meaning. It is used in reference to any belief or behaviour which is 
quintessentially ni-Vanuatu, or which has resonance with a sense of traditional 
identity – thereby invoking a connotation of being ‗non-Western‘. 
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Individual Sphere 
Ricardo reports that an individual‘s self-efficacy is a key factor in 
reducing vulnerabilities around sexual wellbeing and security (Ricardo et 
al. 2005: 71). While navigating complex and marginal positions ―between 
traditional subsistence values and urban ways of life‖ (VYPP, 2008: 94), 
young informants to the VYPP indicated that a sense of self-efficacy was 
linked to staying in touch with kastom and maintaining a sense of ni-
Vanuatu identity. Studies highlight a range of environmental factors 
which are impacting on young people‘s sexual wellbeing in complex ways 
– including oppressive structures of opportunity; economic 
marginalisation; shifting gender norms and ‗social ambiguity‘; as well as 
tensions between tradition and personal desires (McMillan, 2011; VYPP, 
2008). In seeking to understand young people‘s knowledge and practices 
around safe sex, these studies direct attention to complex interactions in 
the wider environment. 
While necessarily brief, the above sketch illustrates how an ecological 
framework permits insight into the formation of sexual health 
vulnerabilities. For instance, in highlighting how economic changes at a 
macro-structural level can link to poverty of opportunity at an individual 
level; and in highlighting how exposure to a ‗global youth culture‘ may 
contribute to ambiguities around traditional gender roles. In turn, we see 
that young people‘s self-efficacy for HIV prevention is embedded, 
shaped, enabled and constrained by these wider ecologies – of changing 
economic conditions, education and employment opportunities, peer 
and youth cultures, and inter-generational leadership inter alia.  
In this way, as ecological analysis serves to underwrite the inadequacy 
of interpreting base-line surveillance data, such as that generated by the 
Vanuatu Ministry of Health, without situating it in the context from 
which it derives; and of framing HIV as a discrete and privileged health 
issue – rather than inextricably linked to sexual and reproductive health. 
It follows that, for programming to be responsive to the complexities of 
young people‘s lives, it is must be both integrative and participatory. 
Thus the Cairo PoA demands that young people be seen not only as 
subjects of research and intervention, but as key stakeholders and key 
informants – uniquely positioned to inform programming which reflects 
and responds to their social realities, be they enabling or constraining: 
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―Youth should be actively involved in the planning, implantation and 
evaluation of development activities that have a direct impact on their 
lives… (including) services concerning sexual and reproductive health, 
including… the prevention of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted 
diseases.‖ (art 6.15)  
For instance, in the case of Vanuatu, numerous sources indicate a 
critical need to upscale youth-led sexual education programming – such 
as those offered by the successful Wan Smol Bag12 and others (MoH, 
2011; VYPP, 2008; UN, 2009; UNDP, 2009). Moreover, youth 
informants in multiple studies – including the Vanuatu Young People‘s 
Project (2008) and the Ministry of Health‘s recent report (2011) – testify 
overwhelmingly to an articulated interest among young people to engage 
in such opportunities… as is their right. 
Finally, an ecological analysis highlights that transformation at an 
individual level alone is insufficient to secure sexual health. Rather, there 
is a necessity for a multi-sectoral approach to overcoming barriers to 
sexual health, including poverty of opportunity – for instance, by 
reducing barriers for education among girls; by mainstreaming gender 
awareness across all Ministries; and by incentivising employment of local 
personnel in Vanuatu‘s international tourism industry to reduce 
economic marginalisation, and where sexual health education can be 
mainstreamed under employer duty of care. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, the Cairo Consensus expresses an epistemological shift, 
which directs attention to analysing and transforming the wider ecologies 
in which young people‘s sexual wellbeing is embedded. This approach 
expresses constructivist perspectives of ‗youth‘ and sex which challenge 
naturalist assumptions. By articulating multiple spheres of social reality, 
an ecological framework is a relevant analytical tool for tracing the 
formation of young people‘s HIV risk and vulnerabilities – as embedded 
in wider socio-cultural circumstances and political economy. 
                                                 
12 Wan Smol Bag is a popular Vanuatu theatre company specialising in youth 
issues, especially those pertaining to sexual and reproductive health. Their 
activities include the local production of a television series; theatre in schools; a 
peer educator programme; and two RSH clinics. 
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Furthermore, an ecological analysis serves to underwrite the need for 
integrated sexual and reproductive programmes and HIV services, and 
for young people to be recognised as key stakeholders and expert 
informants into programmatic design. By filling this demand, sexual 
health programming is more likely to reflect young people‘s social 
realities and empower young people to negotiate the complexities of 
their social worlds. Empowering young people is insufficient, however, 
without wider transformation. Thus this paper ends with a call to further 
scrutinise the role of adults, community leaders and social structures in 
reinforcing the sexual health vulnerabilities of young people – as well as 
possibilities for multi-sectoral and community-wide strategies to reduce 
them.  
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7 
The Cocha-bamba “Water War”: 
Beyond popular alliance and identity 
construction; a historical materialist 
analysis of counter-hegemonic 
resistance in Bolivia 
SASKIA WIDENHORN 
(Germany) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In popular protests in April of 2000, thousands of Bolivians forced the 
government to take back the privatisation of the water company of the 
department of Cochabamba. The water privatisation had been realised in 
the context of neoliberal restructuring begun in 1985. The Bolivian 
"water war" has received extensive media attention. Its popular 
interpretation as alliance across class and race boundaries triumphing 
over a neoliberal policy and neoliberalism in general can easily make the 
protests appear as sounding the ―death knell‖ (Domingo, 2009: 115) of 
neoliberalism in Bolivia.1 
This popular interpretation does not provide a satisfactory analysis of 
the event for two particular reasons: first, by only looking at the 
conjunctural time, it omits the importance of the longue durée in its 
explanation. Second, being limited to the realm of the empirical, it 
ignores the underlying roots of the protests. Given these shortcomings, 
this essay seeks to explore the question of why so many people came to 
protest at that particular time in the region of Cochabamba, and what the 
                                                 
The neoliberal period in Bolivia is sometimes defined as lasting from 1985-
2000, the water war marking the end of neoliberalism. Cf. Domingo (2009). 
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answer implies in relation to neoliberalism in Bolivia and its opposition. 
Although the severity of the impacts of water privatisation certainly 
played an important role in mobilising people, this essay argues that the 
causes of resistance lie beyond the level of events, that is, the direct 
experience of increased water bills. Moreover, it argues that the protests 
cannot be sufficiently explained by the fact that people across classes and 
beyond their different positions in the production system came to ally to 
challenge neoliberalism via discourse and the construction of a shared 
identity. Defining neoliberalism as a form of capitalism, I aim to show 
that the deeper roots of resistance are to be found in real interests 
shaped by different positions in the social relations of production prior 
to and during neoliberalism. A unifying discourse and the construction 
of identity against a common enemy contributed to the power and 
legitimacy of the movement. 
Scholars advocating the ontological primacy of the role of ideas might 
question the primary focus on social relations of production and 
accusing the material-ideational approach for paying insufficient 
attention to the role of ideas and being too deterministic. Obviously, the 
material-ideational perspective emphasises less the nature and evolution 
of ideas. However, it does take ideas and discourse seriously, but argues, 
following Margaret Archer (1982), that these are nurtured – not 
determined – by material realities. Only a material-ideational position, by 
exploring the underpinnings of Bolivian popular resistance with the help 
of history, sufficiently addresses the question of why particular groups 
have particular ideas that led to their resistance. 
The essay is structured in the following way. The first part shows the 
neoliberal context a well as the water privatisation and its opposition 
in 1999/2000. Second, the positions of the major popular groups in 
the social relations of production over time are explored to track the 
roots of resistance. The third part synthesises by placing the ―water war‖ 
in its historical material context and ends with some final thoughts on 
the implications of the findings for neoliberalism and its contestations 
in Bolivia. 
1. NEOLIBERALISM IN BOLIVIA AND THE “WATER WAR” 
Neoliberal reforms in Bolivia were introduced in the context of severe 
economic crisis and hyperinflation in 1985, through a combination of 
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coercion and consent (cf. Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 68). Under pressure 
from the IMF, and in alliance with major parts of the national economic 
and political elites and the military, the government embarked on 
―South America‘s second most radical neoliberal restructuring 
programme‖ (op. cit.: 60), ending the period of unsuccessful import 
substitution industrialisation and eighteen years of military rule. Apart 
from macroeconomic stabilisation, it involved trade liberalisation and 
structural reforms of the state. Privatisation of state- owned enterprises 
(SOEs), however, was initially not part of the reforms, because the 
governments faced the opposition of parts of the private sector; 
although generally committed to structural adjustment, the National 
Business Federation CEPB as representative of the business elites 
insisted on the state‘s responsibility to stimulate the economy (op. cit.: 
70). Privatisation2 was only pursued on a larger scale in the mid-1990s, 
by the strong neoliberal government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, 
and in response to pressure exercised by International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) and the US (cf. op. cit: 107ff). 
Bolivian water companies were either cooperatives or publicly owned 
until the end of the 1990s. The public system, including the Cochabamba 
water company SEMAPA, was inefficient, underfunded and corrupt (op. 
cit.: 163) and left many people without access – arguments used by the 
government to legitimise the selling of SEMAPA to the international 
consortium Aguas del Tunari, led by the US- based Bechtel corporation, at 
the end of 1999. The firm was granted exclusive property rights over 
water resources, with the result that people in the urban area of 
Cochabamba as well as in the rural surroundings had to contract with the 
corporation to be able to use water – even water from wells they had 
dug on their own in the absence of access to public water supply 
(Spronk, 2007: 15). Fuelled by the World Bank‘s insistence to stop any 
public financial support to the Cochabamba water utility, the local 
people had to bear the burden of the newly privatised indebted 
company, water bills increasing by up to 200% (op. cit.: 16). 
Privatisation almost immediately triggered social protest by diverse 
groups, such as urban formal and informal workers, rural peasants and 
                                                 
2 Privatisation took the form of ―capitalisation‖, a partial selling of SOEs to 
private firms, but which eventually resulted in de facto privatisation. Cf. Kohl 
& Farthing (2006: 107ff.). 
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coca farmers (cocaleros) (op. cit.: 18), organised under the newly founded 
―Coordinadora” (Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida – Coalition 
for the Defence of Water and Life). The protestors refused to pay their 
water bills (Olivera & Lewis, 2004: 32) and began street protests and 
blockades, which provoked a violent response by the government. 
Internal tensions in the government led the centre-right party Nueva 
Fuerza Republicana (NFR) to abandon the national ruling coalition (Assies, 
2003: 26), and parts of the local business elites also changed over to the 
insurgent camp (op. cit.: 23). The protests, which had spread to large 
parts of the country, turned more radical in April 2000, when the 
government breached an agreement with the Coordinadora. In the same 
month, the government succumbed to popular pressure and revoked the 
contract with Aguas del Tunari. 
In order to understand the factors which led to this resistance, it is 
important to take a closer look at the fractions of labour participating in 
the protests and their positions in the organisation of production over 
time. 
2. THE ROOTS OF RESISTANCE 
Historically, mining and agriculture were the two main sectors of the 
Bolivian export-dependent economy. Indigenous people were forced to 
work for national and international elites in silver (and later tin) mines or 
on large agricultural estates throughout the colonial period (1538-1825) 
and the Bolivian liberal Republic until the Revolution of 1952. Thus for 
more than 400 years, indigenous peasants and miners were the 
―underclass‖, contributing to the accumulation of wealth of national and 
international elites while not owning the means of production. 
The 1952 revolution abolished bonded labour and put an end to the 
mining and landed oligarchies. Tin mines and other key industries were 
nationalised (Webber, 2008a: 32), peasants were given small landholdings 
(Kohl & Farthing, 2006: 63) and workers began to organise in labour 
unions. At the same time, a process of capitalist development began, and 
the newly strengthened state increasingly invested in private enterprises 
such as agro-industrial businesses (Sanabria, 1999: 549). The increasing 
power of commercial agriculture culminated under neoliberalism, and 
forced many peasants, who had constituted a significant fraction of the 
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workforce for the country‘s export of raw materials and food supply, to 
migrate into cities or abroad (Arze Vargas, 2008: 244). 
Neoliberal reforms most heavily affected the miners. In 1985/86, the 
government closed state mines, leaving 23.000 out of 30.000 miners 
jobless (Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 71), and dismantled the historically 
powerful miner‘s union, thereby paralysing the Bolivian Workers‘ 
Federation COB (Central Obrera Boliviana) (Domingo, 2009: 117). Since 
the miners were weakened by the economic crisis and the decline of 
world tin prices, their fierce resistance could not stop the process. As a 
result, huge numbers of unemployed miners migrated to cities, often 
finding work in the informal economy, and to Cochabamba to seek 
employment in the booming coca economy (Webber, 2008b: 67). 
The trajectory of the coca growers differed significantly from those 
of other peasants and miners. Coca cultivation boomed in the 1970s, 
particularly in the Chapare region in Cochabamba, thanks to a 
flourishing coca-cocaine trade resulting from high world market prices 
for cocaine. Coca‘s crucial role for employment and livelihood (Webber, 
2008b: 67) gave it a special meaning for peasant families. In the 1980s,  
― ‗cocaine dollars‘ (...) provided a solid economic cushion for the 
neoliberal program‖ (Sanabria, 1999: 549) and contributed to the 
enrichment of parts of elites of the military, the state and the agro-
industry involved in cocaine trafficking (ibid.). At the same time, the US 
exercised immense pressure for coca destruction in line with its ―war on 
drugs‖, which culminated in President Hugo Banzer‗s coca eradication 
plan in 1997. It forcefully destroyed coca cultivation and thereby also the 
economy of the region of Cochabamba, leading to a deterioration of 
the overall economic situation.3 However, the objective of complete 
coca eradication was not achieved. While the miners had been entirely 
dependent on their wage labour and had been economically weakened, 
the coca farmers‘ greater economic autonomy, the importance of coca 
for the national economy and the reinforcement by migrated former 
miners explain their relatively powerful position. Violent government 
repression did not break the cocaleros’ resistance, but led to a stronger 
sense of identity (Sanabria, 1999: 550ff.). Moreover, internal tensions in 
the neoliberal camp allowed the coca growers to ally with opposition 
                                                 
3 Coca eradication from 1997 to 2000 caused an estimated economic loss of 
US$ 610 million (Arze Vargas, 2008, footnote 11, p. 285). 
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parties of the government and the National Business Federation which 
had opposed privatisation of SOEs in the mid-1980s (op. cit.: 553). 
The emergence of a powerful cocalero movement as well as other social 
movements was facilitated not only by cleavages among the dominant 
classes, but also by an evolution of the neoliberal process itself. Various 
institutional and constitutional reforms undertaken under the first 
presidency of Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997) sought to provide the 
contested neoliberal project with legitimacy, thereby also opening up 
political spaces and creating opportunities for the emergence of new 
actors. Electoral reforms facilitated the representation of indigenous 
people and peasants in National Congress (Domingo, 2009: 116; Kohl & 
Farthing, 2006: 126). The Law of Popular Participation and a 
constitutional reform, both in 1994, also brought important innovations 
(cf. Albro, 2010: 75). Another space for social movements presented, 
ironically, the weakening of the historically strong labour union COB, 
which led to a broader organisation of different fractions of labour, 
beyond class-lines and comprising also the increasing number of urban 
informal workers (Kohl & Farthing, 2006: 75; Linera, 2004: 71). The 
new social movements were more flexible than the old labour union, 
making possible the formation of ―ad hoc groups‖ to address particular 
issues of common interest, combining nationalist, indigenous, anti-
imperial and anti-neoliberal discourses. It is in this context that the 
privatisation of the Cochabamba water company took place. 
3. PLACING THE “WATER WAR” INTO CONTEXT 
The department of Cochabamba is characterised by the crucial role of 
coca farming in the economy and the dependence on water as vital 
resource for irrigation and livelihood, but it is also the region where 
Bolivia‘s powerful cocalero movement is rooted. These factors contributed 
to the strength of the protests, which brought together citizens from a 
wide spectrum of civil society and found alliance with international 
organisations (Kohl & Farthing, 2006: 189; Sanabria, 1999: 553). These 
processes were supported by a favourable international climate4 and the 
                                                 
4 This includes the growing contestation of neoliberal tenets, the rise of new 
social movements on a global sphere and the acknowledgement of indigenous 
rights in international fora. 
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construction of a shared identity, promoted by the unifying platform of 
the Coordinadora and its powerful discourse (Linera, 2004: 72). 
Yet, the underlying interests of the uprising groups were shaped by 
the dynamics of the organisation of production. Throughout large parts 
of the Bolivian history, the ―underclass‖ was effectively forced to 
contribute to imperial and capitalist domination while being exploited 
and denied the rights to share in the benefits of the wealth of 
resources. Nonetheless, they occupied a key role in the production 
system for the export-dependent economy and partly owned the means 
of production since 1952. The widespread deprivation of this position 
and dependence on capitalists, reinforced by neoliberal restructuring, 
shaped particular interests and fostered popular reactions. People‘s 
recurrent counter-hegemonic protests as well as an internal evolution 
and inconsistencies of the neoliberal project – apparent for example in 
the ambiguous role played by the National Business Federation – created 
new structures which nurtured subsequent social actions. 
In light of this background, is becomes evident that the ―water war‖ 
can only partly be explained by a movement joining ―spontaneously to 
protest against a particular policy decision‖ (Domingo, 2009: 121f.). It 
rather needs to be understood as the outcome of processes of struggle 
and contestation over the reconfiguration and solidification of power 
relations, grounded in historical experiences of colonisation, 
imperialism, capitalist restructuring and globalisation. 
The analysis has demonstrated that neoliberalism is a contested 
process, which is neither complete nor homogeneous. In Bolivia, 
repeated popular agency, including the Cochabamba protests, has created 
new contexts enabling further mobilisations against neoliberal policies.5 
However, the long-term internal coherence of an opposition consisting 
of different fractions of labour has certain limitations (cf. Kohl & 
Farthing, 2006: 193; Spronk, 2007). Moreover, although the victory of 
the cocalero movement‘s former leader Evo Morales in the presidential 
elections in 2005 marked a significant change in direction in Bolivian 
politics, neoliberal ―reforms are not limited to ideology or policy 
choice. They have acquired a material basis in the transformations that 
                                                 
5 Several large protests have occurred since 2000, among others against tax 
reforms and gas, oil and water privatisations. 
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they have wrought on the economic fabric of Latin America‖ (Saad-
Filho, 2005: 228). 
Some would like to see the Cochabamba protests as ―turning 
point‖ (Kohl, 2006: 321) towards the end of neoliberalism in Bolivia. 
However, shifting the paradigm would involve essential changes in the 
organisation of production and power relations. Not least due to 
neoliberalism‘s hegemony and Bolivia‘s embeddedness in the 
international system, this presents a formidable task at national level. 
These very real constraints are all too obvious in the current ―anti-
neoliberal‖ government of Bolivia.6 
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“Give us today our daily bread” 
Religion and social policy:  
a case for considering the role of 
religion in influencing social policy 
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This essay seeks to understand the role of religion in shaping social 
policy, with a particular focus on social welfare. The historical 
emergence of poor relief and welfare in Europe, and the importance 
of Christian religious institutions in shaping and implementing these 
processes has been widely documented. However, the role of religion 
in shaping policies and practices of social welfare outside of Europe 
and Northern America, or the role of religion in contemporary public 
space, and its role in influencing social welfare has been explored to a 
far lesser degree. In fact, the absence of religion from modern social 
policy studies is conspicuous. 
Recently, a number of factors (globalization, producing highly 
heterogeneous and religiously pluraristic societies; the advancement of 
neoliberal capitalism religion, promoting social policy reform 
encouraging social service provision by non-state actors, including 
religious actors; a concern in the social sciences for more holistic 
analysis, highlighting cultural and religious dimensions of social 
experience; politicized religiosity across the world, giving rise to the 
question of the role of religion in the public space) have conspired to 
reintroduce religion as a matter relevant to social policy and welfare. 
Incorporation of religion as an important dimension in social policy 
studies has been slow, and uneven: a lopsided focus within social studies 
in general has meant that the balance of analysis produced has been 
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on European and North American cases. Within this, literature 
produced in/about the United States has addressed the nexus of 
religion and social policy more prominently. In terms of the content of 
the research produced, religions have generally been treated on the basis 
of the ways in which religion ―shapes societies and the values held by 
members of societies‖ (Plant, 2009: 844). Less attention has been paid 
to the role of the theological content of different faith traditions as 
producing different kinds of practice (op. cit.: 845), or as offering 
alternative visions of social welfare. 
Through drawing on the relevance of religion in the development 
of poor relief and social welfare in the past, this essay argues that, 
contrary to ‗orthodox‘ social policy studies, religious institutions and 
assumptions retained important influence during the period of the 
modern welfare state. A case is made that social policy is, by definition, 
a project characterised by normative values and moralities, that, ―… 
what is at stake is the fundamental question about a polity‘s values and 
its responsibilities to all its members‖, that ―value judgements matter‖ 
(Mkandawire, 2005: 1). 
Through exploring understandings of social policy with an explicit 
focus on the influence/potential impact of religion on social policy, a 
case is made that religion continues to function as a ―fundamental 
variable‖ in the formulation of social policy and in influencing the 
contexts in which social welfare is conceived and delivered. The 
argument is made that, since religion is intrinsically concerned with 
human well-being (Jawad 2010), it is essentially related to social policy 
and welfare concerns, producing both negative and positive effects 
(such as social division, religiously incited/justified conflict,1 or 
alternatively social cohesion, including reconciliatory and interfaith 
                                                 
1 Religiously incited or justified conflict is manifested in cases such as the 
conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, the continuing conflict 
between Israel and Palestine, and in terrorism, such as fundamentalist Christian 
groups‘ bombings of abortion clinics, or Islamic fundamentalist groups acts of 
terror against ‗immoral unbelievers‘ and their ‗Satanic‘ influence in the world. 
While religion is clearly not the only factor prompting actors in ‗religious 
conflicts‘ toward conflict, it may be a significant factor in doing so, and 
certainly is in providing a legitimating framework or narrative for continued 
involvement in such conflict. 
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work, social welfare service provision). The potential limitations and 
possibilities posed by religious influence in the ‗public‘ space of social 
welfare are then considered. 
THE CHURCH AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE:  
FROM „POOR RELIEF‟ TO THE NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM  
In order to explore the role of religion in shaping social welfare in 
contemporary times, it is illuminating to provide a brief history of the 
development and practice of social welfare, considering particularly the 
role of religion in order to explore whether the manner of influence 
religion may have had historically is likely to continue to be of 
relevance in the vastly different circumstance of contemporary 
society. This section discusses European, particularly English poor relief 
and holds that the involvement of religion in this process was directly 
relevant, and even causally related to the development of social welfare 
as we recognise it, and thus, while the changing circumstances may have 
altered the form of religious involvement in social policy (in some 
respects), the nature of this involvement remains comparable and 
significant. 
In providing a discussion of the provision of assistance to the poor 
prior to the development of centralised social welfare and the 
emergence of social policy, focus is placed on the welfarist traditions 
of England in particular and Europe more generally. This Eurocentric 
bias has been adopted for a number of reasons; understandings of and 
literature about social welfare have traditionally focussed heavily on and 
drawn from the European experience. Part of the reason for this is 
that many of the developments which eventually produced the welfare 
state first took place, or were ‗formalised‘ in England. The rise of poor 
relief, which arguably led to the development of more bureaucratic 
social welfare, can be linked, among other things, to the rise of 
capitalism in England, which precipitated heightened societal inequality, 
increased poverty and urbanisation. It was in this context that questions 
pertinent to social welfare and policy project were explored [who is 
defined as poor, and ―which poor people should be helped, in what 
ways, and who should pay for this assistance?‖ Should we help only 
―our own‖ local poor, or does ―our community‖ extend more widely 
and require that others be assisted also? Should the moral condition of 
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the poor and the cause of their poverty affect whether/what kind of 
assistance the poor receive? ( McIntosh, 2005: 457)]. The close 
traditional association of the English and European case with a 
particular religion, Christianity, makes it an apposite case study to 
explore the relationship between religion and social policy and welfare.2 
Poor relief 
Prior to the development of centralised welfare systems in England, 
care for the poor was provided at local levels, organised and 
administered through the religious bodies which functioned as centres 
of political, economic and social leadership and power in each locality. 
Indeed, the Church, in the Middle Ages, was the first body to adopt 
responsibility for the poor (Jawad 2010, personal communication)): 
parishes served as administrative units, as well as moral communities, 
through which assistance to the poor was provided (McIntosh, 2005: 
466). 
Extensive research has been conducted on the emergence of the 
Elizabethan Poor Laws, and the close connection between the 
provision of poor relief and religious institutions and motivations has 
been well established (see Block & Somers, 2003; Trattner, 1974) and 
so will not be rehearsed in detail here. Constructions of the categories 
of the poor and of the responsibility of ―Christian society‖ (McIntosh, 
2005: 461) were explicitly informed by religious assumptions and values. 
For example, the ‗undeserving poor‘ were defined as those experiencing 
poverty as a result of ―bad moral conduct‖, (op. cit.: 462); provision of 
care for the poor was motivated not only by practical expediency, but 
fundamentally by the Biblical injunction to care for the poor which made 
doing so the moral responsibility of Christian believers (Kahl, 2005). 
Adopting a concern with poverty was understood as a critical 
dimension of righteousness, and as directly related to notions of 
personal salvation and rewards in the afterlife (Plant, 2009; McIntosh, 
2005: 467; Kahl, 2005: 95). Reforms during this period can be 
                                                 
2 It is important to note further that the heavy focus on European case studies 
in social policy studies and the literature produced on social welfare reflects a 
Eurocentric bias – welfare systems in the Middle East, Asia and Africa have not 
traditionally been explored. For instance, Jawad (2010: 659) bemoans an 
―inadequate analysis of social welfare provision in the Middle East‖. 
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described as linked by ―strong moralistic note(s)‖ produced by religious 
assumptions (Roach, quoted in Gladstone, 1980: 63). 
The Protestant Reformation was a watershed moment in the 
development of social welfare as it served to ossify distinctions between 
Catholic, Calvinist and Lutheran approaches to poor relief (Kahl 
2005:92). The social doctrines of each denomination became 
institutionalised in the countries in which the religious influence of each 
denomination was strongest and once institutionalised, became absorbed 
into and formative of the countries value sets regarding the 
identification and treatment of the poor, such that they remain ―deeply 
embedded today‖ (Kahl, 2005: 94).3 Jawad argues along similar lines 
that these ―various traditions have had a direct impact on the way in 
                                                 
3 Kahl (2005) identifies these religious traditions taking root in the following 
countries: Catholicism in Spain, Italy, France; Lutheranism in Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden; Calvanist/Reformed Protestant in Switzerland, Holland, 
England and the United States. She argues that differences in recent and 
contemporary welfare policies and practice in these countries can be attributed 
to the different interpretations of Christian religious teaching and principles 
relevant to poor relief, notably understandings of personal salvation 
(Catholicism advocated salvation through good works for the poor, 
Lutheranism advocated salvation by faith alone, and Calvinism salvation 
through hard work), and conceptions of the role of the state in relation to the 
provision of social assistance. Kahl argues that an exploration of the ways in 
which the social doctrines of these traditions became embedded in the cultures 
of each of these countries can provide answers to questions like: 
•  ―Why is French social assistance as ungenerous as U.S. social assistance 
(relative to the average productive wage? 
•  Why do the United Kingdom and the United States hold individuals 
responsible for their own poverty and its escape, while the Scandinavian 
countries and Germany see it as a societal responsibility? 
•  Why are long-term social assistance recipients conceived of as an 
‗‗underclass‘‘ of dependent welfare ‗‗scroungers‘‘ in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, while they are viewed as socially excluded in France and 
Italy? 
• Why is the idea of ‗‗doing something in return‘‘ for social assistance so 
strong in the Anglo-Saxon countries and Scandinavia, yet virtually irrelevant in 
France and Italy?‖ - (Kahl, 2005: 92) 
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which poverty and social welfare have been formulated (...) and even 
how social policy has been structured‖ (2010). 
The Enlightenment period provided a second major watershed 
moment in the development of social welfare. In making the relationship 
between religion and reason dichotomous, a dichotomy between public 
and private spheres of life was created in which religion was relegated to 
private (and more inconsequential) sphere; social welfare took on 
public, secular nature (Jawad 2010). While the Enlightenment period 
the provision of welfare to the state, it did not remove from society 
entirely the influence of the religious assumptions and motivations 
which informed poor relief. Private religious service provision thus 
continued during this period. 
Social welfare 
Traditionally, the development of poor relief and poor laws has 
traditionally been described as a precursor to, but categorised separately 
from, modern social insurance practices and modern social welfare, 
with the latter representing a ―fundamental break from the past‖ (Kahl, 
2005: 92). However, this essay argues the case for the ―continuous 
development line from poor relief to social assistance‖ (Kahl, 2005: 
93). The shifts in history which produced a movement from poor relief 
toward the formulation of more comprehensive social assistance, the 
perceived ‗break‘ from the past began between 1780 and 1880, a 
period characterised by unprecedented economic and technical change 
and advancements which produced both increasing rates of poverty, as 
well as the administrative technologies enabling centralisation through 
which this could be addressed. Social welfare developed out of the 
increasing consolidation of centralism throughout the 19th century, as 
evident in the emergence of Bismarkian social insurance and poor 
relief in Germany in 1880s. Such initiatives were characterised by 
increasing levels of state intervention and control; in England, this was 
accompanied, almost paradoxically, by ―a strong emphasis on individual-
ism and self-help‖ (Gladstone, 1980: 61). The institution of the New 
Deal by the USA after the Great Depression further formalised and 
developed state welfare as the central state took on responsibility for the 
welfare of its citizens. The welfare state is considered by many to have 
entered its golden era in the expression of social welfare in the United 
Kingdom after the Second World War. Many commentators now 
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suggest that many Northern countries have entered a post-materialist 
state and post-welfare, in which welfare principles have been replaced by 
workfare ideals (see Dean, 2007; Reese, 2001). It is almost ironic that 
it is during this ‗post-welfare‘ period (particularly in Northern countries) 
that the role of religion is coming to the fore once again as an important 
concern in social welfare policy. 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the development of social 
policy and welfare in Europe has been and, even despite itself, continues 
to bear the marks of its formation by varying Christian traditions. 
The discipline of social studies has developed largely alongside the 
emergence of the welfare state; there is very little literature connecting 
the development of poor relief with the contemporary welfare as we 
recognise it today (Kahl is a notable exception). A further and important 
characteristic of social policy studies, contrasted to studies of poor relief, 
relates to the absence of religion as a sphere of concern or analysis. 
Social policy studies, and even social scientific literature on welfare 
state development has, until very recently, been an entirely secular affair. 
Gorski describes ―the orthodox view‖ as being simply that ―religion 
didn‘t matter‖ (2005: 371), with religious beliefs and practices, 
confessional identities and differences not being regarded as having any 
relevance for social policy, with ―social welfare, justice, and labor‖ being 
seen entirely as ―secular matters‖.4 Jawad (2010) holds that this secular 
(and arguably Eurocentric)5 perspective continues to predominate, that 
                                                 
4 As mentioned above, variations between Northern European and North 
American positions in discussing religion as having public influence exist, it 
being more common to discuss and appeal to religious assumptions and 
realities in the United States. 
5 As noted above, social policy studies have developed along a Eurocentric bias. 
Part of the result of this is that there exists a distinction between social policy 
studies focusing on the developed, and developing world (noted by 
Mkwandawire (2001) and Jawad (2008; 2010). Mkandawire describes the 
contrast between work on social policy in developing and developed countries 
as ―striking‖, going on to note that ―Literature on social policy in developing 
countries often lacks the conceptual depth that one finds in the literature in the 
developed (especially European) countries‖ (2001: 21). A further distinction 
relates to the willingness to address religion in social policy, which has been 
more readily done in the ‗developing‘ world. 
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―discussion of morality, ethics or religion is marginal in the social policy 
literature with few exceptions‖.6 
The significant debt of the welfare state (and thus indirectly of the 
rise of social policy that accompanied it after the Second World War) 
to religious traditions, both through their extensive involvement in 
social welfare service provision, and through the promotion of human 
wellbeing, makes the hesitance of social policy studies to explore the 
role of religion puzzling, and an area requiring analysis (Jawad, 2010). 
The above section has demonstrated the historical relevance of 
religion to the formation and development of welfare thinking. Even 
where academic social policy studies have overlooked this in relation 
to the modern welfare state, the religious involvement in social welfare 
has been identified as continuous, indeed, Jawad has argued that 
―Christian ethics helped to develop the idealist values which 
underpinned the post- War welfare state‖ (Jawad, 2010). The case for 
the relevance of religion to social welfare is only strengthened by 
drawing on alternative case studies. For example, an exploration into 
social and religious welfare in the Middle East immediately demonstrates 
the centrality of religion to social policy in the region. 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS OF WELFARE AND RELIGION 
The ‗golden age‘ of welfare, epitomised in post-war Britain, has given 
way in the face of ideological shifts towards a neo-liberal expression of 
capitalism and its accompanying focus on individuals as rational, 
economically (rather than socially or morally) driven ‗consumers‘ and on 
                                                 
6 This ―near total silence‖ (ibid) has been attributed by Nesbitt to the rise of 
modernization and secularisation trends in Northern countries, the extended 
suppression of religious expression under communist regimes and the 
disenfranchisement of ‗Third World cultures‘ from their ―indigenous cultural 
and religious roots‖. An concurrent explanation has been offered by Skocpol, 
who accounts for the absence of religious voices or dimensions of analysis in 
social policy studies, or indeed in social policy formation, by arguing that ―In 
recent years, the academic literature on ‗social welfare policy‘ has been so 
dominated by leftist secularists that it has written out of the record positive 
contributions from religiously inspired services to the poor. If noted at all, such 
ministry has transmuted into Machiavellian acts of class of racial domination.‖ 
(Jawad, 2010). 
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processes of ―responsibilisation‖ (in which responsibility for personal 
welfare is transferred from the state to the individual, and met through 
extra-state measures to increasing degrees, such as through private 
insurance, or reliance on services provided by the third sector) (Dean, 
2007: 581; Reese, 2001: 362). This process of ‗responsibilisation‘, or the 
movement from a welfare to workfare state, has been characterised as 
producing an ―amoral familialism‖ in which the privatisation of welfare 
services creates a conflict between the short term interests of individuals 
and families, and the needs of the larger community (Reese, 2001: 
363). Dean describes these changes as reflecting ―shifting political 
orthodoxies and moral assumptions‖ (2007: 574). It is interesting to 
note that, while the workfare state has been critiqued for producing 
―amoral‖ conflicts of interest between individuals/families and society at 
large, the welfare state was criticised (by proponents of workfare 
principles) for creating an ―amoral dependency culture‖ (Dean, 2007: 
576).7 Both contemporary welfare and workfare states have been 
critiqued for creating destructively ―amoral‖ societal conditions, 
indicating the (hidden) presence of morality within both of these 
approaches to welfare; it hints too that the exclusion of religion from 
the public space and explicit inclusion in social policy discourse has 
left the resultant social welfare morally lacking in some way. 
The felt need for a return to engagement with morality (and hence 
also religion) in public social policy stems from a number of factors: 1) 
once social welfare by the state was rolled back, the extensive network 
of religious social service provision was revealed and expanded, making 
religious groups important actors in social welfare.8 2) Northern 
                                                 
7 For more on this ‗perversity thesis‘, see Somers and Block 2005, ‗From 
Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and Institutions over 200 Years of 
Welfare Debate‘. 
8 In the United Kingdom and the United States, reforms such as ‗Charitable 
Choice‘ provision in the 1996 Federal Welfare Reform of the United States, 
have paved the way for increased collaboration between the state and religious 
welfare providers, with an expanded role in social service provision, and 
potentially, policy formation afforded to religious bodies. A similar 
collaboration is tentatively being pursues in South Africa currently. While in 
‗developed‘ countries, the involvement of religious organisations in welfare is 
due in part to the state rolling back its welfare provision, in developing 
countries, such involvement typically occurs because of states‘ inability to roll 
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countries can be said to have reached a ―post-material‖: material needs 
are met, destroying class-based associations and leaving individualised 
concerns with ―belonging, identity and self-realisation‖ to become 
important dimensions by which welfare is conceived (Dean, 2007: 576). 
One expression of this has been the rise of the ‗social exclusion‘ 
approach in (parts of) Europe as a key driver of social policy. 3) 
Globalisation has produced heterogenous and religiously/morally 
pluralistic societies. In seeking to address the needs of diverse groups, 
arrive at shared norms and values and create social cohesion, it has 
become imperative for social policy to engage with competing value 
sets and religious identities. 4) Complementing the above processes, 
moves in the social sciences toward ―the challenge of holism‖ (Jawad, 
2010). Greater moves toward the incorporation of cultural dimensions 
of analysis in recognition of the ‗wholeness‘ of people and holistic nature 
of society have facilitated a resurgence of concerns with religion because 
religion ―appeals precisely to the moral, spiritual and emotional 
dimensions of human experience‖ (ibid.). 5) Politicised religiosity has 
risen to the fore on the international political agenda, particularly 
through militant strains of politicized Islam, as evident in its 
extremist expression in the terrorist action of groups such as al Qaeda, 
but also in moderate groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL POLICY (AND ITS LINKS WITH RELIGION) 
This previous section of the essay built a case for recognising the 
relevance of religion to social policy. This section seeks to explore in 
greater detail the specificities of how religion shapes and influences 
social policy. Social policy is typically dealt with in purely secular terms, 
thus excluding the object of our analysis. In order to counter this 
tendency, I have decided to take a fresh look at the definition of 
social policy: I offer my discussion of the concept, highlighting areas of 
connection with religious institutions, below. 
Social Policy involves systematic, collective interventions into the 
social life of a society to transform social institutions and social 
relations in order to realise a shared vision of ‗the good society‘, that 
                                                                                                                   
out comprehensive enough social service provision. The extensive provision of 
health and education services across Africa is a testament to this. 
88 HANNAH LINDIWE DE WET 
is, to improve social welfare (Mkandawire, 2001: 6). Social welfare is 
conceived of in relation to concepts of ‗needs‘ and ‗well-being‘. These 
concepts, conceptions of the good society, and thus the nature and 
forms of the desired changes in social institutions and in social relations 
expressed in social policy are ―defined in relation to the social norms of 
a given society‖ (Jawad, 2008: 145);9 social policies thus take many 
forms and are embedded in the particular social, political, cultural and 
economic contexts in which they emerge and seek to address. Religion 
plays a significant role in shaping the cultural, social, political and, to a 
degree, even the economic soil in which social policies are both rooted 
and renegotiated, and indeed, in relation to human well-being itself 
(Jawad, 2010 ).  
The nature of social policy will be discussed further through exploring 
the key aspects of the above definition more fully. 
SOCIAL WELFARE – „THE GOOD SOCIETY‟ 
Common ways of thinking about the end of social policy or the ‗good 
society‘, and thus of characterising social policy itself, relate to 
concerns to address human needs and improve well-being, often 
through redistribution of resources (Jawad, 2010: 661), for or in addition 
to the satisfaction of basic needs, and/or the provision of ―adequate and 
secure livelihoods‖ (Mkandawire, 2001: 6), as well as the mitigation of 
risk (Dean, 2007: 577). Social policy has more recently been conceived 
of in relation to a number of concepts, such as ―‗social exclusion‘, 
‗capabilities‘, and ‗recognition‘‖ (Dean, 2009: 311).10 
                                                 
9 Mkandawire argues similarly that ―Each of the core concerns of social policy 
– needs, deserts, and citizenship – are social constructs that derive full meaning 
from the cultural and ideological definition of ―deserving poor‖, ―entitlement‖ 
and ―citizen‘s rights‖ (2005: 1). 
10 These are normative, optimistic understandings of social policy. Dean 
(2009:311) notes that social policies and systems can function to ―promote or 
impair human wellbeing‖ (italics my own). Social policies may indeed be 
employed for ignoble ends: Nazi Germany employed (anti)social policies to 
discriminate against and eliminate minority groups to realise its vision of ‗the 
good society‘, while the Apartheid government in South Africa used social 
policy effectively to oppress the majority of its population. Authoritarian states 
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Religious assumptions and values are likely to influence commonly 
held visions of the ‗good society‘. In fact, religions, in providing a 
framework through which to understand and pursue human well-being, 
guidelines about how adherents should live, and conceptualisations of 
what a ‗good society‘ should look like, can be said to produce their 
own social policy, which is enacted through their ―social teachings, 
doctrinal changes, discipline adoptions and a range of social pressures, 
politics and controversies‖ (Nesbitt 2001: x). Historically, state social 
policies can be said to have been built upon or grown out of existing 
religious social policy; existing religious ‗social policies‘ can be regarded 
as influential in shaping contemporary state social policy and welfare 
provision.11 
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS – NORMS AND VALUES, IDENTITY, SOCIAL 
COHESION 
‗Social institutions‘ can be understood, after Douglas North, as socially 
constructed norms and values, as well as the organisations/institutions 
that espouse and operationalise these and function to ―structure 
human interaction‖ through constraining and guiding social relations 
(North, 1993: 2). Religious institutions constrain and/or guide social 
relations and thus the social policies they inform explicitly through the 
influence of religious bodies, and implicitly through influencing societal 
norms and values. 
Particularly important elements of norms and values (and of social 
policies) include conceptualisations of individual and collective identity, 
indeed, ―particular constructions of identity underpin and legitimize 
policies‖. 
                                                                                                                   
may also employ social policies to legitimate autocratic rule (the case in some 
late industrialising countries – See Mkandawire, 2005). 
11 In such cases, it is important to be aware that religious welfare may be 
designed to achieve an entirely alternative vision of social welfare. For example, 
in religious welfare in Lebanon focuses primarily on protecting ‗social morality‘, 
rather than alleviation of poverty. The Lebanese state welfare system, 
influenced as it is by the substantial religious welfare provision within its 
borders, also provides ―social care‖ in order to address ―social case‖ matters, 
with human need defined in terms of social relationships rather than material 
poverty, even in conditions of notable material poverty (see Jawad, 2008). 
90 HANNAH LINDIWE DE WET 
Socially constructed identities are ―ethically situated‖ in that they 
carry within them notions of ―responsibility‖, which relate to 
conceptions of obligation and relationship to the national community 
(important in nation building processes) as well as (potentially) to 
religious bodies/communities and are expressed in notions of civic (or 
religious) duty, moral obligation and social responsibility (Dean, 2007: 
580). Such ethical constructions of responsibility are shaped in part by 
prevailing religious norms and morals: examples of such constructions 
of in terms of obligation might be an Islamic obligation to give alms; an 
example of responsibility in terms of relationship could be a 
Christian logic of inclusion, recognizing ‗others‘ as ‗true neighbours‘, 
following the parable of ‗The Good Samaritan‘). Socially constructed 
identities are further ethically situated in that they are underpinned by 
appeals to ethics and morality, which give them ―moral force‖. 
Identities may be constructed in terms of citizenship, ethnicity or 
religious affiliation/adherence (among other options). Constructed 
identities may combine these elements (consider Israeli or Palestinian 
national identities), or be constructed in opposition to each other (for 
example, Geert Wilders‘ attempts to construct a Dutch national identity 
are framed in terms of citizenship and belonging in Holland, and is 
distinctly opposed to incorporating elements of Muslim identity into 
Dutch nationality, and constructed through such opposition). 
The discussion of ‗citizenship‘ in social policy discourse has 
perhaps been overly elevated, or at least, incorrectly universalised. 
Citizenship and welfare relate to each other in a situation in which 
welfare and social policy have been assigned as the responsibility of 
the state, such that the key aspect of identity relevant to receiving 
welfare is citizenship, affording access to welfare. This is certainly the 
case in the North, where social welfare constituted an important nation 
building tool/process in democratic states. However, social policy and 
social welfare in other parts of the world has been associated with 
religious institutions (such as the Middle East), or families (as in Asia, 
and Africa) rather than the state. In the Middle East, religious identity 
is of key importance in accessing welfare, rather than citizenship. Rana 
Jawad has discussed this in terms of a Lebanese case study (see Jawad, 
2002; 2008; 2010). 
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SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS – SOCIAL COHESION, SOCIAL COMPACT, SOCIAL 
NEGOTIATION 
‗Social relations‘ refer to all levels of human interaction, including 
intra-household, community, national and global interactions. These 
relationships are shaped by dynamics of ―class, community, ethnicity, 
gender, etc.‖ (Mkandawire, 2001: 6) and may function to foster social 
cohesion (or alternately, division). Just as appeals to religious identity 
may foster social cohesion in circumstances of religious homogeneity, 
they may be divisive in situations of religious diversity. In such 
circumstances, Nesbitt moves that ―Making a diverse society cohere 
involves the development of agreed-upon norms embodied in social 
policies‖. Here, social policy provides the forum, and shared public 
norms provide the ―grounding structures to negotiate and incorporate 
diverse religious worldviews‖ (ibid.); a key role of social policy is thus 
to foster social cohesion. 
Dean describes such shared public norms, or ―moral rationality‖ to 
use his term, as produced through a process of ―social negotiation‖ 
(2007: 578). This social negotiation involves different actors with 
competing sets of interests, informed by particular sets of values and 
holding differing ideological positions (Mkandawire, 2001: 19) wrestling 
over ―whose definitions of reality are embodied in ‗welfare legislation‘, 
whose particular concepts of a ‗society and its social problems‘‖ are 
embodied in the shared public norms and social policies (Carrier & 
Kendall, quoted in Gladstone, 1980: 61). In this respect, the dynamic 
negotiation of shared interests touches on power in society and is the 
result of political bargaining (Mkandawire, 2001: 18). Religious 
institutions are often powerful actors in this process of negotiation and 
contribute considerably to the creation of a ―shared morality or set of 
normative assumptions undergirding a wide sector of society‖. Jawad 
describes this process of social negotiation as an important dimension 
of nation-building in the Middle East, with religion being ―one vital 
part of this new equation‖. (Jawad, 2010: 663-4). 
SOCIAL POLICY AND NATION BUILDING AS A SOCIAL CONTRACT 
Social Policy can be expressed a ‗social contract‘ between the 
implementer of social welfare policy and those affected by the policies, 
who may also lend legitimacy to the social policy project. Social 
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policy is most commonly thought of, or at least discussed in relation 
to, the democratic nation state: in a simplistic formulation, social 
norms shared by the public are expressed in social policies enacted by 
the government (either through direct state implementation or by the 
state creating an ‗enabling environment‘ for private actors to deliver 
services within the given policy framework); the public supports and 
legitimates this process, agreeing to the particular formation of the 
‗social pact‘ through paying taxes and offering political support. This 
relationship between the state and the individual can be formed in 
various manners: the social contract may adopt a more individualist, or 
solidaristic nature, individualist conceptions of the relationship between 
the individual and the state may be termed ―contractualistic‖, in 
which ―competitive and self- interested individuals‖ capitulate certain 
personal freedoms to the state in order to benefit from the protection of 
the state from other self-interested individuals (Dean, 2007: 579). 
Interaction with the social order, and responsibility, is understood 
from an individualist perspective. By contrast, a ―solidaristic‖ or 
collectivist conception of social order prioritises social cohesion and 
solidarity as the basis of social action and social policy; responsibility is 
understood as shared (ibid.). Such normative conceptions of 
responsibility are socially constructed and informed in part by the 
religious milieu and influences (these are by definition ethical and moral 
constructions). Constructions of responsibility within a solidaristic 
perspective adopt a more universalist leaning, and thus are associated 
with redistributive and more universal social policy, and social 
democratic welfare states (Dean, 2007: 580). By contrast, individualist 
contractarian constructions of welfare ‗individualise‘ responsibility, 
removing the burden of responsibility from the state considerable 
degree, creating the space for the market or third sector to deliver 
social welfare services in a ‗workfare‘ format. Such conceptions of the 
individual/state relationship lend themselves to targeted social policy. 
This characterisation of social policy requires further discussion. The 
‗implementor‘ of social policy is typically, but not necessarily the nation 
state. International influences on national social policy are becoming 
more prominent in a globalised context in which the influence of supra-
national or international institutions and actors (e.g. IMF, WTO, UNDP, 
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the Catholic Church, etc.) is felt,12 and in which ‗global‘ problems 
demand global policy responses, with implications for national social 
policy. Apart from the state, other non-state actors may be actively 
involved in welfare service provision, as well as in contributing to the 
formulation of social policy. The private sector may provide social 
welfare services through the market, or as contracted by states. The 
‗third sector‘ is another crucial provider of services and welfare. 
Voluntary and NGO welfare services have historically provided 
substantial welfare provision and continue to do so; religious welfare 
and religiously motivated welfare constitutes a hugely significant 
component of such service provision. This is certainly the case across 
Africa, as well as in much of the Middle East. Jawad (2002: 323) 
discusses the case study of Lebanon in detail, describing the extensive 
network of religious welfare NGOs operating throughout the country, 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs allocating 55- 60% of its annual 
budget to such religious welfare groups. 
In addition to service provision, religious bodies may function as 
important transnational and national institutions with a significant 
influence on social policy: religious institutions, in particular their 
moral norms and values, play an important role in interpreting, and 
creating the context in which social policy is conceived, applied and 
received. Some clear examples emerge when considering social 
policy relating to reproductive rights and health in Latin America, or 
to girls and women‘s education in the Middle East, or to abortion in 
the United States. Further to this, and perhaps even more importantly, 
Jawad argues that ―whilst religious groups may provide a cost-effective 
means of future service provision‖ the ―strength and authenticity of 
their potential contribution to (the formation of) social policy‖ 
should not be overlooked (Jawad, 2010).  
                                                 
―Globalization affects social policy both at a normative level and in a more 
practical way, by setting constraints (fiscal and trade) that social policy must be 
attentive to.‖ (Mkandawire, 2001: iii). A clear example of this is the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers insisted upon by the IMF and World Bank, which 
attach social conditionalities to the economic conditionalities upon which 
assistance is offered; similarly, Papal encyclicals, for instance, on the use of 
contraceptives, carry not an insignificant weight in influencing reproductive 
health care policies in predominantly Catholic countries. 
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SOCIAL ACTION 
Some brief reflection on the role of religion in shaping the cultural, 
economic, social and political contexts which give rise to social policy 
and which social welfare must address is pertinent. 
Nesbitt (2001) argues that religion has often provided the 
―empowering ideology and motivation for social changes‖, with Jawad 
(2010) concurring on the importance of religion in ―stimulating 
association life and providing the moral energy behind the ideals and 
the pursuit of social justice.‖ In this sense, religion serves as a core 
motivation and inspiration for many of the world‘s people, spurring 
political reforms and resolutions, civil and human rights movements, 
with important political, social and pro-poor movements across the 
world able to attribute the genesis of their struggle and the ―driving 
force‖ behind this in their religious identities (Jawad, 2010: 659). Just as 
religion can be seen as informing social practice and welfare conditions 
(consider the Hindu caste system), religious identity and resources can 
likewise be harnessed in social movements and political reforms to 
institute a change in social conditions – consider the role of religious 
identity and imagery in the civil rights movement in the United States, 
or in the Truth and Reconciliation process in South Africa. 
The above section has explored the ways in which religion may shape 
social policy and welfare. The limitations or dangers, as well as 
possibilities posed by (the greater recognition of) religion in social 
welfare are discussed below. 
LIMITATIONS AND DANGERS OF RELIGIOUS WELFARE 
Reservations around recognising or consolidating the role of religion in 
public service provision and policy discussion relate to fears over the 
potentially divisive, or exclusionary function that institutionalised 
religious identities may produce in welfare provisioning – will minority 
religious groups be excluded from assistance? Will those of the ‗right‘ 
religious identity be privileged at the expense of others? (Nesbitt 2001: 
xi). A key issue here is that of accountability, if religious welfare is 
provided for apart from the state, it is often difficult to monitor issues of 
quality control or discrimination. This is made even more difficult by the 
nature of many religious welfare providers: they are small, serve limited 
populations, are generally unconnected with other service providers or 
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general policies on what services should be provided, and often have 
weak administrative capacities for coordinating with state or other 
welfare providers. Where religious service providers provide welfare in 
the absence of state welfare, relationships of patronage may develop, 
again undermining accountability, and creating the conditions for 
politicised religiosity which may become harmful to democratization 
processes, or even generative of conflict. 
As noted above, religious welfare services typically serve small pop-
ulations (they are often run out of a Church or Mosque for example). 
Reliance by the state on the private provision of welfare is dangerous 
because religious welfare provides only a fragmented pattern of service 
delivery; it is bound to leave some excluded from welfare. This concern 
links to those expressed by Swart (2008), Winkler (2008) and Belcher & 
Tice (2011) regarding the ability of Church welfare networks to 
adequately cope with the burden of service provision placed on them 
through reforms to expand the role of religious service provision 
alongside/in place of government welfare provision in the South 
African and United States cases. The argument here is made that 
religious welfare provision is best placed to deliver quality localized 
welfare, but does not have the resources or capacity to expand beyond 
this. Interestingly, concern has been raised by some religious welfare 
providers that becoming involved in a welfare service provision 
partnership with the state will compromise the ‗prophetic identity‘ of 
the church. 
Additional concerns relate to the nature of welfare offered. Quality 
control has mentioned as a concern above, one dimension of this 
concern relates to whether religious services are progressive or 
regressive in terms of advancing gender equality, or in protecting human 
rights. Where welfare provision is offered on the basis of charity, rather 
than a concern with justice and for human rights, this may undermine 
commitment to the protection of human rights. (It is important to note 
here however that much of religious welfare provision is premised on 
notions of justice and development, see Plant, 2009). 
MOVING FORWARD 
This essay has demonstrated, through discussing the intimate 
implication of religion in early and developing forms of social welfare, 
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it‘s essential relationship with social policy and the ―deeply historical 
and ever- present role which all religions have played in shaping both 
social ideals about human well-being and real life outcomes in society‖ 
(Jawad, 2010 ). This was further demonstrated by noting the lasting 
impact of religious social doctrines, even as they have been absorbed 
into national sets of norms and values and reworked into modern 
social welfare configurations. A detailed discussion of the ways in which 
religion and social policy interact was focused by taking a fresh look at 
concept of social policy itself, reiterating the important influence of 
religion (for good or bad) on social policy. The contemporary resurgence 
of interest in religion as providing for the practical delivery of social 
welfare was then discussed in the context of a globalised world of 
―multireligious … multicultural, globally interdependent societies‖ 
(Nesbitt 2001: x), along with concerns as to the potential constraints 
faced by religious welfare providers in doing so. Along with the role of 
religion in social policy, these constraints must be taken seriously. 
Perhaps the first step in dealing with both of these is to encourage 
the consideration of social well-being and social welfare from the 
theological particularities of religious groups and to incorporate this into 
social policy dialogue. 
Globalisation has created new realities and new structural forms of 
poverty, as well as the cultural forces shaping these social problems 
(Jawad, 2010). In its concern for human well-being, ―religion continues 
to be a source of solutions to modern-day social problems‖ (Jawad, 
2010: 670). In order for social policy to deal appropriately with the 
multicultural and multivalue societies being created throughout the 
world, and with contexts of explicit religiosity, the multiple voices of 
populations must be heard and reflected in social policy. Religious voices 
must be heard, and their visions of social welfare incorporated. 
Jawad (2010) argues that, through adopting a religious perspective, a 
change in emphasis can be made from concerns with well-being to 
―ways of being‖, meaning chiefly that religiously inspired welfare provides 
a perspective concerned fundamentally with identity (as opposed to 
utilitarian constructions of happiness), that incorporates elements of the 
―personal/metaphysical (spiritual) experience of welfare‖, and makes 
clear a connection between social justice and (religiously held) truth. 
The question is now no longer whether or not religion should play a 
role in social policy; it already does. The questions now remain as to 
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how to pursue this understanding so as to formulate social welfare 
policies and practices which recipients find ―morally convincing‖ 
(Jawad, 2002: 327); opportunities to conceive of social policy from 
religious perspectives offer exciting prospects to social policy studies. 
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Development Aid:  
Postponing Sustainable Development 
in Africa Until Further Notice 
SIBORA DHIMA 
(Albania) 
 
 
WHY DEVELOPMENT AID & WHY AFRICA? 
Despite suffering a prolonged crisis of legitimacy in the last two decades, 
aid remains at the very top of the agenda of most development initiatives 
directed to the world‘s poorest and most underdeveloped countries. 
Whether these initiatives are small scale projects bringing mosquito nets 
to a village in Malawi or global conventions aiming to ‗make poverty 
history‘, aid is always there, at the very top, the number one prescription 
for the ‗disease‘ of underdevelopment. So powerful in fact is the belief, 
whole-hearted as it may be, that aid will indeed succeed in taking these 
countries out of poverty and on to the path of development, that most 
debates, critiques or reforms focus on the amount, conditionality, 
effectiveness or deployment of aid rather than questioning the 
probability it will ever succeed to achieve what it promises: a sustainable 
path that the world‘s poorest countries can follow towards progress and 
development. While there is much to say on the above mentioned 
debates, especially as they succeeded in problematizing the way donors 
conceive aid and the methods followed to deploy it, this paper will focus 
less on the reforms needed to make aid more effective and more on the 
possibility that the aid approach to development itself, having so far 
failed miserably to achieve what it has been promising for decades, may 
need to be scraped for new approaches that focus not on alleviating the 
symptoms of poverty but on providing these countries with the tools to 
help themselves. 
100 SIBORA DHIMA 
Amidst all debates and discourses the second largest continent in the 
world stands still to represent the whole development aid dilemma. 
Nowhere has the disappointment and disillusionment with donor 
promises been greater than in Africa – the continent that has received 
unprecedented aid flows only to find itself at the turn of the millennium 
highly dependent on (if not indebted to) aid from the developed world. 
It is rather disturbing to see in the last decade renewed calls for even 
more ODA coming from various parts of the UN, the World Bank, 
many NGOs as well as recipient countries, even though ―this region 
already receives historically unprecedented volumes of aid‖ (Moss et al. 
2006: 1). This essay takes impetus from these calls representing the 
persistent loyalty to an approach that is being criticized heavily for its 
failure to deliver. In this regard, I will outline below three main criticisms 
of the aid-solution to the development dilemma in light of the current 
state of African economies. Mainly that the aid approach to development 
often goes against one of its main goals – institutional development and 
encouragement of good policies, it turns into a disaster for the human 
resource distribution within and outside African economies and it 
perpetuates a discourse that is ever more disempowering and generates 
dependence instead of sustainability. Below these three critiques are 
elaborated further. 
AID FOR INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD POLICY 
ENVIRONMENTS – A WORK IN PROGRESS 
One of the main goals of aid programs in Africa is, in good faith to the 
traditional development initiatives in other parts of the world, to 
encourage the development of ‗good governance‘ institutions and ‗good‘ 
policies. It goes without saying that even the most inexperienced donors 
have long ago understood not only the importance of aid effectiveness 
but also that this one depends heavily on such achievements. In fact, 
most conditionalities on aid emphasize the need for institutional 
reforms, strongly relying on the premise that aid will indeed strengthen 
state capacity and public institutions while at the same time helping to 
improve (or in some countries create) the institutional framework for the 
implementation of various development initiatives. But is this necessarily 
the case? 
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Moss, Pettersson and Van de Walle explored this question and the 
literature dealing with the effects of large amounts of aid on institutional 
development in a working paper in 2006 and the results confirmed what 
many other aid critics had previously stipulated: the effects of 
development aid on institutions were more likely to result in an aid-
institutions paradox than to have the desired effect of helping such 
institutions thrive. By devoting special attention to two sectors that seem 
to be more likely to suffer from the potential negative effects of aid, the 
fiscal and state revenues sectors, they conclude that ―states which can 
raise a substantial proportion of their revenues from the international 
community are less accountable to their citizens and under less pressure 
to maintain popular legitimacy‖ (Moss et al., 2006: 1). Therefore there 
will be less incentive to invest in effective public institutions.  
This is only one of many academic as well as critical journalistic 
studies that hold this view.  
With regard to the ‗good‘ policies claim, one of the most cited works 
is a study by Burnside & Dollar and the Policy Research Department in 
the World Bank that, through econometrics estimation techniques, 
explored the relationship between aid, good policy environments and 
growth. They concluded that when aid flowed into good-policy 
environments it indeed conducted to growth. However – and this would 
be the obvious reaction to such statement – aid does not usually flow 
into good policy environments. Donors instead claim that aid will lead to 
such environments (as well as growth). Here is where the results of the 
study disagree. Growth aside, the study finds: ―the effect of aid on 
policies to be insignificantly different from zero‖ (Burnside & Dollar, 
1997: 28). In other words, the premise that more money flowing into a 
country through aid programs will develop that country‘s political 
environment is incorrect. So, while aid would indeed be more effective 
in good policy environments, it is only logical to conclude that: as it does 
not lead to such environments, aid is also much less effective in their 
absence.  
Such studies were also used to explore whether aid conditionality 
itself was conducive to an improvement in the institutional framework of 
the recipient countries. Some organizations have of course recognized 
the limitations of the conditionality approach but believe it can still work 
if the ‗right‘ conditions are to be applied (Oxfam, 1995). However, a 
more elaborate perspective could also reach the conclusion that it is not 
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the wrong type of conditions, but rather conditionality itself that has 
failed to develop better institutions and policies in Africa. One might 
argue that the relationship between donors and recipient countries is far 
more complicated than ―I give if... I take back if you don‘t...‖. In fact, 
since aid is often seen as an investment and results can only be expected 
somewhere down the road, it is not that easy (and often not in the best 
interest) for the donor party to pull out. The figures are in fact 
disturbing: As reviewed by the World Bank itself in 1992, ―although 
compliance rates on conditions were below 50%, tranche release rates 
were close to 100%‖ (Kanbur, 1998: 4). These agencies need to after all 
justify their budgets and therefore tend to be indulgent when conditions 
are not fulfilled (Goldsmith, 2001: 125). How can aid be expected to 
enforce ‗good‘ institutions (if that can indeed be considered a legitimate 
goal of development aid) if the relations between donor and recipient 
make it impossible to enforce conditionality? 
High aid flows might in fact have the opposite effect by weakening 
institutions instead of strengthening them. This can happen because aid 
is often accompanied by high transaction costs that increase 
fragmentation, leave no room for opportunities to learn and heavily 
impact government budgeting processes (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004: 
260). In fact, as Bräutigam & Knack puts it: ―high levels of aid can create 
incentives that make it more difficult to overcome the collective action 
problems involved in building a more capable and responsive state‖ 
(2004: 260-261). 
These are only some of the many studies that have explored the 
relationship between aid, institutions and policies and that have 
expressed serious concerns, increasingly shared by the African public, on 
the effects of aid on a country‘s political and institutional platforms.  
THE QUEST FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: DRAINING HUMAN RESOURCES 
OR DISTORTING THEIR DISTRIBUTION 
Yes aid may have often failed Africa, but it was all for a good cause. 
Perhaps donors were inexperienced, did not try hard enough, aid was not 
big enough or not effective enough. If we only keep trying who knows… 
This repetitive, seemingly consensual, perspective among the donor 
community seems to ignore a large part of aid programs that were 
deliberately and shamefully used to advance the direct interests of the 
 9 Development Aid: Postponing Sustainable Development in Africa 103 
donor agencies. The human resources field is an example of how aid has 
both marginalized the distribution of human resources within recipient 
countries while at the same time encouraging intensive outflows of 
experts from African countries to western economies, a phenomenon 
more commonly known as brain-drain. Really, the logic might just be the 
same as with any other resource being drained out of developing 
countries. Only in the case of human resources the states do not ‗export‘ 
them, not even on unfavorable terms to at least make the best of a bad 
deal. The ‗best and brightest‘ of African economies seem to be shifting 
either outside Africa or often seek employment within the myriad of 
international organizations operating in African countries. To say that aid 
was the only, or even defining, factor in this is to miss out on a large part 
of a bigger, more complex picture where migration, underdevelopment 
and brain-drain are inextricably linked, but recent studies seem to show 
that aid certainly did affect the phenomenon to a large degree. 
With regard to brain-drain, the health care sector in particular has 
received great attention from both journalists and academics not only 
because it was so heavily marginalized by the interference of foreign aid 
but also because, given the disastrous public health situation in many of 
these countries, it is difficult to see how they can embark on a 
sustainable road to development without first addressing the large 
portions of their population being constantly affected or threatened by 
various diseases. Yet, ―although the developed countries of the North 
are giving aid with one hand, they are robbing African countries with the 
other by siphoning off their most precious resource – trained doctors 
and nurses‖ (Johnson, 2005: 2). Countries where human resources are 
fluent in English are understandably particularly threatened by brain-
drain and literature denouncing such phenomenon especially in the 
public health sector, is ample and quite elaborate (see Johnson 2005; 
Schrecker & Labonte, 2004; Muula, 2005; Martineau et al. 2004). 
However the brain-drain of resources that could have been used 
nationally is only one dimension of this argument. The aid approach to 
development affects the internal distribution of human resources within 
the country as well, often by distorting it. It is only to be expected that 
the considerable difference of wages offered by international 
organizations in comparison with most national public and private 
enterprises means that the most qualified professionals will be attracted 
by these organizations. There is considerable room for debate on 
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whether this would indeed be the most efficient use of such resources, 
especially considering that the en masse level of involvement of national 
experts within these organizations rarely surpasses that of administrative 
or logistics departments. In an interview that falls nothing short of 
remarkable, with Spiegel International, Kenyan economics expert James 
Shikwati, put it very bluntly by referring to these as:  
―... jobs that were created artificially in the first place and that distort 
reality... When an aid organization needs a driver, dozens apply for the job. 
And because it's unacceptable that the aid worker's chauffeur only speaks 
his own tribal language, an applicant is needed who also speaks English 
fluently – and, ideally, one who is also well mannered. So you end up with 
some African biochemist driving an aid worker around, distributing 
European food, and forcing local farmers out of their jobs.‖ (2005) 
In fact, this is a phenomenon affecting all developing countries. While 
many individuals benefit at times, between these market distortions and 
the brain-drain of professionals towards western economies, the sector 
of human resources as a whole in developing countries, has certainly 
been on the losing side of the aid approach.  
HOLLYWOOD AND ROCK SINGERS MAKING POVERTY HISTORY: THE 
EVERLASTING DISEMPOWERMENT  
Africa has become the symbol of any development aid enterprise. One 
can hardly think of the word aid or charity or donation nowadays 
without subconsciously relating it to the ‗black continent‘. Songs have 
been written about it, ‗Live Aid‘ festivals have been organized about it, 
pictures have been taken and made into posters that are so painfully 
heart breaking, one no longer dares say Africa is anything other than the 
continent of suffering. This has of course been helped by world famous 
rock stars with orange sunglasses comparing the situation in Africa to the 
Irish potato famine, Hollywood stars and goodwill ambassadors of the 
UN adopting African children and a general portrayal by the media of 
Africa as nothing but pot-bellied babies with tsetse flies on their eyelids 
(Brea, 2007). 
In light of this powerful discourse, of course, many criticisms have 
followed exposing the dangers that come with it. And it is interesting to 
note that these criticisms are, in a way, dating back to the first foreign aid 
institution, the Marshall Plan, and its implementation. Similar concerns 
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were expressed by the US administration almost 6 decades ago amid 
worries that huge amounts of foreign aid flowing to European countries 
would increase dependence while at the same time downplaying the 
potential of self-help elements. (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004: 256). The 
same logic applies to the immense amounts of aid flowing to Africa in 
the last decades. So while there continue to be renewed calls for 
increased ODA, these are confronted, now more than ever, with 
countless voices from within and outside of Africa calling in unison ―... 
for God's sake, please just stop‖ (Shikwati, 2005; Brea, 2007). 
One need look no further than foreign investment flows into African 
economies and compare them to aid flows to understand the frustration 
of African academics and journalists with this discourse. Why investment 
flows? Because investment presents endless opportunities to actually 
enrich a country and can easily be the engine to its development (it is 
hard to remember a case when aid played such a role). However 
investment in Africa seems to remain low, regardless of efforts by both 
government and aid agencies, especially in those countries that need it 
the most. To put the figure into perspective, between 1993 and 1997 the 
region‘s net ODA receipts totaled $86.5 billion. In these same five years 
net foreign direct investment to Africa was only $9.5 billion (Goldsmith, 
2001). Critics to the aid approach blame the disempowering discourse 
created around Africa and its people and its governments for the lack of 
investment even in those African economies that have significant rates 
of growth. 
Major aid oriented organizations are also greatly affected by such a 
disempowering public discourse and often become its strongest 
perpetrators. One need only take a look at some of their web sites which 
seem less like awareness raising campaigns and more like e-bay 
platforms, displaying items named in heartbreaking labels like ‗donate a 
hygiene kit‘ or ‗adopt a child today‘ that charitable people might want to 
‗add to the basket‘. I‘m referring here to websites like Oxfam‘s on-line 
shopping web site and their ‗Unwrapped‘ initiative, for example, through 
which one can purchase a mosquito net for £11. Oxfam will than take 
care of getting this gift to where it‘s needed the most. And it comes with 
instructions. One can only save one child at a time from malaria 
apparently. A few months ago, in a public reaction to OECD aid figures, 
the same organization expressed its outrage and concern at the fact that 
―the £11bn shortfall could have paid for...mosquito nets for 1 million 
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people, to protect them from malaria‖ (Oxfam 2011) when for years 
now members of local communities in Africa have called for new 
approaches to addressing the issue. About 5 years ago, an interesting 
article published in The American again quoted Kenyan economist 
Shikwati:  
―We can fight malaria by distributing free mosquito nets, which may cost 
$10-$60 each by the time you get them down often impassable dirt roads. 
Or, as Shikwati suggests, we can train locals how to operate a business 
spraying homes with an insecticide that will keep them mosquito-free for 
six months at about $2 a family.‖ (Brea, 2007) 
This example goes to show how the way African communities are 
perceived drastically affects the solutions devised to address their 
problems. In a time when many of the experts are calling for solutions 
be designed locally, it is important to keep in mind that this cannot be 
achieved unless we first change the way Africans and the 
underdevelopment problem are perceived 
CONCLUSION 
This essay aimed to assess the negative impact an aid approach to 
development may have by focusing on three main criticisms in light of 
the current state of African economies: the aid approach to development 
often goes against one of its main goals – institutional development and 
encouragement of good policies, it turns into a disaster for the human 
resource distribution within and outside African economies and it 
perpetuates a discourse that is ever more disempowering and generates 
dependence instead of sustainability.  
The abovementioned criticisms do not mean to say that aid is not 
effective or even necessary to lessen some of the worst manifestations of 
poverty and underdevelopment. However, assistance or relief should be 
clearly set apart from development, especially by agencies devising 
solutions to the development issue. By confusing the two, these agencies 
risk not only devising ineffective plans, as the abovementioned examples 
have shown, but often reproduce the very phenomena they are trying to 
fight. 
Development aid is not relief aid. Development initiatives are not to 
be confused with poverty alleviation initiatives. These last ones can 
surely be addressed to a certain extent through aid, though it is very 
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likely that aid will be unable to address the root causes of poverty and 
bad governance. Development initiatives on the other hand should focus 
less on flooding poor countries with money, clothes and cheap (highly 
subsidized) food and more on wealth creation. Once this priority is set 
straight, the donors and development agencies need to recognize the 
need, not for more money, but more foreign capital and better terms of 
trade. Most importantly, when the difference between development aid 
and relief aid is clear, development organizations might just realize that 
they are operating in the wrong paradigm and that they will fail to make 
any lasting change on the ground unless the whole development 
discourse changes first. Under this new discourse, a new way of 
conceiving any intervention in these countries may well arise, one that 
aims not to repair old structures but build new ones, one that sees not 
limitations but opportunities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The complexity of fiscal decentralization in many countries has brought 
different impacts, even when intended for the same purposes and 
using the same instruments. Five major decentralization policy 
instruments: allocation of responsibilities, distribution of taxing power, 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers, central government controls, and the 
local government election rules, may bring a very different impact in the 
four impact areas: economic efficiency, macro-economic stability, 
income redistribution, and political efficiency (Prud‘homme, 2003: 19-
20). 
In decentralized Indonesia, many responsibilities are on the hands 
of local government, thus they are given the taxing power for 
collecting the local revenue and also receive central government 
transfer to overcome the vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalance 
among local governments. Many researches found that during the first 
decade of decentralization in Indonesia, there was no significant 
improvement of local government‘s self-reliance. In other words, the 
local governments are still having strong dependency to national 
governments grants. 
However, this conclusion is not enough in explaining the case of 
local governments who have abundance of natural resources in their 
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jurisdiction in which they gain huge revenues from the extraction of it. 
In these local governments, we would expect that natural resources 
related revenue would increase their self-reliance from central 
government grants, and will able to stimulate them to increase the 
local tax from the other economic sector. Therefore, it is important to 
see the influence of the natural resources revenue on the local tax 
effort in natural resources-rich local governments. 
In order to answer the question, the essay aims to assess the 
relationship between natural resources revenue to the local tax efforts 
in the resources-rich local government. In addition, the essay also 
assesses the accountability performance in these local governments in 
order to see the impact of the level of local tax effort on the 
accountability of the local governments and to conclude if there is any 
relationship between the natural resources revenue to the accountability 
of the local government. 
The essay starts with literatures review on the central government 
transfer, natural resources revenue and their impact on the local 
governments in some countries. The next section gives description 
about decentralisation policy in Indonesia, especially related to 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer and the level of discretion the local 
governments have in the spending. The two following sections 
examine the effect of the natural resources revenue to the local tax 
effort and the continuing effect of the local tax effort to the 
accountability of the three selected resources-rich local governments in 
Indonesia. The essay finally gives conclusions with some broad policy 
recommendations. 
 2. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TRANSFER AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
REVENUE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Impact of central government transfer on the local taxation and 
accountability of the local government has been well documented on 
many researches. Prud‘homme (2003) finds the evidence from 367 
municipalities in Parana (Brazil), that local tax effort decreased as the 
transfer increased. This is because the incentives to collect local revenue 
tend to disappear when the central government transfers increase (Op. 
cit.: 25). This conclusion is similar to Gramlich (1987) that conclude, 
when the central government cuts the transfer, local revenue tends to 
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increase in order to address the lack of source of financing. In relation to 
accountability, the intergovernmental transfer creates a fiscal dependency 
to central government and it will shift the accountability focus of local 
government, from the local people to the central government, from 
downward accountability to upward accountability (Yilmaz et al. 2010: 
280-281). 
Stine (1994) finds different conclusion on his research. He finds 
that when the central government transfer decline, the local revenues 
also tend to decrease. The logic argument for this finding is, when the 
transfer is cut, the local government will lack the fund to support the 
economic activities that intended to increase the local tax base. In 
other words, the local government‘s response to the decrease in the 
transfer by increasing the local tax rate and charge the public 
services. This in turn will counterproductive, because in the long 
run, the economic activities will response negatively to the increase in 
tax rate and services charges and this will decrease the local tax or 
revenue. The cut in the transfer creates vicious circles for the local 
revenue. 
The same phenomenon also applied for the revenue that the 
government gains from natural resources extraction. This is also 
known as one aspects of resources curse theory that emphasized on 
the impact of natural resources abundance and disincentive to collect 
the non-natural resources domestic revenue. Evidence from Moore 
(1998, 2007) and Collier (as cited in Bornhorst et al. 2009), stated that 
governments who depend on natural resources revenue tend to 
generate less revenue from another domestic sources. In addition, as a 
non-tax source of revenue, natural resources revenue also gives 
disincentives for the government to be accountable to the people. It 
is reflected in their policy preference of the spending priorities and 
many illegal activities of the bureaucrats such as corruption, graft, etc. 
(Centre for the Future State, n.d.). 
3. DECENTRALIZED INDONESIA 
In decentralized Indonesia, most of the local government source of 
revenue is the equalization funds, which are mostly in the form of 
general purposes grants and revenue sharing grants. The most source of 
revenue is unconditional general purposes grant, which is in total 
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accounted for 74% of total consolidated Indonesia local revenue in 2001 
(Mahi, 2002: 7). The second main source of equalization fund is the 
revenue sharing: tax and non-tax revenue. Local governments who have 
strong tax base depend on their portion of tax revenue from central 
government, while endowed local governments with abundance of 
natural resources get higher portion of their revenue from natural 
resources revenue sharing. 
The revenue from natural resources is shared between central 
government, provincial government and local government. The 
sharing mechanism is based on derivation basis from the originating 
local governments using different percentages, depends on the type of 
natural resources produced: forestry, mining, fishery, geo-thermal 
energy, oil, gas, and re-forestation fund. In summary, most of the 
percentages shared to the central government, while the local 
government in which resources are extracted get higher portion of 
the revenue than the other districts in the same province. 
In addition, for the both type of equalization funds, the local 
governments have almost complete discretion in taking decisions on 
how to use the money, based on their spending priorities. However, 
although the both funds are the transfer from central government, the 
general purposes grant is mainly aim to address fiscal imbalances 
across regions and on the other hand also as a source of local 
financing for the local governments who has fiscal gap, which is the 
different between the fiscal need and fiscal capacity. Within this 
setting, the resources-rich local governments who have strong fiscal 
capacity from their natural resources revenue should not be depend on 
the general purposes grant. 
4. NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE AND LOCAL TAX EFFORT 
In order to assess the relationships between natural resources revenue 
and local tax effort at district level in Indonesia, this paper use data 
from three regions that endowed with abundant of natural resources: 
Rokan Hilir in Riau province is an oil-producing region, Musi 
Banyuasin in South Sumatera province is producing oil and gas, and 
Kutai Timur regions in East Kalimantan province is a well-known 
region for its coal mining and oil sector. Based on the Supreme 
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Audit Board‘s audit report, these three regions are on the list of the 
top 10 the richest regions in Indonesia in 2010. 
The revenue from natural resources extraction receive by these local 
governments under the intergovernmental fiscal transfer will be 
compared with the general purposes grants and local tax effort (the 
ratio between the locally generated revenue and the local tax potential). 
This paper uses the Gross Domestic Regional Product to measure 
the local tax potential (not including the calculation of oil, mining and 
gas revenue sectors). With this definition, the local tax effort 
measurement can be use to describe the local government‘s effort to 
collect tax and generate revenue from others economic sectors besides 
the extraction of natural resources. 
Table 1 
The Composition of Main Sources of Local Government’s Revenue  
and The Local Tax Effort Ratio 
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Within this setting, this paper tries to put the hypothesis that, just like 
any dependency from central government transfer, dependency on 
natural resources revenue gives disincentives for natural resources-rich 
local governments to generate other sources of domestic/local revenues. 
The data shows that during 2004-2008 there is a trend of increase 
in the natural resources revenue sharing in the three endowed local 
governments. It is interesting to observe that even when the natural 
resources revenue increased, in general, the general purposes grants 
from central government are also increased, almost in the similar 
pattern. The positive result of the influence in the increasing of 
natural resources revenue sharing to the decreasing dependency from 
central government general purposes grants only happened in the 
Rokan Hilir Regency, with the general purposes grant shows a 
declining trend and even zero in 2008. Conversely, in the other two 
regions, the trend of increased in natural resources revenue also 
accompanied with the increased in the general purposes grant. 
However, in the Rokan Hilir region, the main factor that 
influence the zero amount in general purposes grants in 2008 is not 
the local government‘s effort on collecting taxes, but the abolition of 
the ―hold harmless‖ provisions that regulate that all recipient 
governments receive at least the same amount of what they received 
as general-purpose transfers in the last fiscal year period. With the 
abolition of hold harmless provisions, local governments who have 
strong fiscal capacity to finance their bureaucracy and pay the salary 
of the local civil servants may not receive the general purposes grants 
or may receive it in the amount less than the amount in the previous 
year. 
In the relation between natural resources revenue and internally 
generated revenue (IGR), there is a general trend in the all regions 
observed, that the increased in natural resources revenue also 
accompanied with the increased in the IGR. It is a positive result, 
which can be indicated that there is an effort of local government to 
convert the money they gained from natural resources extraction to 
the other economic sectors that generate the revenue. However, from 
the next analysis on the sources of internally generated revenues, it is 
shown on the table that the local tax and retribution contributed 
only a small part of the increased in IGR. As shown in the graphic 1, 
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the percentage of local tax and retribution to the internally generated 
revenue, in general, is only below 30%. It is indicated that the local 
governments generate local own revenue from the sources other than 
local tax and retribution. This finding is strengthened by the facts 
that the local tax effort in the regions is relatively very low. 
Graph 1 
The Contribution of Local Tax and Retribution 
To Internally Generated Revenue 
 
 
One interesting finding related to the internally generated revenue, 
based on the National Audit Supreme Board Report, in 2006, the 
internally generated revenue of 71.61 millions rupiah in the Rokan 
Hilir Regency is mostly as a result of the interest revenue from the 
placement of local budget in the bank, which is accounted for 50,99 
millions rupiah or 71% of the local own revenue. It is seems that 
there is a tendency for resources-rich local governments to save the 
money in the bank to get the easy money, and not to spend it in 
their development priorities. Unfortunately, due to the limited access 
to data sources, the author cannot present the comparison of the interest 
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revenue with the other local governments for the period of 
observation. 
This section findings strengthen the facts that the natural 
resources revenue received by the endowed regions tend still does not 
reduce the dependency from the central government grants. Moreover, 
although there seems to be a trend of increased in the internally 
generated revenue, the contribution of the local tax and retribution to 
the internal revenue is still very low. To conclude, the increase in the 
natural resources revenue and general purposes grants increase not 
accompanied by a proportional increase in regional efforts to increase 
revenue, particularly for local tax effort. 
This finding is also support the previous research by Nagathan and 
Sigvagnanam (1999), stated that the provision of a planned transfer 
will give a negative impact on local tax effort, because it will create 
the fiscal laziness (as cited in Kuncoro, 2007). It also support the 
OECD research on the effect of the natural resources revenue in the 
economic development, stated that the natural resources dependent 
government does not have incentives to promote others economic 
activities to gain other source of revenue beside revenue from natural 
resources extraction (OECD, 2008). 
Moreover, in line with the spirit of decentralization to enhance the 
local government‘s accountability, the next section will discuss the 
implication of these findings to the accountability performance of the 
respective local governments. 
5. NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Enhancing the accountability of local government is one of the main 
objectives of decentralisation, because decentralization offers greater 
opportunities to exerting stronger pressures both from above (upward 
accountability) and below (downward accountability) (Merat, 2004: 
247; Yilmaz & Mahieu, 2010: 259). Upward accountability to central 
government is a significant feature of accountability for the local 
government who depend on the central government‘s grants, while 
downward accountability can be encourage by enhancing the reliance of 
local governments on locally raised taxes (Merat, 2004: 247). 
Significant revenue autonomy and some tax-effort incentives are 
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critical to encourage downward accountability and increase the 
efficiency of local government operations (Yilmaz et al. 2010: 280). 
As mentioned above, the endowed local governments in Indonesia 
are, in general, still dependent on the transfer of natural resources 
revenue sharing and general purposes grants from the central 
government. This dependency is not accompanied with any 
conditionality. The local governments have an almost complete 
discretion in taking decisions on how to spend the money. On the 
other hand, within they taxing power, they do not optimize the 
revenue from others economic sectors beside the natural resources 
extraction, or in other words: they have less effort in generating the 
local taxes. In such situation, it is relevant to question the level of 
accountability they have to the both side, upward and downward 
accountability. 
Upward Accountability to Central Government 
In the natural resources-rich local government in Indonesia, they have 
complete discretion over the spending from the main source of their 
revenue, which is comes from central government in the form of 
natural resources revenue sharing and general purposes grant. 
Although central government does not put any string attach in such 
funding, the local governments are expected to fully disclose all the 
information in their financial statement about how they spent the 
money and report it in accordance with the national government 
accounting standards. Although the central government is not the 
only stakeholders of the local government‘s financial statement, the 
central government has strong interest for the quality of information 
produced in the report in order to produce national government 
consolidated financial report as a responsibility of the president to 
the parliament. 
One of the indicators that can be used to measure the financial 
accountability and transparency of the local government is the opinion 
of the Supreme Audit Board (BPK) on the local government‘s annual 
financial statement report. The basic rationalization for using this 
indicator is that the accountability can be encouraged by reducing the 
informational gap related to the government‘s activities (Eckardt, 
2008). One of the means to facilitate the flow of information to 
others stakeholders is the financial statement of the government‘s. In 
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Indonesia, since 2006, Supreme Audit Board starts giving the opinion, 
on the base of the assessment results on the effectiveness of internal 
control systems, conformity with the governmental accounting 
standards, adequate disclosures, and compliance with laws and 
regulations. The internal control system aspect is divided into 
accounting and reporting, budget implementation, and the weakness of 
internal control structure. 
Under Law No. 15 of 2004 there are 4 types of audit opinion given by 
the BPK RI upon examination of a Financial Statements. First, 
―Unqualified Opinion‖, stated that the financial statements of the entity 
being examined, present fairly in all material respects, the financial 
position, results of operations and cash flows of certain entities in 
accordance with government accounting principles generally accepted. 
Second, ―Qualified Opinion‖, stating that the financial statements of the 
entity being examined present fairly in all material respects, the financial 
position, results of operations and cash flows of the entity in accordance 
with accounting principles generally accepted in Indonesia, except for 
the impact of matters relating to the excluded. Third, ―Adverse‖, stating 
that the financial statements of the entity being examined does not 
present fairly the financial position, results of operations and cash flows 
of certain entities in accordance with accounting principles generally 
accepted in Indonesia. Fourth, ―Disclaimer‖, stated that the auditor does 
not express an opinion on financial statements, if audit evidence is not 
enough to make conclusions. 
As an incentive for the local government to improve the quality of 
their financial statement, central government gives an award, based 
on the assessment of their financial performance. The implication of 
this award is an additional incentive grants to the well- performed local 
government, ranging from 18 to 38 billion rupiah, according to the rank 
achievements. This amount of money that is quite significant for the 
additional source of revenues for the local government. 
However, based on the recapitulation of the Supreme Audit 
Board‘s audit opinion on the local government‘s financial statements, 
during the period observed, there is no significant improvement in the 
quality of the financial report of the selected local governments in this 
paper. Rokan Hilir and Musi Banyuasin regency relatively have 
better audit opinion, although it is not the best opinion on audit of 
financial statement. Both of them are also able to maintain it during 
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the 2006-2008. In conversely, the Kutai Timur Regency‘s financial 
statement shows a series of disclaimer opinion from the Supreme Audit 
Board. As additional information, in 2009, the Musi Banyuasin‘s 
financial statement got an ―adverse opinion‖, which means a two 
steps decline in the rank of audit opinion. 
Table 2 
The Supreme Audit Board Audit Opinion On the Local Government’s 
Financial Statements 
 
 
From this simple observation, it has some initial evidences to 
conclude that the trend of increase in the natural resources revenue 
and general purposes grants, as discussed in the previous section, 
does not give enough incentive for the three local governments to 
improve the quality of their financial statement and enhance budget 
management capacity of the local staff. They also seem don‘t have an 
effort to get some additional revenue from the incentives grants for a 
better financial performance. As the result, they have relatively low 
accountability to the central government in the financial reporting and 
also low transparency to every financial statement‘s stakeholders, 
including the local parliament and local people. 
However, although the opinion of Supreme Audit Board may 
reflect the transparency in accounting and reporting of local revenues 
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and expenditure, it still does not have a strong direct relation to the 
degree of corruption in the local government, although it can be use 
as an initial evidence for the investigation audit on corruption. In other 
words, the local government who has disclaimer opinion does not 
necessarily mean that there is a high degree of corruption in the local 
bureaucracy; conversely, the local government who has the 
unqualified opinion on their financial statement does not really mean 
that they are clean from the corrupt practice. 
Downward Accountability to Citizens 
Downward accountability to the citizens can be improved by enhancing 
political accountability through elections (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000) 
or by involving the citizens directly in the decision-making process 
beyond elections (Yilmaz et al. 2010: 268). In Indonesia, since 2004, the 
direct election system starts implemented to elect the mayor in the 
municipality, the regent in regency, and the governor in the 
provincial level. With the new election systems, accompanied with 
local discretion on the public expenditure and transfer of many 
responsibilities to the local government, the assumption of the policy 
makers is that it will enhance the downward accountability to the 
local people, because it is assumed that local government can respond 
effective and efficiently to the needs of their locality. However, direct 
election of the local leaders and parliaments, off course, does not 
automatically create accountability, although there may be a greater 
opportunity of increasing demand to the government for accountable 
within such election system. 
To further examine whether the local officials, specifically mayors in 
the resources-rich regions, are likely to be accountable to their people, 
this paper takes the corruption issue related to the mayors, during their 
active period. This paper use the journalistic information published on 
the three national news websites (www.jakartapost.com, www.detik.com, 
www.kompas.com), and two non-profit websites that focusing 
themselves on the corruption issues (www.infokorupsi.com and www. 
antikorupsi.org). These journalistic works also supported by some 
documents released by the public officials, for example, Audit Supreme 
Board‘s reports, Public Attorney documents, and Police Reports. The 
illegal events are including the allegation of fraud, corruption, 
gratification, and other illegal activities associated with the mayors during 
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the 2004-2008. The searching method used in the research are based on 
the some keywords in Bahasa Indonesia and English, and using the 
searching box feature available in the respective website. The keywords 
used are: name of the each mayor during 2004-2008, the name of the 
regions, corruption, korupsi, gratification, gratifikasi, audit, BPK, 
kejaksaan, and the combination among the keywords. Although this 
paper acknowledge the limitation of evidence on mayor‘s corruption, 
and the issue of corruption might be blowing up to the media by the 
political opposition; the news in the credible website with some supports 
of the official documents still may become initial evidences to measure 
the downward accountability of the mayors. 
This paper finds that the mayors in the three endowed local 
governments observed are allegedly involved in the corruption and 
fraud practice during their active period, although with the different 
level of allegation. This finding is not surprisingly achieved. It is also 
supporting the fact that in January 2011, 17 out of 33 governors and 138 
out of 497 mayors/regents in Indonesia is suspected in corruption, 
fraud and any others illegal activities related to their position 
(Kompas, 2011). 
This finding also supported the previous research‘s findings, such as 
Yilmaz and Mahieu (2010), that suggests the weaknesses in downward 
accountability of the resources-rich government because no citizens‘ 
scrutiny over the budgeting processes. To sum-up with the first section‘s 
conclusions, whether in the national or sub-national level, governments 
who rely on natural resources revenue and have less effort in local tax 
collection, tend to be less accountable to the citizen, have a non-
transparent sources of revenues, and have ineffective bureaucracy. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Much literature has identified political-economy mechanisms that 
may be triggered by endowment of natural resources. Throughout the 
essay, the relationship between natural resources revenue to the local 
tax efforts in the resources-rich local government has discussed in the 
framework of decentralization and assesses the continuation effect on 
the local government‘s accountability. The essay also finds the 
relationship between the natural resources revenue to the 
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accountability of the local government, although it cannot be generalized 
for every resources-rich local government. 
Table 3 
Compiled News About Allegations of Corruption and Fraud of Mayors in 
the Selected Local Governments 
 
 
 
First, the essay finds that in the local governments observed, there 
is no significant influence of the central government transfer in the 
form of natural resources revenue sharing to the local tax effort. The 
resources-rich local governments, beside gain huge natural resources 
revenue, also still depend on the general purposes grants from central 
government. The evidences show that the natural resources revenue 
has become disincentive for the local government to increase another 
source of local revenue. This result also indicates that local 
governments prefer not to optimize their local revenue resources in 
order to get the central government transfer in larger amount. 
Second, in the implication of the low level of the effort to collect 
the locally raised taxes to the accountability of the local governments, 
the essay finds some initial evidence of weaknesses in the both axes of 
accountability: upward accountability to central government and 
downward accountability to the citizen. Upward accountability to 
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central government in financial reporting is low due to lack of 
transparency, low quality of their financial statement and low capacity 
of the local staff. Downward accountability, especially the 
accountability of the mayors to the local people is undermined by the 
fact of many corruptions, frauds, and illegal activities alleged to the 
mayors. 
The implication of this research to the decentralization policy is 
that there is a need to formulate the sharing mechanism that 
encourages the local government to enhance the effort to collect the 
local taxes within their taxing power. However, the conclusion of this 
research cannot be generalized for the all resources-rich local 
governments. This limitation is due to the samples are only from the 
three regions and covers only short-periods of time, while the overall 
local governments consist of provinces, cities, and more than 400 
regions. Therefore, future research is expected to broaden the scope of 
research and to enrich the understanding of the behavior of local 
budgets at different levels of autonomy. Another challenge now is to 
ensure that resources-rich local governments spend the revenue gain 
from natural resources effectively in order to maintain the 
sustainability of development. 
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Power, Sexuality and Transience: 
Policing of Indonesian Migrant 
Domestic Workers in Singapore 
NURULSYAHIRAH TAHA 
(Singapore) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The small city-state of Singapore is well-known for pursuing capitalist 
development since independence in 1965. Less-known however, is that 
this development has been and is still based on large demands for 
migrant labour from poorer neighbouring countries to bring in new 
knowledge and fill in labour gaps for low-skilled, low-paid and high 
opportunity cost jobs that Singaporeans are not willing to do. 
Domestic work is commonly considered as one of these 
abovementioned jobs as most of the population is highly-educated. The 
need for migrant domestic workers (MDWs) is thus often framed as an 
economic necessity (Verma, 2009). MDWs are seen as practical 
alternatives for low-valued domestic work in order to free Singapore‘ 
high-skilled but limited human resources for highly-valued work. MDWs 
are also a convenient response to Singapore‘s ageing population as 
families get smaller and there are less potential carers.  
As domestic work is still considered the private, female domain, 
MDWs are also considered as ‗cheap, disposable‘ female labour from 
developing countries (Sassen, 2002). The existing pattern of migrant 
work was characterised by the Foreign Maid Scheme in 1978, where 
women from mostly Indonesia and The Philippines, but also from Sri 
Lanka, India and other Southeast Asian countries were allowed to 
migrate to Singapore to work as live-in domestic workers. There are 
currently about 196,000 MDWs in Singapore, making up about 18 per 
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cent of Singapore‘s non-resident labour force (Ministry of Manpower, 
2011). 
While the government of The Philippines has made it a law to oblige 
Singaporean employers to give their Filipino domestic workers a day off 
once a week, the Indonesian government has no such law. Various 
sources estimate that about 50 to 80 percent of MDWs do not get a 
weekly day off. As Indonesian MDWs in particular are not guaranteed 
any rest days, they are subject to the most surveillance, such as only 
entering public space under close supervision (e.g. to nearby mosque) or 
by chance (e.g. to supermarket), and the reason of ‗falling into bad 
company‘ is often invoked to justify such social control (ibid.). 
Verma (2009) deconstructed the ‗economic necessity‘ of MDWs as 
hiding ‗specific socio-cultural and historically determined issues of 
power, control, status and relative levels of affordability‘, which is in turn 
based on Chin‘s (1998) contextual approach of ‗relating the politics of 
governance to the politics of social reproduction‘. In other words, what 
is seen as economic rationality is related to social morality and 
population control. Keeping Verma‘s insights in mind, I argue in this 
essay that the policing1 of Indonesian MDWs is based on specific 
discursive constructions of their sexuality, which reinforces power 
relations of gender, class, and ethnicity in the service of global capitalism. 
In the first section, I situate the Indonesian live-in MDW 
economically, socially and politically. In the second section, I analyse the 
negative discursive representations of Indonesian MDWs in Singaporean 
law and media, which form a narrative for both state and employers. In 
the third section, I provide examples to show how the policing of 
Indonesian MDWs is based on ideas of their sexuality, and finally, I 
discuss the implications of these heteronormative and gendered ideas of 
Indonesian MDWs‘ sexuality for the reproduction of power relations. 
                                                 
1 This is a term I take from Catherine Campbell, Yugi Nair and Sbongile 
Maimane‘s (2000) analysis of the stigmatization of young peo-ple or women 
with HIV/AIDS as a form of ‗psychological policing‘, or the disciplining and 
punishment of those who ‗breach power relations of gender and generation‘. 
However, here I use the term ‗policing‘ to refer to defensive actions undertaken 
to prevent the breach of any power rela-tions. 
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1. SITUATING THE INDONESIAN MDW 
MDWs help to bridge Singapore‘s ‗economic rationality‘ and ‗social 
morality‘ (Verma, 2009). This section deconstructs the economic, 
political, and social needs for MDWs.  
Economic rationality prevails in all spheres of Singaporean society, as 
pushed by an interventionist state that finds its legitimacy by ‗delivering 
its citizens a high standard of material life via guided capitalism‘ (Chua 
1995, in Verma, 2009). The ruling elite, the People‘s Action Party (PAP) 
considers itself a moral leadership, accountable for inculcating the right 
values in its citizens. 
In Foucauldian terms, MDWs are the state‘s instrument of bio-power; 
their commoditised bodies are controlled in order to uphold the PAP‘s 
moral leadership (Verma, 2009). MDWs started coming into Singapore 
in the context of increased female labour force participation in Singapore 
during industrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s. Soon after, the PAP 
introduced its ‗Shared Values‘, which consisted of a list of ‗five shared 
core values for all Singaporeans‘, promoting ‗family as the basic unit of 
society‘, upon which to build larger social structures. 
In their analysis of PAP‘s narratives, Heng and Devan (1992) show 
that the gendered and patriarchal ideologies of reproduction revolved 
around a ‗biologically and socially reproductive‘ heterosexual, nuclear, 
and self-reliant family. Men live primarily in the public sphere as 
breadwinners and household heads, while women manage the private, 
domestic sphere. Historically, women‘s legal status and protection in 
Singapore were accorded based on the traditional roles of wife and 
mother, with attendant duties of childcare and domesticity, as stated in 
the 1961 Women‘s Charter. 
The increasing numbers of women leaving the domestic sphere2 and 
subsequent inflow of MDWs from neighbouring countries did not upset 
state-endorsed patriarchy because women (of a different class and 
ethnicity) were still primarily responsible for the domestic sphere. 
Declining fertility rates meant a growing need for elderly care, and state 
rhetoric insisted that the ‗best care‘ is that provided within the household 
and family. Thus, women are valorised as mothers and care-givers while 
also being encouraged to work. This rhetoric is accompanied by policies 
                                                 
2 In 2008, female labour force participation was 55.6% (Huang & Yeoh, 1996). 
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that make it cheaper and more convenient to hire domestic workers than 
professional services or institutions such as nursing homes (Teo & Piper, 
2009; Yeoh & Huang, 2010).3  
At the same time, the growing urban middle class aspired to a kind of 
lifestyle that only the previously rich could afford. While family members 
(mostly women) carry out some household chores and do care work by 
themselves, other domestic work is transferred to the MDWs, allowing 
female employers to enjoy the emotional value of motherhood. Verma 
(2009) concludes that employing MDWs is a luxury; it facilitates 
aspirations and affirms status for those aspiring to a middle-class 
lifestyle. 
The increasing demand for domestic servants across Asia and the 
Middle East over the last two decades meant that Indonesian women are 
increasingly leaving to work abroad. This is facilitated by being offered 
capital (in terms of debt) to migrate for work as they usually face 
restrictions on their mobility as live-in domestic workers in the 
destination country, making them simpler to control than male 
Indonesian migrants, who often have greater freedom of mobility. Being 
a MDW also offers divorced women the possibility of supporting her 
family, while many young rural women see it as a way to at least 
temporarily escape a restrictive village life.  
Lindquist‘s (2010) ethnographic study of labour recruiters in 
Indonesia provides a comprehensive account of the labour recruitment 
process the commoditisation of MDWs‘ bodies. While there is a formal 
process, migrants instead often rely on ‗middlemen‘ who must ‗deliver 
migrants before they are paid in full‘ – and thus the women‘s bodies 
rapidly transform into valuable goods to be controlled and protected. 
Besides the licensing of labour agencies by the state, other aspects of the 
migration chain4 are left to the caprices of the employment agencies and 
market forces. However, in the last five years there have been stricter 
measures to monitor these labour agencies. 
                                                 
3 Indeed, the Jamiyah Darul Takrim nursing home will only take in patients 
who have ‗exhausted all possible care arrangements such as hiring a domestic 
helper‘ (Jamiyah Nursing Home, 2011). 
4 For example, the ‗demand and supply of foreign domestic workers in 
Singapore, the matching of potential employers and prospective employees, and 
the drawing up of employment contracts‘ (Yeoh & Huang, 2010). 
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Although the vast majority of Indonesian MDWs in Singapore are 
documented, they experience precariousness in their contracts and 
salaries. MDWs are governed by the vague Employment of Foreign 
Manpower Act, where the terms and conditions of their contracts and 
their actual salary is left to the employer or market forces. They are 
regulated by a work permit system that only allows live-in arrangements 
with a single household. Most contracts last two years and are subject to 
renewal by the same or another employer, who can cancel a contract 
with only seven days notice to the Ministry of Manpower. The latter also 
does not stipulate mandatory off-days. The lack of a clear job scope 
means that a MDW‘s duties, working hours and rest days are left to the 
employer‘s needs and wants – ‗potentially exploitative conditions of a 
different order‘ (Yeoh & Huang, 2010). 
In helping employers aspire to a middle-class lifestyle, a specific kind 
of MDW is needed. Constable‘s (1997) study on the surveillance of 
Filipina MDWs‘ dress and appearance gives us insight into the possible 
kinds and implications of policing. As MDWs are seen as extensions of 
the local women in a household, they are more often than not policed 
with respect to their appearance, personal hygiene, sexuality and/or 
morality. Such policing consequently has effects on their mobility and 
ability to organise, form interpersonal relationships outside of the family, 
gain access to education or religious services. In the context of 
Indonesian MDWs in Singapore, I argue that such policing is based on 
ideas of their sexual morality. 
In order to understand the examples of such policing in the third 
section, one must first take a look at the discursive constructions of 
MDWs in Singapore‘s law and media in the following section.  
2. DISCURSIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF MDWS IN LAW AND MEDIA 
One assumes that any legislation enacted to protect a marginalised group 
is beneficial, having been designed with their welfare in mind. One 
expects that such laws were formulated to provide them with options of 
safety measure on the grounds of their apparent powerlessness and 
propensity to become victims of would-be exploiters. However, this 
section argues that the Singapore‘s Employment of Foreign Manpower 
Act (EFMA) is inadequate in protecting ‗foreign manpower‘ in general 
and MDWs in particular. Instead, it gives employers the license to 
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control this marginalised group by creating negative discursive 
representations of their sexual morality. 
There are several clauses in the EFMA that discursively and 
collectively represent foreign workers in general as being potentially 
deviant: 
S1.1: The worker shall be under the employer‘s direct employment, and 
the employer shall be responsible for the control and supervision of the 
worker. 
S1.7: The employer shall not involve or allow the worker to be engaged in 
any illegal, immoral or undesirable conduct or activity. 
S4.11: The foreign worker shall not indulge or be involved in any illegal, 
immoral or undesirable activities, including breaking up families in 
Singapore. 
S4.10: If the foreign worker is a female foreign worker, the foreign worker 
shall not become pregnant or deliver any child in Singapore during the 
validity of her Work Permit/Visit Pass, unless she is a Work Permit holder 
who is already married to a Singapore Citizen or Permanent Resident with 
the approval of the Controller (Ministry of Manpower). 
(Ministry of Manpower, 2011) 
The first two points construct MDWs as being child-like and a heavy 
responsibility as charges to their employers. The emphasis on ‗control‘ 
and ‗supervision‘ construct MDWs as incapable of norm-abiding 
behaviour and requiring constant management. These two points could 
reasonably encourage or even make it mandatory for employers to police 
their domestic workers. As for the reasons for policing, the vague nature 
of ‗illegal, immoral or undesirable‘ activities leaves the scope of 
criminality up to the employer. 
In the third point, the given example of ‗breaking up families‘ is illegal 
because of their migrant status (otherwise divorce is legal in Singapore), 
and is deemed ‗immoral‘ and ‗undesirable‘. This is in line with the state‘s 
construction of the family as a ‗basic unit‘ vital to the well-being of 
society at large. The fact that MDWs and not other Singaporeans, are 
singled out as potential ‗home-wreckers‘ is possibly partly due to their 
status as live-in household help. They do not ‗completely belong to the 
‗public‘ or ‗private‘ realm, instead dwelling somewhere in between‘, 
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where they are ‗often treated ambivalently, neither as a rightful family 
member nor a trained employee‘ (Yeoh & Huang, 2010).  
‗Breakingup of families‘ implies that the domestic worker is a threat 
to a female employer‘s roles as a wife and sexual partner. In modern 
Hong Kong, controlling a MDW‘s sexuality could be a wife‘s attempts to 
‗control her husband and defend the integrity of her family unit against a 
potentially aggressive outsider‘ (Constable, 1997). In line with the state‘s 
construction of the heterosexual and nuclear family, the law pre-
emptively criminalises seduction of the male employer, a potentially easy 
act due to the intimate nature of domestic work and the live-in status of 
MDWs. Such stories in the media have lasting influence potency because 
they construct MDWs as a sexually transgressive ‗social Other‘, thus 
helping to forge a ‗collective urban identity‘ (Sun, 2008). 
MDWs have to adhere to strict rules of conduct. They have to be law-
abiding, morally upright and engage in ‗desirable‘ activities – implicit 
recommendations that are as vague as the stated ones. This ambiguity 
becomes problematic due to their live-in situation, and their migrant 
status. Situated at the intersection of various marginalisations, MDWs are 
at high risk of potential covert or overt abuse and exploitation. 
The media also constructs MDWs as being helpless victims, through 
sensational articles on the publicised cases of molestation by male 
employers or male migrant workers, emotional and physical abuse by 
female employers, unsafe work practices and the less publicised cases of 
receiving insufficient food, rest, salary (or having their salary withheld), 
or being deprived of freedoms (to use the phone, leave the house, meet 
friends). 
A recent case in the local newspaper describes the murder of 
Ruliwayati, a Indonesian MDW, by a Bangladeshi male migrant worker 
after a ‗tempestuous‘ relationship (Soh, 2011). The article details her 
extra-marital affair as being fraught with arguments about her husband 
and son back in Indonesia. The sub-headline (―Woman, whose body was 
found in tank, had ‗near break-ups‘ with her boyfriend‖) highlights two 
common themes in the media about MDWs: criminality and sexuality. 
The writer describes the relationship as being a consequence of 
loneliness, a normal aspect of being a migrant worker – thus giving it a 
sense of inevitability. Ruliwayati is constructed as a sacrificing migrant, 
‗forced‘ to leave her young son due to ‗financial problems‘. She is 
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described as ‗petite and attractive‘ while there is no description given of 
the Bangladeshi lover, suggesting that the former‘s attractiveness made 
the latter attracted to her. Finally, although she often argued with her 
lover, they often reconciled even though she wanted to break it off. This 
constructs her as having an uncontrollable need for affection, stemming 
from loneliness and her migrant status. Implicitly, the article claims to 
show the negative consequences of breaching society‘s standards of 
morality, especially if one is a migrant. 
On the flipside, MDWs are also represented in the media as being 
perpetrators of minor and major crimes. Such representations by state 
laws and the media create a dominant discourse of MDWs‘ sexuality; 
they ‗have no modes of sexual subjectivity to identify with except as 
transgressive figures or victims of sexual offenses‘ (Sun, 2008). 
In fact, there are no official statistics available on the numbers of 
abuse perpetrated by either employers or MDWs themselves – neither 
from the Ministry of Manpower, the Department of Statistics, or the 
Singapore Police Force – however, Verma‘s (2010) triangulated 
qualitative and quantitative data shows that ‗there is more violence 
enacted than is being recorded, and in various other forms besides the 
overtly physical‘. Sexuality-based policing is part of such violence, which 
is difficult to estimate given the private nature of domestic work. 
Sexuality as a unit of analysis has been hidden or overwhelmed by 
concepts of ‗gender roles, morals, deviance, and pathology‘. Manalansan 
(2006) finds that many ‗queer scholars argue that all social 
discourses…more often privilege, if not exclusively promote, hetero-
normative ideas, practices, and institutions‘. The next section looks at 
some examples of such hetero-normative policing of MDWs by labour 
agencies, state law and employers.  
3. POLICING BY AGENCIES, STATE AND EMPLOYERS 
The EFMA expressly states that MDWs cannot get pregnant while in 
Singapore or marry any Singapore citizens or residents throughout the 
duration of their work permit. The state assumes that MDWs could use 
their sexuality to create and manipulate situations to ‗garner material and 
cultural capital through emotional and monetary relationships with 
(Singaporean) men who may eventually enable the women to live more 
comfortable lives‘ (Manalansan, 2006). Any MDW who is pregnant will 
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be repatriated and until recently, employers could lose a SGD5000 
security deposit if their MDW goes against any of the conditions in the 
EFMA. 
In Lindquist‘s (2010) ethnographic study of Indonesian labour 
agencies, he is told by the manager of a Jakarta-based agency that 
pregnancy is one of the ‗most common type of disease (penyakit yang 
paling biasa)‘ for female migrants. By making pregnancy equivalent to 
serious diseases like hepatitis B and thus vital to vaccinate against, these 
labour agencies legitimise their practice of forcing MDWs to get 
(sometimes additional) contraceptive shots before leaving Indonesia. 
Labour agencies also often ‗encapsulate‘ or isolate these women in their 
offices for a short period of time (akin to detention) before sending 
them out, on the basis of the risk of pregnancy.5 In return, these agencies 
limit their losses, since the fees to send MDWs to destination countries 
are exacted in the form of debts. These strict and harsh practices are 
legitimised with a certain conception of the MDWs‘ fertility. 
In Singapore, the state imposes obligatory medical examinations on 
MDWs every six months, which includes tests for pregnancy, HIV and 
sexually-transmitted diseases in addition to a general medical check-up. 
These requirements construct the state as fearing the MDW‘s sexuality. 
After detailing one rule after another, it appears that MDWs are more 
bodies than people. These strict rules help to ‗create docile, productive 
bodies needed to service capitalism‘, who embody transience and relative 
powerlessness (Verma 2009). 
While employers also police their MDWs in ways linked to the latter‘s 
sexuality, they may not do so because of primarily politico-economic 
motives. They may police the MDWs on the grounds of cultural-based 
morality, fear of bad influences or fear that their MDW will run away (in 
which case they will forfeit part of their SGD 5000 security bond). 
Through personal communication and personal observations of 
Malay Muslim employers of Indonesian MDWs, a cultural-based policing 
becomes salient. These employers claim that they treat their MDWs as 
part of their own family, based on the similar religion, language and 
dietary practices between these employers and their MDWs, but such 
                                                 
5 It takes several weeks after conception to test for pregnancy ‗with any 
certainty‘ (Lindquist, 2010). 
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rhetoric is problematic it masks structural inequalities and relations of 
power. 
Narayan‘s (2000) argument of viewing cultures as a ‗package‘ can help 
our understanding of why these employers can justify their policing 
based on MDWs sharing the same religion (Islam). While Constable 
(1997) found that the it was more difficult to integrate Filipina MDWs as 
fictive family members, due to among other factors, their cultural 
differences, in this case similar ethnic heritage (Javanese, Sumatran, or 
Batak) and ensuing similar dietary practices and preferences make it 
easier for employers to put aside differences between their cultures and 
use the rhetoric of family. 
In addition to the infantilising tendency of the primary, female 
employer (usually also a wife and mother in the household) which is also 
promoted by the state, Indonesian MDWs tend to be younger and less-
educated than their Filipina counterparts, so they are consequently 
treated like young daughters of a conservative Malay Muslim family and 
subject to the same (or stricter) policing of their dress code, activities 
outside the home, relationships with the opposite sex, deferential 
attitudes (or lack thereof) towards older family members, and 
assumptions about their social and sexual naïveté. Most these forms of 
policing are rooted in notions of sexuality.  
For example, in my home, my parents always exhorted our 
Indonesian MDWs to pray and they also kept tabs on how they dressed 
(whether an outfit was too tight or too revealing). Some of my more 
conservative relatives also ensured that their MDWs wore a tudung 
(headscarf) each time they left the house. At times, the MDWs were 
subject to stricter policing than the young girls of the family themselves, 
revealing the relations of power between employer and employee. 
Alternatively, some employers or even MDWs themselves insisted on 
short, masculine, hairstyles. Constable‘s (1997) study on how employers 
in Hong Kong controlled the dress codes of their Filipina MDWs, 
including cutting their hair short, resonates with my personal 
observations. In this context however, the masculine hairstyle is not 
merely to dampen the MDWs sexuality and create neutral, non-
threatening androgyny but also to subvert the Islamic mainstream 
requirement of covering the hair of adult women. As most MDWs do 
not end up covering their hair constantly in a household (due to reasons 
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of practicality), shorter hair helps employers feel less threatened as the 
MDWs themselves appear and possibly feel less attractive. 
Policing helps employers to legitimise not giving their MDWs any 
days off. Although the EFMA recommends6 to employers to give their 
MDWs rest days that allow them to leave the household, this depends on 
the employment contract, and often financial compensation can be 
exchanged for no rest days at all. The examples below show how TR and 
LR, both female Singaporean Malay Muslim employers in their 30s, use 
reasons of social and sexual naïveté to justify not giving their Indonesian 
MDWs any rest days. 
TR: Looks like there will soon be many cases of maids with Banglas found 
in rooftop water tanks… Giving them a day off will make me kepala pusing. 
Already now I makan hati. No [days off] from me. I hope one day you … 
[will get] a chance to feel of having a maid who take care of your kids and 
do housework then you know what we are going through. If we were 
given a choice, we will go without a maid too. Maybe you all haven‘t felt it 
yet, that‘s why. Main hembus aje! 
LR: They have a different level of emotional and mental tolerance and I 
worry that the maids themselves may not be able to cope with the social 
effects that they may face when they are out during their off-days. Too 
many people are out there to take advantage of them. Spill-over effect is 
the safety and well-being of my very young kids could be at stake. 
(Personal communication, 8 Jun 2011) 
Both employers use the examples of Bangladeshi male migrant 
workers as potential predators preying on their socially and sexually 
naive MDWs. TR refers to the murder case of Ruliwayati to as an 
example of the dangers of letting her MDW move around beyond the 
house. She sees the rest days as opportunities for her MDW to get into 
trouble and potentially violate laws or the conditions of her work permit, 
                                                 
6 The EFMA recommends rest days among other recommendations, such as 
providing medical treatment, ‗adequate‘ food and rest, ‗safe‘ working conditions 
and ‗acceptable accommodation‘. However, such recommendations are not 
legally binding and are thus left to the employers‘ discretion. Accommodation 
arrangements vary for live-in domestic workers vary, depending on family size, 
housing conditions and the consideration of employers. 
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which could in turn give herself a headache (kepala pusing) and make her 
angrier (makan hati) than she is already.7 
LR also does not give her MDW a day off because she is afraid that 
they will be exploited. Such a fear is in line with the gendered 
assumptions of violence, that it will be men (specifically male migrant 
men) that will take advantage of or exploit women. The ‗spill-over effect‘ 
and compromise of the ‗safety and well-being of (her) very young kids‘ 
that LR alludes to could be referring to the word-of-mouth cases of 
MDWs who invite their Bangladeshi boyfriends into their employers‘ 
homes when the latter are not around. LR seems to suggest that by 
allowing her MDW out of the house, she could seduce or be seduced by 
dangerous strangers and bring them into her house.8 
4. DISCUSSION 
Luibhéid (2002) remarks that the state‘s legal, political, cultural and 
economic regulation of migration ‗reproduces sexual identities, practices, 
and categories‘, because these regulations are ‗mediated though implicit 
sexualized ideas‘ about migrants. Therefore, the MDW embodies such 
policing based on race, ethnicity and sexuality and represents the site for 
‗promoting‘ or ‗repressing sexualised images, desires and stereotypes‘ 
(Manalansan, 2006). 
The gendered stereotype perpetuated by the media and employers of 
a socially and sexually naive MDW who will be taken advantage of by 
migrant men highlights male violence and exploitation of women. The 
gendered focus on male violence towards women serve to draw attention 
away from the violence or exploitation that female employers inflict on 
                                                 
7 It is also interesting how TR victimises herself as being forced to hire a 
MDW. This phenomenon echoes Verma‘s (2010) insight on how some female 
employers that ‗make a mockery of the idea of the ‗second shift‘‘ by becoming 
‗‗stressed‘ over having to take on the role of micro-manager to a ‗stupid‘ or 
‗frustrating‘ maid. 
8 LR also infantilises her MDW by assuming that they are unable to handle the 
‗social effects that they may face‘ when they are outside the employer‘s 
household. The casting of MDWs as being ‗needy, immature and inadequate‘ 
may help employers perceive themselves to be ‗generous, thoughtful and 
superior moral guardians‘, as suggested by Verma (2010). 
138 NURULSYAHIRAH TAHA 
MDWs, or MDWs on the less-powerful young children or elderly people 
in their care. 
On the other hand, the heteronormative stereotype of the sexually 
active MDW who will bring dangerous male strangers into the 
employer‘s home excludes MDWs with other sexual orientations. 
Indeed, Constable (1997) found that some Filipina MDWs in Hong 
Kong preferred to emulate men‘s dress; she also found a sizeable 
number of Filipinas in lesbian relationships, partly due to the greater 
freedom that migration brings but also due to the sexual ‗safety‘ (no risk 
of pregnancy) of a same-sex relationship. In fact, Von der Borch (2008) 
found that many Indonesian MDWs saw their migration to Singapore as 
a chance to explore their sexuality and gain sexual experience. 
Both stereotypes justify the social repression of MDWs and 
reproduce existing gender roles. These gendered and heteronormative 
stereotypes legitimise the restriction of the MDWs‘ mobility and related 
access to education and social association (meeting other MDWs can 
allow them to share unpleasant experiences but also strategies of coping). 
This is because ‗family and migration policies are in dialectical relation‘ 
i.e. any reform of the working and living conditions of MDWs depends 
on the state‘s approach to welfare and especially its construction of the 
‗ideal Singapore family‘ (Teo & Piper, 2009). As long as state rhetoric 
about the family and welfare provision stays the same, it is difficult to 
change policies affecting migrants.  
Regional-level relations of gender, class and ethnicity are reproduced, 
and mimicked at the national level. The policing of MDWs reproduce 
power relations of gender in the household by reproducing normative 
meanings of reproduction and mothering for both MDWs and 
employers. By hiring MDWs as an extension of themselves for the 
private sphere while they work in the public sphere, female employers do 
not challenge economic rationalism and the state‘s rhetoric of family. 
Capitalism and patriarchy go in tandem because of the ‗process of 
(re)domestication of women – including both wife and domestic worker‘, 
establishing instead a ‗class-based sexual sensibility‘ and a ‗new moral 
hierarchy‘ (Sun, 2008). 
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CONCLUSION 
This essay analyses the heteronormative and gendered policing of the 
sexuality of Indonesian MDWs. In essence, it argues that such policing, 
while it uses the pretexts of cultural sameness and familial harmony, 
actually serves to reinforce national and regional power relations of 
gender, class, and ethnicity in the service of global capitalism. 
It takes as an overarching framework the deconstruction of discourse 
in the law and media, to uncover deeper discourse that reveals multiple 
relations of power. The analysis is divided into four sections that look at 
four different aspects of the policing of MDWs. The first section situates 
the Indonesian MDWs as occupying the intersection of economic 
rationality, Singapore‘s rhetoric of the ‗ideal family‘, and the gendered 
nature of migration for paid domestic work. The second section looks at 
the discursive representations of MDWs in general in state laws, and 
Indonesian MDWs in particular in the media. 
These discursive representations of infantile, naive and helpless 
victims, yet uncontrollably deviant and sexual, are echoed in the ways 
that labour agencies, the state, and Malay Muslim employers police 
Indonesian MDWs, as elaborated on in the third section. This policing 
by labour agencies construct MDWs as ‗valuable commodities to be 
controlled by agencies and employers and later workers to be regulated 
and citizens to be protected by state actors‘ (Lindquist 2010), legitimising 
strict immigration policies, exploitative labour relations and imbalanced 
employer-employee relations. 
The final section discusses the implications of policing. 
Heteronormative stereotypes of migrants and gender roles of employers 
are reproduced, thus taking attention away from female-female violence 
and sexual agency of MDWs. At the regional level, the continual hiring 
of MDWs reproduce power relations of gender, class and ethnicity, thus 
maintaining patriarchy, authoritarian rule and global capitalism. 
While the examples used here are specific and contextual, they help us 
to understand some of the mechanisms of power at work in the policing 
of MDWs, one of many types of top-down violence against marginalised 
groups. It is above all important to understand the mechanisms of power 
in order to find the opportunities for social action. 
140 NURULSYAHIRAH TAHA 
REFERENCES 
Campbell, C., Y. Nair and S. Maimane (2006) ‗Aids Stigma, Sexual Moralities 
And The Policing Of Women And Youth In South Africa‘ Feminist 
Review 83(1): 132-138. 
Chin, C. (1998) ‗In Service and Servitude: Foreign Domestic Workers and the 
Malaysian ―Modernity‖ Project‘. New York, USA: Columbia University 
Press, pp.1-30. 
Chua, B.H. (1995). ‗Chapter 1: From Authoritarianism to Communitarianism‘, 
in Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, pp. 9-39. London, UK: 
Routledge. 
Constable, N. (1997) 'Sexuality and Discipline among Filipina Domestic 
Workers in Hong Kong', American Ethnologist 24(3): 539-558. 
Heng, G. and J. Devan (1992) 'State Fatherhood: The Politics of Sexuality, 
Nationalism and Race in Singapore', Nationalisms and Sexualities, pp. 343-364. 
New York/London: Routledge. 
Huang, S. and B. Yeoh (1996) 'Ties that Bind: State Policy and Migrant Female 
Domestic Helpers in Singapore', Geoforum 27(4): 479-493. 
Jamiyah Nursing Home (2011) 'Admission Criteria'. Accessed 20 June, 2011 
<http://jnh.jamiyah.org.sg/subindex.asp?id=A080_11>. 
Lindquist, J. (2010) 'Labour Recruitment, Circuits of Capital and Gendered 
Mobility: Reconceptualizing the Indonesian Migration Industry', Pacific 
Affairs 83(1): 115-132. 
Luibhéid, E. (2002) Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.  
Manalansan, M.F. (2006) 'Queer Intersections: Sexuality and Gender in 
Migration Studies', International Migration Review 40(1): 224-249. 
Ministry of Manpower (2011). 'Employment of Foreign Manpower Act 
(Chapter 91A)'. Singapore Statutes Online. Accessed 23 Jun 2011 
<http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-
bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno=REVED-91A>. 
Narayan, U. (2000) ‗Undoing the ‗Package Picture‘ of Cultures‘, Feminisms at a 
Millennium, Signs (25)4: 1083-1086. 
Sassen, S. (2002) 'Global Cities and Survival Circuits', in B. Ehrenreich and A.R. 
Hochschild (eds) Global Woman: Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New 
Economy, pp. 254-274. New York: Metropolitan Books. 
Singapore Government (1991) Shared Values. White Paper, 2 January. 
Singapore Government Printer. 
 11 Power, Sexuality and Transience 141 
Soh, E. (2011) 'Maid often Argued with Lover: Friend', The Straits Times 18 May, 
p.2. 
Sun, W. (2008) 'Sexuality, Domesticity, and Citizenship in the Chinese Media: 
Man's Needs, Maid's Rights', China Information 22(2): 221-244. 
Teo, Y. and N. Piper (2009) 'Foreigners in our Homes: Linking Migration and 
Family Policies in Singapore', Population Space And Place 15(2): 147-159. 
The Singapore National Committee for the United Nations Development Fund 
for Women, Humanitarian Organisation for Migration Economics and 
Transient Workers Count Too (2011) 'Made to Work: Employers. Attitudes 
Towards Granting Regular Days Off to Migrant Domestic Workers‘. 
Accessed 24 Jun 2011 <http://www.scribd.com/doc/58677324>. 
Verma, A. (2009). ‗Unpacking Economic Necessity: Locating the Foreign 
Domestic Worker in Singapore.‘ Draft version. 
Verma, A. (2010) 'Multiple Forms of Violence in Maid-Employer Relations in 
Singapore', Master Thesis. Singapore: National University of Singapore. 
Von der Borch, R. (2008) 'Straddling Worlds: Indonesian Migrant Domestic 
Workers in Singapore', in M. Ford and L. Parker (eds) Women and Work in 
Indonesia, pp. 195-214. New York and Oxon: Routledge. 
Yeoh, B. and S. Huang (2010) 'Foreign Domestic Workers and Home-Based 
Care for Elders in Singapore', Journal Of Aging and Social Policy 22(1): 69-88. 
 
 
  
142 
 
12 
American Women‟s Movement in 
Turmoil: An Analysis of “American 
Electra” by Susan Faludi 
MAHSA SHEKARLOO 
(Iran) 
 
 
 
Within feminist circles, there has been much hand wringing over the fate 
of the movement‘s future since its heyday in the 1970‘s. There have been 
different interpretations from feminist scholars and activists over why 
American society has seemed to turn away from feminism. Of particular 
concern has been the growing observation that many young women are 
not embracing feminism. Susan Faludi‘s piece, ―American 
Electra,‖published in Harper’s Magazine, is a provocative contribution to 
this debate. Faludi analyzes the historical rise and fall of feminism 
through a generational lens and argues that the women‘s movement is 
being threatened by a legacy that pits generations against each other 
along a mother-daughter divide.  
Faludi, a well-known American feminist, makes her argument in a 
complex and extensive essay, which is part historical, part social analysis, 
and part personal narrative. While the breadth and depth of her essay 
does not allow for an exhaustive analysis within the constraints of this 
paper, I have chosen to examine several components of Faludi‘s essay, as 
a narrative. The first part of this paper will examine how Faludi, as a 
feminist, situates herself within the structure of a personal experience 
narrative (PEN) in a way that allows her to launch a very public critique 
of the women‘s movement. The second part will examine Faludi‘s 
conception of the women‘s movement, as a narrative concept, because 
for Faludi and many other feminists, the women‘s movement is first and 
foremost, a political movement. As such, her essay can be viewed as a 
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political narrative, which aims to change society ―by stating claims about 
the future based on assumptions about the past and the present‖ 
(Shenhav 2004: 82). Due to space constraints, I will restrict my 
application of Shenhav‘s narrative conceptualization analysis to the 
chronological re-ordering of the women‘s movement and its key words 
to understand how Faludi‘s conceptualization of the narrative past and 
present informs her prescriptions for the future. Lastly, I will examine 
the essay‘s two main categories of the women‘s movement 
(mother/older and daughter/young) to show how Faludi‘schoice of 
categorization constructs her feminist social world by privileging 
particular social identities.  
CONTEXT 
The American women‘s movement began as a political project to 
emancipate women from oppressive structures that hindered their 
participation in public life. Later, the movement extended its critique 
into the private domain and argued that family life and intimate relations 
are also imbued with relations of power. Bythe late 1970‘s, the Second 
Wave movement was not only engaged in political and social activism, 
but also in the production of a body of feminist thought. It is safe to say 
that one of the greatest achievements of the Second Wave was the 
institutionalization of women‘s studies within the academy.  
As a discipline, women‘s studies (like its political activist branch) was 
based on its ―description of a particular kind of subject: women‖ 
(Salamon 2008: 118). However, the coherence of this social category, 
which had long served as the foundation of the women‘s movement, was 
soon interrogated by various scholars and activists in the 1980‘s, who 
argued that various subjectivities, derived from race, ethnicity, and sexual 
orientation for example, had been excluded. In essence, their critique 
challenged the universality of the category of women and highlighted its 
dimensions of exclusion. The response was to expand the definition of 
woman to include these excluded subjectivities into the category as well 
(Salamon 2008: 119).  
In the 1990‘s, this interrogation expanded into the very notions of 
gender and sex, which aimed to destabilize binaries of gender 
(feminine/masculine) and sex (female/male) by pointing to alternative 
forms of identities, such as trans-gendered identities, and to intersex 
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persons, like hermaphrodites. Feminist theorists like Judith Butler 
questioned the very nature of woman, arguing that not only gender, but 
also sex, is socially and discursively constructed, and therefore, a product 
of power. None of these debates, relating to race, sexual orientation, 
gender, and sex, have been resolved, nor have they completely uprooted 
earlier traditions of feminist thought. As such, these conflicting analyses 
and political visions co-reside uneasily within U.S. feminism.  
The effect of these interrogations has not only shifted the terms of 
the debate within feminist theory, but also within women‘s activism. This 
is because contemporary feminism is both an analytical and political 
project (Mahmood2001:206). Ever since feminist analysis has questioned 
the universality and coherence of the category of woman, feminist 
politics has been struggling to formulate a broad-based political vision 
for the future. In other words, on what basis can the women‘s 
movement organize when there is no longer a solid consensus on who or 
what ―women‖ are?  
Susan Faludi‘s piece is another contribution to this debate, which was 
published in Harper’s Magazine. The choice of magazine is interesting for 
several reasons. Faludi has chosen to write a critical piece about 
feminism in a non-feminist journal. Faludi is not an academic so one 
would not expect her to write in a feminist academic journal. But why 
not write in a feminist magazine? It could be that there are very few 
feminist print magazines for a popular audience and most have limited 
circulation. Instead, she has opted to write for a respected magazine 
known for its progressive, left-leaning politics and history of over 150 
years. Keen to Harper’s long history, perhaps she wanted her essay to 
remain safely stored in a magazine whose historical legacy in progressive 
American journalism is secured.  
Yet, Harper’s long history raises another issue: Faludi‘s essay is 
compelling for many reasons, but in light of the debates within feminism 
outlined above, it is significant for her inclusion of yet another social 
identity into the debates, and that is of youth. In Faludi‘s essay, the 
tension is not organized along racial or sexual lines, although the subtext 
is definitely there, but rather between generational lines. It is a battle 
between older and younger within the women‘s movement. The new 
group or social identity that is rocking the boat this time is youth. From 
what is popularly known about youth and from what Faludi tells us in 
her piece, youth mostly read and write on the Internet. The most 
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influential young feminist forums are on the Internet and much 
discussions and networking are taking place through social media. 
Harper’s Magazine is not available on the web without a subscription so its 
articles are not freely available on the Internet. It‘s safe to assume, 
considering its ―old reputation‖ and relative inaccessibility to youth, that 
young feminists are not reading Harper’s Magazine in significant numbers. 
So, who is Faludi‘s audience? It would seem that Faludi intended her 
audience to be the older feminists and other sympathetic progressives, 
who are more likely to read Harper’s. 
If so, such an intention could account for her generally sympathetic 
tone to the older generation, in which she makes efforts to articulate 
their sense of betrayal. In other words, Faludi is treading a delicate line: 
Her blunt critique is intended for older feminists but written with a style 
that says, ―I am sympathetic to your plight.‖ This way, her auditors can 
safely feel that they are not objects of attack while maintaining an open 
ear to her critique.  
I. ANALYSIS OF TEXT AS NARRATIVE STRUCTURE 
The text‘s structure will be analyzed using Labov‘sstructuring of the 
personal experience narrative (PEN), as discussed in Johnstone‘s article, 
―Discourse Analysis and Narrative‖. However, due to the essay‘s 
complexity, length, and use of different styles of writing, I have 
expanded on the PEN model to provide a more thorough illustration of 
the essay‘s structure.  
Abstract Clause and Introduction  
The abstract clause sets up the narrative by announcing ―that the 
narrator has a story to tell and makes a claim to the right to tell it, a claim 
supported by the suggestion that it will be a good story, worth the 
audience‘s time and the speaking rights the audience will temporarily 
relinquish (Johnstone : 638). In this section, I will examine the essay‘s 
title and its opening sentences, as part of the abstract clause. Because the 
essay is lengthy and the breadth of its narrative is extensive, I also 
include a brief discussion of the two-page introduction, of which the 
abstract clause is one part. The introduction provides Faludi‘s 
conceptualization of the problems within the women‘ movement, the 
justification for the conceptualization, and the stakes that are involved.  
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Abstract clause 
Harper‘s Magazine readers are introduced to the essay on the cover page 
of the magazine. It is listed first, as the lead article, under the heading, 
―American Electra.‖ Electra refers to the Greek mythological character, 
who along with her brother, plot to kill their mother and step-father for 
killing their father (Wikipedia: ―Electra‖). The ancient Greek tragedy 
writers, Sophocles and Euripides,each devote a tragic play to her life. 
Later, in 1913, the psychoanalyst, Carl Jung, uses her name as a 
metaphor to describe the mother-daughter ―psychosexual conflict,‖ in 
which the daughter‘s initial attachment to her mother is transferred to 
her father, hence initiating a sexual competition with her mother 
(Wikipedia: ―Electra Complex‖).  
Continuing the metaphoric use, Faludi also uses Electra‘s name as a 
metaphor to describe a mother-daughter conflict. The preceding word, 
―American,‖ informs the reader that the essay‘s story is specifically about 
America. The subtitle provides the rest of the necessary information to 
understand what the story will be about: ―Feminism‘s Ritual Matricide‖. 
The mother-daughter conflict is taking place within feminism and it is 
the mothers who are being killed. So who are the perpetrators? Referring 
back to Electra, we can conclude that the killing is taking place at the 
hands of the daughter. More ominously, the killing is ritual, which 
according to the New Oxford American Dictionary, means it has become 
―convention or habit‖. So, not only are mothers being killed, but the 
repeated killing has somehow become acceptable within feminism!  
Feminism has a long history of contesting unequal relationships 
between women and men and their related gendered constructs, such as 
patriarchy, masculinity, and so on. Needless to say, Faludi‘s selection of a 
title, which suggests repeated acts of violence between women, is 
unusual anddefinitely provocative. Furthermore, the subtitle‘s use of the 
word, matricide, suggests Faludi‘s position about this mother-daughter 
conflict: It is the mothers who are the object of their daughters‘ violence 
and destruction.  
The essay‘s opening sentence provides the reader with an elaboration 
of the problem: ―No one who has been engaged in feminist politics and 
thought for any length of time can be oblivious to an abiding aspect of 
the modern women‘s movement in America—that so often, and despite 
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its many victories, it seems to falter along a ‗mother-daughter‘ divide‖. 
As someone who is involved with feminism, Faludi makes her claim to 
tell the story of a historical legacy that weakens the women‘s movement: 
The division between mothers and daughters within modern U.S. 
feminism. The metaphoric use of familial terms constructs feminism as a 
family or community of women. This long-standing problem is so 
obvious as to be inescapable to those who are ―engaged‖ with and 
ostensibly sympathetic to feminism. As a well-known American feminist 
who previously authored a best-selling book about the backlash to 
feminism in American society, Faludi is one such person. This time, she 
turns her critical eye not to external factors that are weakening the 
movement, but to internal ones. As a concerned member of the family—
not as mother or daughter but perhaps older sister—she is authorized 
and compelled to write this piece and to provide a critical assessment of 
the women‘s movement.  
The opening sentence also defines feminism as both a political 
practice and a body of thought. By using the word, ―and‖ instead of ―or‖ 
between the two components, we are to understand that the practice and 
theory in feminism are intertwined, co-constitutive, and as such, largely 
inseparable.Put another way, feminism can be understood as a political 
project that challenges unequal power relations on both political and 
analytical fronts. And it is on both fronts, that the movement is in 
trouble.  
Introduction: What’s at stake 
According to Faludi, feminism is being threatened by ―the battle of the 
ages‖ which she metaphorically describes as a mother-daughter rift (29). 
By the second paragraph, Faludi assesses the battle as one of power in 
which American feminism ―hasn‘t figured out how to pass power down 
from woman to woman, to bequeath authority to its progeny‖ (29). The 
costs of this inability threaten ―women‘s progress not just within the 
women‘s movement but in every venue of American public life‖ (29). 
For Faludi, the women‘s movement is a political movement that needs to 
―reproduce itself as a strong and sturdy force‖ (30). Why, one may ask, is it 
so necessary for the movement to stay strong? The reader is to 
understand that gender inequalities remain a significant social problem 
that threatens women‘s advancement in society and threatens the 
wellbeing of American society, more broadly. As a feminist, Faludi is 
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concerned with unequal power relations in society organized along 
gender lines. Therefore, what is at stake is not just the equality of 
women, but the achievement of social justice.  
Faludi identifies some of the ongoing problems of women today, 
such as unequal pay, lower employment status, women‘s poverty, lack of 
social support for working mothers, the weak presence of women in 
decision-making positions in economic, political, and social spheres, and 
sexual and domestic violence (30). As a feminist, Faludi identifies the 
social position of women as a political issue and as a key indicator of 
society‘s advancement. In her framework, the women‘s movement is 
THE political movement that is able and responsible for advocating and 
securing women‘s advancement. As such, the internal battle between 
women within the movement threatens its ability to successfully improve 
women‘s lives and to achieve gender equality. For Faludi, the social 
category of woman is a given and what is at stake is their emancipation 
from economic, political, and social systems of oppression.  
The urgency and graveness of feminism‘s internal problems are 
illustrated through sentences such as, ―How can women ever vanquish 
their external enemies when they are intent on blowing up their own 
house?‖ (30). Instead of using Harper‘s Magazine as a forum to address 
the external obstacles, her essay serves as a wake-up call to her fellow 
feminists—as a trustworthy, authoritative and concerned insider—to pay 
attention to feminism‘s ―self-destruction‖ (30). 
Lest the reader think that Faludi has imagined the problem, she 
provides numerous examples of statements by fellow feminists from 
both camps (old and young) that support her assessment: ―How many 
times have we heard women say, ‗No older woman has helped me in my 
career—my mentors have all been men‘?‖; ―…a more general dismay 
about feminism I hear all the time from women:… ‗Young women are 
narcissists who don‘t care about politics‘‖(29-30). Such sentiments are 
presented as so prevalent within the movement that they have practically 
become truisms. As we will see later in the essay, Faludi‘s task is to show 
that the generational divide is not new, but rather, a legacy from the past. 
By using the word, ―we‖, Faludi makes clear that she is referring to 
herself and other women who are engaged in the movement and who are 
familiar with this internal discourse.  
Later within the introduction, Faludi switches to the first person 
singular and implicates herself as ―not exempt‖ (Faludi 2010: 30). She 
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recounts a lunch date with a fellow feminist, where after they complain 
about younger feminists, her friend claims, ―‘We‘re really furious with 
these young women, aren‘t we?‘‖. And Faludi writes in response, ―And 
they with us‖ (Faludi 2010: 30). Even though Faludi implicates herself in 
the camp of the older feminists by using the words, ―we‖ and ―us‖, she 
uses her response, ―And they with us‖, to show her willingness and 
intention to understand both sides of the conflict. As such, she will be 
judicious and fair and will examine both perspectives. She bolsters this 
claim by situating herself as a 51-year old woman who does not fit neatly 
into the older or younger birth cohorts within the movement. Sometimes 
she feels sympathetic with the younger women‘s position and other 
times, ―a middle-aged grumpiness tends to place me on the ‗old‘ side‖ 
(Faludi 2010: 30). By extension, she is telling the reader that her 
ambiguous generational status enables her to better examine the two 
camps, of which she is not a full-fledged member of either. Again, 
perhaps Faludi can be considered as an older sister—old enough to 
identify with her mother and young enough to have a rapport with her 
younger sister.  
Orientation 
Within the personal experience narrative, orientation ―introduces the 
characters, temporal and physical setting‖ (Johnstone 2001: 638). In the 
next section of the essay, Faludi takes us back a year to the annual 
meeting of the National Organization for Women (NOW) in the 
Sheraton Indianapolis Hotel to meet the characters that will drive the 
events and tensions that take place later in the piece. Here, we are 
introduced to the characters that play supporting and major roles in the 
major event to take place: the election of the next NOW president.  
For readers who are not familiar with the women‘s movement in the 
U.S., they may be confused by the significance of the event and Faludi‘s 
omission of any explanation of NOW‘s role within the women‘s 
movement. Here, again, we are reminded that Faludi‘s intended audience 
are those people who already have some information about feminist 
politics and who already are familiar with NOW‘s historical role. 
Therefore, no explanations are forthcoming about NOW‘s founding in 
the early 1970‘s at the height of the second wave of the women‘s 
movement to advocate for women‘s equality. For Faludi, the significance 
of NOW, past and present, is self-evident, thus revealing her own 
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orientation within the movement, since there are many feminists who 
would argue that NOW is no longer a significant player. More 
ominously, they could argue that NOW privileges white middle-class 
identities and political priorities at the expense of others. Or at the very 
least, other feminists could argue that NOW is just one of many players 
within a movement that not only includes different generations but also 
different feminist orientations and identities, and therefore, Faludi needs 
to justify why she chose NOW over other organizations. One 
justification could be that as a 30something-year old organization, NOW 
includes members of both camps and therefore provides a useful site to 
examine the generational divide within the movement.  
Faludi informs the reader that the impending election of the next 
president could serve as a seminal moment since the leading candidate, 
Latifa Lyles, if elected, ―would be the youngest NOW president ever, 
and the first black president since…the early Seventies‖ (Faludi 2010: 
31). This is one of several places in the essay where Faludi acknowledges 
other social identities, such as race, within the women‘s movement. But 
because her argument is based on generational identities, she does not 
explore and integrate these tensions further. Such elisions, even for the 
sake of making her argument clearer, are problematic because multiple 
factors of identity (and power) cannot be neatly peeled off and separated 
from one another. This is especially relevant in the case of NOW, which 
as an organization has only had one black president, ―who held the 
position for a year,‖ despite the significant contributions of black women 
to the women‘s movement (Faludi 2010: 31). 
Various characters declare that their support and enthusiasm and 
make far-reaching claims for Lyles‘ probable win: her young age (33 
years old), youthful disposition, commitment to a more diverse 
constituency, and technological savvy could propel NOW to ―a different 
level‖ and make it ―super-relevant‖ again (Faludi 2010: 31). We also learn 
that Lyles is a long-term member of NOW who gradually moved up the 
ranks and whose development was nurtured by the incumbent 55-year 
old president who supports her candidacy. At this point in the story, 
things are looking good: A young black candidate who was nurtured 
from within the organization could rise to leadership. There is little 
indication of the destructive generational rift, even though the 
introduction of another candidate, 56-year old Terry O‘Neill, hints at an 
impending shift. 
 12 American Women‟s Movement in Turmoil 151 
Complicating Action: “Unity” deteriorates to a “standing joke” 
According to Labov, complicating action clauses ―refer to events in the 
world of the story and, in the world of the telling, they create tension 
that keeps auditors listening‖ (Johnstone 2001: 638). With the 
introduction of O‘Neill, who boldly declares to resurrect the priorities 
and strategies of NOW‘s older members, the optimistic world of the 
NOW electionsoon disintegrates. The generational rift explodes to the 
surface and overshadows all other internal differences as both camps 
hurl accusations at each other. Faludi has access to both camps and 
quotes the hostile comments, even those that are made within each 
camp‘s respectiveconfines. Faludi‘s goal is not to present a unified front 
to the external world or to take sides, but rather to show the destructive 
nature of the inter-generational battle, of which both sides are complicit.  
The NOW election deteriorates into a site of bitter differences, 
recriminations, and power struggle. In response, Faludi, makes her 
emotional evaluation, ―…an event recently imagined as an institutional 
baton-passing was suddenly threatening to tear the organization apart—
and tear it apart along dismayingly predictable lines‖ (Faludi 2010: 32). 
Faludi is at once both insider and outsider: a fellow feminist who is 
emotionally distressed by what she is witnessing while working as an 
outsider journalist/ social critic, ―comment[ing] on the story from the 
outside‖ (Johnstone 2001: 638).  
Narratives within the PEN Narrative: Historicizing the Generational 
Conflict 
Once Faludi establishes the conflict and tension within the story of the 
NOW election, Faludi breaks with the narrative to provide a historical 
background to the conflict. She provides two historical narratives: The 
past decade, when the current conflicts began, and a historical account of 
the establishment and development of the women‘s movement. By 
historicizing the women‘s movement, Faludi‘s intention is to establish 
how and why the roots of the mother-daughter conflict began.  
When providing the recent context for the current conflict, she 
discusses the various debates within the women‘s movement since 2000 
that serve to reiterate her conceptualization of the mother-daughter 
divide. This section is filled with angry and resentful sentiments from 
both sides. We learn that race, sexual orientation, and sexuality are 
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frequent issues of contestation, in which the older generation is 
oftentimes put on the defensive. Again for Faludi, the underlying theme 
in these debates is the age-divide, thus subsuming these other issues to 
her privileging of generational relations. At times, she sarcastically 
recounts the younger generation‘s critique, as when she states that 
younger lesbians ―reject their Sixties predecessors by typecasting older 
lesbians as frumpish big mamas plodding around in hausfrau muumuus 
and baking nutritional nut loaves, while their bad-girl daughters are 
breaking the bedsprings with their battery of sex toys and strap-ons‖ 
(Faludi 2010: 34). Reading such statements, it is hard not to sympathize 
with the older women who are ridiculed for not being sexy enough.  
However, one gets the sense that in her quest to prove the graveness 
of the mother-daughter conflict, Faludi sacrifices the substance of the 
debates. For example, serious criticisms have been launched at queer 
communities in the U.S. for relinquishing their radical edge for the sake 
of acceptance in U.S. society. One specific topic of debate concerns the 
movement to legalize gay marriage. While it is outside the scope of this 
paper to engage in the debates, numerous lesbians have expressed 
concern about the push for making homosexuality another normative 
category alongside heterosexuality; where the goal is to legitimize 
homosexuality by its inclusion into the institutionalized realm of the 
family. My point is not to affirm these critiques, but rather to say that 
looked upon from this other perspective, the older women can be 
viewed differently: Not as radicals who are losing their ground in an 
increasingly conservative, consumer-saturated society, but rather as 
conservatives who no longer want to stand outside and critique 
mainstream society and who desire inclusion instead. 
The second part of her historical account is an interesting review of 
the development of the American women‘s movement. Here, we are told 
that early feminists of the 19th century relied heavily on the mother-
daughter alliance to empower women of both generations and to enable 
their entry into social life. However, the bond breaks by the 1920‘s with 
the rise of consumerism in American life, thus pitting daughters against 
mothers, and establishing the divisive legacy that continued through the 
second wave of the 1970‘s and that flourishes in the third wave of today. 
In this section, Faludi herself, as observer, is not present in this section. 
Rather, she writes as a historian, removed and personally absent.  
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Result/Resolution: There are no real winners 
The resolution ―releases the tension and tells what finally happened‖ 
(Johnstone 2001: 638). After eight pages of extensive historicizing of 
mother-daughter relations within the American women‘s movement, 
Faludi returns to the site of the NOW election on its last day. The legacy 
of generational division has wreaked havoc on the once hopeful NOW 
election; the scene has turned bitter, as expressed through ―rumors and 
allegation‖ from both sides (Faludi 2010: 40). Faludi chooses to be 
present in the younger Lyles‘ suite to witness reactions from the election 
result. By a slim margin, we learn that Lyles loses the race, to which ―The 
room fell silent in shock‖ (Faludi 2010: 41). Lyles optimistically reassures 
her supporters that they will prevail as the leaders of the future, which 
she calls ―twenty-first century feminism‖ (Faludi 2010: 41). Does this 
framing imply a break from the past or rather a continuing development 
from the past? Faludi provides no answers, yet she tells us that several of 
the younger promising members of NOW, including Lyles, ultimately 
leave the organization after the election. Whatever their future holds, it 
will no longer be linked to the organizational future of NOW.  
For now, the older members of NOW have prevailed. Their positions 
secured once again, Faludi, the insider-outsider, interrogates the older 
members over breakfast the following day about NOW‘s future and their 
―failure to pass the torch to a younger generation‖ (Faludi 2010: 41). 
Faludi‘s overriding concern is that inter-generational battles are 
weakening the movement‘s effectiveness and the NOW election serves 
as evidence of the movement‘s self-destructive tendencies. It is this 
larger concern that emboldens her to reveal the nastier, behind the 
scenes fights between the women. This was, after all, an internal battle, a 
family-fight of sorts, and Faludi wants us to know that there are no real 
victors. Throughout the essay, Faludi is at pains to show both sides of 
the battle through her extensive quoting of younger and older members. 
She shows us their conflicting emotions and the emotional costs: The 
disappointment of the youth and the remorse of some of the older 
members who want reconciliation. Others remain angry and accuse the 
young of ageism and a presumptuous desire for power.  
Through these revelations, we also see how power is organized along 
generational lines. On the one hand, the older women maintain their 
hold on institutional power, but they are operating in a social context 
that devalues women as they age and that tends to favor youth. The 
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reader gets the sense that while the older women have won the battle, 
they may ultimately be on the losing side of the war.  
The Coda Clause: The End of History? 
The coda clause announces that the story is over, sometimes 
―connecting the world of the story with the present‖ (Johnstone 2001: 
638). For the coda of the story, Faludi moves the narrative ten months 
after the election, when she attends an academic conference on the 
future of gender studies. Here, Faludi examines theother key aspect of 
feminism, its theoretical and scholarly side, where there are also anxieties 
about the future. Faludi takes us to the other important institutional 
legacy of the movement‘s second wave in the 1970‘s – the 
institutionalization of gender studies in the academy. In this section, we 
are to learn that this achievement is also in peril, and once again, the 
danger is largely emanating from within.  
For Faludi, the circulation of power straining inter-generational 
relations emanates from a newer ―consumer-saturated feminism‖, which 
celebrates dubious characters such as the pop-star Lady Gaga, as the 
future (Faludi 2010: 41-42). This embrace and integration of consumer 
culture into feminism is received by the older generation as a betrayal of 
―‘the political projects and promises of other generations‘‖ and an 
indication of a ―‘shared generational political apathy in the face of 
widespread social injustice‘‖ (Faludi 2010: 42).  
In this section, the lines of division are clearer for Faludi: Between 
one generation who wants to maintain the liberatory vision of the past 
and the other who wants to ―‘shed the weight of history‘‖ (Faludi 2010: 
42). Faludi aligns herself on the side of the older scholars, who feel 
betrayed by the younger feminists, when she states that the past feminist 
vision ―now faces displacement from an even more infantile 
transgressiveness… that posits a world where pseudo-rebellions are 
mounted but never won nor desired to be won, where ‗liberation‘ begins 
and ends with wordplay and pop-culture pastiche and fishnet stockings, 
and where all needs can be met by the bountiful commercial breast, the 
marketplace‘s simulacrum of the mother‖ (Faludi 2010: 42). The costs 
for this ahistorical, commercially-inspired feminism is the de-
institutionalization of feminism within the academy and the de-linking of 
the political with the theoretical. Here, Faludi does not give airtime to 
those feminist scholars who critique women‘s studies for their emphasis 
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on politics at the expense of theoretical rigor. Faludi, like the older 
feminists, believes a ―new theory‖ means an inferior politically 
compromised one. The essay ends with her sympathetic encounter with 
―a lone woman with graying hair,‖ a professor, who despite her efforts 
to integrate her curricula with younger feminist scholarship, has been 
pushed out of the university.  
Her exclusion signals the demise of feminist studies for Faludi even 
though this conclusion is questionable considering that the New School, 
the institution in question, has plenty of other feminist scholars who 
teach in other departments. For Faludi, the feminist project cannot 
continue if it is integrated into other disciplinary departments. The 
establishment of women‘s studies as a separate discipline was a 
significant achievement of the second wave. Its elimination can only 
signal a larger demise of the movement and not arefiguring of its future.  
II. NARRATIVE CONCEPT: THE WOMEN‟S MOVEMENT 
The following section provides a chronological ordering of the women‘s 
movement, which Faludiuses as a narrative concept. Since Faludi does 
not structure her essay and use of the concept in a linear temporal order, 
I have re-ordered itchronologically to understand how her claims for the 
future are informed by her conceptualization of the past. 
Women‟s Movement 
The ―women‘s movement‖ serves as a narrative concept, which Shenhav 
defines to be, ―a special sign, in which ‗the signifier‘ links with a 
‗signified‘ ‗story‘ or a type of story, consisting of at least two events‖ 
(Shenhav 2004: 83). The key words of the concept constitute the various 
historical incarnations of the movement, which Faludi characterizes as 
―America‘s most fruitful political movement‖ (30). Within this narrative 
concept, there are synonyms and types that have been shaped according 
to the political goals of a particular historical period. The ―feminist 
movement‖ often serves as a synonym for ―women‘s movement.‖ 
Following Shenhav‘s Step 6 of the ―narrative conceptualization analysis,‖ 
I have arranged in chronological order, Faludi‘s discussion of the 
important events ―in which the key words are involved‖ (2004: 83-84). 
Faludi uses the mother-daughter relationship as the metaphor to describe 
the changing relationship between the two generations.  
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18th century 
The decades following the American Revolution are characterized as a 
kind of pre-women‘s movement, when the nation‘s founders constructed 
a notion of ―republic womanhood‖ that linked women‘s roles as 
mothers to their roles as citizens. This newly found ―maternal authority‖ 
enabled and justified ―women‘s entrance into public life‖ (Faludi 2010: 
35). 
19th century (Early First Wave of the women‟s movement) 
 The abolition movement as one kind of female reform movement, in 
which slavery was condemned as a ―violation of maternal rights‖ 
(Faludi 2010: 36). 
 The temperance movement, as the ―largest and most powerful female 
reform movement of the nineteenth century … built around a 
mother-daughter protective vision‖ (Faludi 2010: 36). 
Early 1900s (Peak of the First Wave) 
The women‘s suffrage movement emerged as ―the culmination of all 
these reform efforts,‖ which framed its cause ―as mothers protecting the 
bodily integrity and bolstering the power of their daughters‖ (Faludi 
2010: 36). 
1920s – 1960s 
The 1920‘s were a ―cataclysm,‖ the ―hinge moment‖ that broke the 
mother-daughter alliance, destroyedthe ―old maternal feminism,‖ and lay 
the groundwork for a later ―matricidal feminist culture‖ (Faludi 2010: 36 
& 39). It also ushers in a period in which the women‘s movement ―went 
dark for nearly half a century‖ (Faludi 2010: 39). 
1960s – 1970s (The Second Wave) 
The women‘s liberation movement revives the women‘s movement but 
abandons the mother-daughter bond in favor of ―sisterhood‖ (Faludi 
2010: 39). In this critical historical moment, the movement is founded by 
―motherless daughters‖ and is driven by generational conflict and the 
―driving principle of matricide‖ (Faludi 2010: 39). 
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2000 – present (The Third Wave) 
Third Wave feminist movement embraces a pop-culture politics of 
―‘being seen‘‖ and a post-modern gender theory that challenges ―notions 
of sexualized identity‖ and questions the very category of ―women‖ 
(Faludi 2010: 41 &42). Its commercialized notion of liberation and 
insistence on shedding the weight of history have continued the twin 
legacies of matricide and ―commercially infused relativism in feminist 
activism and scholarship‖ (Faludi 2010: 40). 
III. CATEGORY ANALYSIS 
Within the narrative concept of the women‘s movement, Faludi 
constructs two categories of women: Older/mother and 
younger/daughter across several centuries. Using some elements of 
Yanow‘s methodology of category analysis, I will discuss some of the 
similarities and differences between the categories and examine the 
meanings assigned to them across time, according to the chronological 
ordering outlined in the previous section. Again, due to space 
constraints, the following category analysis is not exhaustive. I have 
chosen to focus on how the power dynamics between the categories 
shift over time and to examine the implications of Faludi‘s privileging of 
the two categories‘ social identity as women, at the expense of other 
identities.  
The most obvious similarity between the categories is that they are all 
women. But as we will see, they are not always feminists.Furthermore, as 
relational concepts, the two categories are defined in relationship to each 
other: Older women are those that are older than the younger women 
and vice versa.  
Faludi exalts the early period of U.S. feminism as a time when the 
mother-daughter relationship served as an empowering framework for 
women. However upon a closer reading, it becomes apparent that within 
this framework, it was largely the mothers who did the organizing and 
formulated feminist demands. The symbolic ―stately woman,‖ ―the older 
women named Justice, Liberty, Peace, and Hope‖ are ―accompanied by 
their symbolic heirs,‖ who are the younger women (Faludi 2010: 35). 
The younger women are members of the supporting cast—they are 
nameless beneficiaries. The ―‘Bereaved Mother,‖ ―‘Mother Frances,‘‖ 
and ―‖Mother State‘‖ are other symbolic figures that Faludi includes in 
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her category of older women, who ―rescue American daughters‖ (2010: 
36). With the exception of the ―Daughters of Temperance,‖ the early 
feminists derive their identities, agency, and power, not as daughters but 
as mothers. Furthermore, the discourse of women‘s emancipation is 
formulated and owned by the older women. As such, an age hierarchy 
and unequal power relation between the two categories are clearly 
discernable. 
With the arrival of the 1920‘s, the onset of the dark period of the 
women‘s movement and the critical turning point in Faludi‘shistorical 
narrative, the visibility of the respective categories is reversed. The 
significant symbols become the young flapper, ―the iconic female image 
of the Twenties‖ and Miss America, who forge their relational identities 
by rejecting their prudish ―obsolete‖ mothers (Faludi 2010: 38). Here, 
Faludi acknowledges the reversal in authority in the mother-daughter 
relationship and for the first time, problematizes the unequal power 
relationship, which she calls matricidal. Faludi does not question the 
power dynamics of the previous period because the older women 
protected and empowered their young within the framework of an 
emancipatory feminist movement. But the younger women‘s autonomy 
from the older women in the 1920‘s is achieved through their 
submission to and identification with exploitative men. Within this new 
relational paradigm, younger women are again denied agency since they 
are being exploited and manipulated by a discourse and by economic 
conditions that are controlled by powerful men. 
When the women‘s movement is revived in the 1960‘s and 1970‘s, it 
does so carrying the baggage of the previous period‘s mother-daughter 
conflict. However, this time, the discourse of the conflict is framed and 
controlled by the younger feminists of the second wave movement. Here 
again, mothers are on trial, not for prudishness, but for being ―consumer 
saps,‖ and older feminists are interrogated for serving as ―dupes of a 
capitalist system‖ (Faludi 2010: 39). What is noteworthy about this 
period is the emergence of younger women as social and political agents. 
For the younger women, their mothers and feminist forebears are 
implicated in the structures that they seek to dismantle. In other words, 
age and generation become factors of structural power in their analysis. 
As a result, the relationships that sustain the younger women are not 
vertical relationships with older women or oppressive men, but rather 
horizontal peer relationships among women.  
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With the arrival of the third wave of the women‘s movement, Faludi 
is more equivocal about the balance of power between the two groups. 
In fact, the problem seems to be two-fold: The older and younger 
women continue to remain oppositional but now the power seems to be 
more evenly distributed. Neither group can gain enough momentum and 
support to jumpstart a movement resembling the impact of the previous 
waves. As a result, the movement remains mired in the mud of its own 
internal battles.  
For Faludi, the solution is for both groups to de-center their 
oppositional generational identities and re-center their shared identities 
as women. Inevitably, and even naturally, Faludi believes that the 
mother-daughter metaphor will continue to give meaning to the 
relationship between younger and older feminists. By pointing to the 
historical precedent of the First Wave, she believes that the mother-
daughter relationship can be framed again as one of unity and mutual 
empowerment. However, as discussed above, I believe that Faludi‘s 
sentimentalizing treatment of the First Wave ignores and serves to 
naturalize the unequal power relations within that earlier relationship.  
Furthermore, the social conditions under which the First Wave 
formulated the mother-daughter bond have significantly changed. Since 
the early 1900s, the expansion of high school and university-level 
education significantly expanded, which helped to create a distinct life-
stage between childhood and adulthood, which we call youth. Between 
1910-1940, the numbers of young Americans who entered high school 
dramatically increased – from less than 20% to 73% (Wikipedia: ―High 
School Movement‖). As a result, young people no longer directly moved 
from childhood to adulthood, which is commonly marked by marriage 
and the establishment of families. This new life stage, which was enabled 
by the expansion of education and the abolition of child labor, led to the 
emergence of youth identities and cultures. Within the U.S. context, 
youth culture left its first explosive mark in the 1960‘s, at the time of the 
Second Wave women‘s movement.  
I believe it is no accident that Faludi discerns the first self-inflicted 
generational rupture during this period. However, because she privileges 
the movement‘s shared identity as women and ignores youth as a social 
identity, she tends to pathologize the generational divide as unnatural 
and destructive. I do not mean to suggest that generational divides are 
inevitable or natural, but rather to argue that the way out of this conflict 
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is not to suggest a return to a sentimentalized past, when social 
conditions differed and when particular social identities had yet to 
emerge or be given a voice. Faludi‘s failure to historicize the category of 
youth, I believe, hampers her assessment of the generational divide.  
A similar point can be made about the other lines of division that 
Faludi mentions but does not elaborate on—the conflicts and debates 
about race, sexual orientation, and sexuality. These were not divisive 
issues in the First Wave because particular practices had yet to become 
widespread, or because members of these groups were so excluded that 
they had yet to gain the opportunity to assert their concerns. While 
Faludi‘s concern is the generational divide, it is hard to ignore the fact 
that the vast majority of women within her two categories, past and 
present, are white. On the one hand, by keeping her categories as racially 
homogenous as possible, Faludi is able to keep us focused on her issue 
of concern, which is generational difference. On the other hand, it is 
very difficult to keep race out of any discussion concerning power 
relations in American social and political life, and feminism is no 
exception. For example, Faludi informs us that one of the most intensely 
contested issues in recent years between the older and younger women 
were the last U.S. presidential elections. We are told that younger women 
said over and over again that they would not vote for Hillary Clinton 
because she reminded them of their mother. But we are not informed 
that most of those women voted for Obama, a black male candidate 
instead. So how to interpret their choice? Do their votes for Obama 
indicate that young feminists prefer patriarchy—Obama, is after all, a 
man—over an older powerful woman? Or are other power relations and 
identities, in addition to those based in gender, also shaping young 
feminists‘ political values and beliefs? If so, does that mean that they are 
betraying feminism?  
There are other ambiguities and omissions in Faludi‘s categorization. 
For example, the professor, Judith Halberstam, whom Faludi introduces 
as a ―daughter‖ was 49-years old at the time of the essay‘s publication. 
Halberstam was only seven years younger than Terry O‘Neill, the NOW 
candidate representing the older generation. Therefore, it seems that it is 
neither age nor generation, but rather theoretical and political 
perspective that seems to define the categories. Furthermore, only those 
perspectives that are deemed oppositional to the other category are 
relevant. In other words, feminists who hold viewpoints, attitudes and 
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values that are not considered oppositional to either group, are not 
included as a category. As such, they are omitted from the debates and 
social world, which Faludi constructs. In fact, there are plenty of 
feminists who challenged and questioned the tenets of Second Wave 
feminism but who neither deny the significance of history nor embrace 
consumer-saturated feminism. Their contribution to the debate is 
missing.  
CONCLUSION 
Susan Faludi‘s provocative and interesting essay uses the mother-
daughter relationship as a metaphor to give meaning to the inter-
generational relationship of feminists within the American women‘s 
movement. Through an historical account of the movement‘s earliest 
days to the present, Faludi shows how the mother-daughter relationship 
has changed from one of cooperation to one of conflict. Faludi holds up 
the early cooperative years as an ideal, in the hopes that today‘s feminists 
find answers to some of their problems in the past.  
By examining Faludi‘s essay as a narrative, I have tried to show the 
ways in which Faludi positions and reveals herself in what must have 
been a difficult essay to write. Faludi is emotionally, intellectually, and 
politically invested in a movement, which she fears is losing strength and 
momentum. The extensive space she gives to airing both sides‘ 
emotional positions serves to drive home the point that the battle is 
painful for both sides.  
As a narrative concept, Faludi‘s portrayal of the women‘s movement 
across time reveals what I believe to be a certain sentimentalizing of the 
past, when conflicts were few and maternal authority was unquestioned. 
Holding the narrative concept of the movement against the categories 
Faludi invokes led me to conclude that the privileging of the women‘s 
movement as first and foremost a movement of women, denies the 
multiple, intertwined social positions that produce complex identities, 
which can no longer be reduced to just a woman‘s sex. For Faludi, what 
holds the women‘s movement together is that ultimately they are all 
women. However, if using woman as a social category and mobilizing 
point for political action was once possible, it was made possible partly 
because other identities were excluded and submerged. I believe that 
Faludi‘s essay falters because she does not address this problem.  
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The construction of ―youth‖ as a category has changed the dynamics 
of the mother-daughter relationship, problematized the hierarchal 
relationship, and positioned age/generation as another structure of 
power. As such, it is no more or less abnormal than other relationships 
of power and is equally deserving of critique and analysis. As a member 
of the Children and Youth Studies specialization at the ISS, I appreciated 
Faludi‘s attempt to critically examine the feminist movement along 
generational lines.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Somalia currently tops every ranking of failed states and is characterized 
by radical decentralization and deregulation. Production and trade are 
loosely governed by clan-based polities, warlords, criminal gangs and 
private entrepreneurs, making Somalia the ―world‘s largest duty free 
shop‖ (Menkhaus 2004: 51). In the wake of state collapse in 1991, and 
especially since 2005, the frequency and sophistication of pirate attacks 
off the coast of Somalia have dramatically increased, amounting to a 
US$8 billion loss in global trade annually and further destabilizing a 
beleaguered territory of geostrategic interest (Bowden et al. 2010). The 
pirate business emerged when local fishermen began to collect fees from 
foreign trawlers who were overfishing Somali waters, but has evolved 
into a transnational industry linking ship and arms dealers, financiers in 
Dubai and London, twelve major pirate enterprises, and shipping 
companies and insurers. A global value chain of the pirate business can 
help illuminate its processes, estimate its costs, and identify its embedded 
interests. The crucial role of trust among non-state actors in the piracy 
value chain displays how relational mechanisms of value chain 
governance can mediate fragmentation and crisis, especially when the 
implicated value chain is informal. 
TRUST MITIGATES SHOCKS AND UNCERTAINTY IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
International value chains are the ―central neural system‖ of the global 
economy, coordinating information and behavior among producers, 
consumers, and state and non- state actors (van Bergeijk 2010: 80).  
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Fragmentation and vertical disintegration of globalized states, firms and 
consumers are said to propagate shocks, increasing the severity and 
simultaneity of trade collapse, but there is weak empirical evidence in 
support of this hypothesis (van Bergeijk 2010: 86-91). Rather, it would 
seem that value chains ―may actually have supported international 
business to business markets‖ to recover from collapse, given that such 
chains ―breed trust amongst firms because of the long run character of 
their trade relationships‖ (ibid.: 92). Trust is the ―expectancy of positive 
outcomes that one can receive based on the expected actions of another 
party in an interaction characterized by uncertainty‖ (Sahay 2003). Such 
trust enables ―a full exploration of what each partner has to offer to the 
exchange and value creation process‖; allows synergies that lower costs 
and risks; and cultivates long-term, interpersonal relationships that guide 
supply chain processes (ibid.: 553). 
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The empirical literature demonstrates that a one standard deviation 
increase in trust corresponds to a minimum 24 percent increase in 
exports.8 Such analysis conceives of distrust and cultural diversity as non-
economic barriers to trade. Cultural explanations of trust are common 
among relational network theorists, who claim that ―reputation or family 
and ethnic ties‖ manage complex interdependencies in a value chain, 
―dampen[ing] opportunistic behavior‖ (Gereffi, Humprey and Sturgeon; 
2005: 81). Socio-spatial proximity in this system facilitates the exchange 
of ―tacit‖ information, guaranteeing a high level of coordination through 
face-to-face interaction (ibid: 85). 
Information and coordination are especially relevant for Somalia‘s 
market structure, currently a neoliberal‘s dream: existing goods and 
services are privatized, trade is internationalized and there is no enforced 
regulation. Facing trade liberalization in the absence of formal, modern 
institutions, Somalis have looked to pre-colonial, clan-based traditions to 
organize economic life. Somalis are divided into large provincial 
networks of familial sub-clans that are not strictly delimited territorially, 
but are nonetheless quite distinct spatially (see Figure 1). The persistence 
of tribal organization in Somalia, where patrilineal lineage has never so 
clearly dictated political and economic alliances, reveals the hold of the 
segmentary kinship model on everyday life (Little, 2003: 12). ―Trust and 
fair practice especially are critical in the Somali economy where legal 
enforcement is minimal‖ (ibid:10). The vibrancy of clan-based trade 
networks has enabled ―resilience‖ in the face of an uncertain future since 
the independence era, helping the population ―survive dismal formal 
economic and political circumstances‖ (ibid: 3). For example, 
―[livestock] traders in the border region have always invoked…kinship 
and ethnicity to gain access to markets‖ and have developed institutions 
like dilaaal (market brokers) to facilitate and guarantee transactions (ibid 
11). ―The notion of trust is inherent to the institution of dilaal and 
relevant to understanding ‗unofficial‘ economies like Somalia‘s‖ (Baars 
and Riedige n.d.). 
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Under conditions of conflict, the role of non-state actors in value 
chains becomes weightier, and can be destructive, as with violence, or 
constructive, as in the ―use of economic assets and relationships to 
increase the cost of conflict and to strengthen…politically stable 
relationships…[and] economic security‖(Van Bergeijk 2010: 17). Modern 
terrorism, for example, usually occurs at the non-state level, increasing 
uncertainty and reducing trust between trading partners. This is 
particularly resonant in Somalia, which has been framed largely by the 
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counter-terrorism discourse since 1991, due to the presence of violent 
Islamists who now control most southern and central territories, as well 
as much of Mogadishu, the capital city. While the international 
community has made fourteen failed attempts to reinstall a central 
government, ongoing chaos has propelled Somalis to seek non-state 
solutions to political and economic insecurity. Clan-based governments 
in Somaliland and Puntland, northern regions of Somalia, have proven 
persistent and have declared their autonomy (see Figure 2). Similarly, 
informal livestock and fishing trades have persisted through state 
collapse, and profitable industries in warlordism and khat (a stimulant 
leaf) have thrived in the past two decades. Non-state strategies of 
economic security—and particularly their dynamics of trust— therefore 
merit greater attention in Somalia. Maritime piracy is one such informal 
economy. 
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TOWARD A GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN FOR PIRACY 
 With the longest coastline in Africa and its status as a failure among 
failed states, Somalia experiences half of all pirate attacks globally. The 
Gulf of Aden north of Somalia feeds into the Suez Canal and is an 
important shipping corridor that links the Mediterranean Sea with the 
Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean. Pirate gangs have their pick among 
21,000 ships that transit the Gulf of Aden annually, including those 
carrying 10 percent of the world‘s oil supply (United Nations, 2010). The 
International Maritime Bureau attributed 65 boardings and hijackings 
and 152 attempted attacks to Somali pirates in 2010 (see Figure 3). Of 
these, 53 took place in the Gulf of Aden, 25 in the Red Sea and 141 in 
the Arabian Sea or Indian Ocean (see Figure 4). Pirates launch attacks 
with motherships, small skiffs (speedboats), GPS and satellite 
technologies, automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. Last 
year, 49 vessels were hijacked and 1016 seafarers were held hostage for 
ransom. The vast majority of these hostages were released unharmed 
after ransom payments averaging US$1-2 million per ship were privately 
delivered on behalf of shipowners. It is less expensive for shippers to 
take the risk and pay ransom if necessary than it is to avoid the Suez 
Canal by rerouting around the southern tip of Africa (Coggins, 2010: 87). 
To buffer the additional risk, they take out high-premium insurance, 
streaming profits to multinational insurers. 
Piracy organizations range from two fishermen in a skiff to 
shareholder structures to gangs of several hundred employees. Main 
pirate hubs include Eyl in Puntland, Xarardheere in central Somalia and 
Kismaayo in southern Somalia, with about nine smaller operations in 
Marka, Garard, Hobyo and Bosasso, among other ports (Bowden, 
2011:8). These coastal cities have become bustling pirate economies, with 
injections of capital and the rise of micro-industries around piracy, like 
arms, housing and feeding hostages, equipment and ship maintenance, 
real estate, banking, khat and prostitution. 
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Pirates are financed both domestically and via financiers in Dubai, 
Beirut, Amsterdam, London, Nairobi and Sana‘a. At port, ―prominent 
business and political figures with assets in the fishing industry provide 
‗seed money‘ for the pirate groups to function, as well as resources and 
equipment‖ (ibid: 8). Abroad, a vast network within the Somali diaspora 
provides funds, technology and information to pirate gangs. Financiers 
retain about 50 percent of ransom payments; pirates retain about 30 
percent, including large portions for bosses and capital investment; and 
about 20 percent goes to bribes for government or port officials 
(UNODC, 2010). 
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Each pirate earns approximately US$6,000-10,000 per successful 
hijacking, with the first pirate on board a target vessel earning a hazard 
bonus of about $5,000 (Bowden, 2011: 12). This dwarfs gross national 
income per capita, less than US$600. Non-monetary benefits also accrue 
to pirates, mainly the social capital that comes with the latest technology, 
the biggest houses and the prettiest wives (Hunter, 2008). 
State actors are also implicated in the piracy value chain. Notably, the 
corrupt government of Puntland tolerates pirates and provides them 
stable business conditions in the absence of a functional market system, 
reaping a major share of profits in the bargain. Internationally, 27 state 
naval forces spend over US$2 billion combatting piracy annually, with 
unimpressive results. Also, a dozen governments prosecute pirates at an 
annual cost of US$31 million, with another US$25 million going to fund 
international anti-piracy organizations (Bowden, 2010: 19-20). 
 
In the face of violence, uncertainty and complexity, clan-based trust 
glues together the piracy value chain on five fronts: recruitment, 
financing, land-based support, legal status and organization. Gang 
leaders are often clan elders or pirate veterans who recruit mainly within 
their clan and geography to foster trust. Similarly, money follows blood, 
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as pirate organizations are networked with financiers abroad mostly 
―informally…along family or clan lines‖ (Bair, 2009: 30). The pirate 
economy relies heavily on the relational ―division of labor provided by 
[a] large network of individuals‖ who drive the micro-industries around 
pirate operations. This ―division of labor increases…vulnerability to 
others‘ failures to fulfill their responsibilities…and as our dependence on 
the cooperation of others grows, so does the importance of trust in their 
reliability.‖ (Sztompka, 1999 in Bair 2009: 42).  
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Aside from recruitment, financing and land-based support, trust is 
also important to piracy because of its legal and organizational ambiguity. 
Local institutions of sharia (Islamic law), xeer (clan-based law) and diya 
(blood payment) precondition actor attitudes toward crime and 
governance. Xeer, for example, holds that there is no ultimate authority 
in law, which may fuel the state weakness piracy requires to thrive (Little, 
2003: 11). Amid this confusion, ―trust becomes an indispensible strategy 
to deal with‖ the aura of secrecy around piracy, or its ―organizational 
opacity‖ as an organized crime (Sztompka, 1999 in Bair,2009 :43). In 
other words, pirates and their supporting actors along the chain are only 
able to navigate uncertainty and generate serious value through trust 
rooted in kinship. 
In short, ―piracy is a long and complex supply chain, involving 
literally hundreds of land- based support staff and increasingly large and 
sophisticated maritime-based operations‖ (Bowden, 2011: 6). A first 
attempt at depicting the piracy value chain, produced last month, is thus 
accurate in its complexity, but fails to capture relational dynamics of clan 
between linkages (see Figures 5 and 6). Key to the global value chain of 
piracy is trust among kin and the social capital it generates to facilitate 
coordination and perpetuate operation. 
CONCLUSION 
Of course, piracy is terror on the high seas, and despite its conflictual 
realities, all attempts must be made to freeze its value chain. Because of 
the recognized salience of clan-based trust to piracy, naval forces are 
experimenting with ‗trust and influence‘ operations to undermine 
relationships along the chain and thereby thwart pirate attacks (Bair, 
2009). The piracy value chain demonstrates the salience of trust within 
clans, but admits that this trust heightens conflict and distrust between 
clans, a fact exploited by counter-piracy operations. The global value 
chain of piracy can also help revise econometric conclusions about the 
empirical costs of piracy. Moreover, it highlights how relational 
mechanisms of governance guide global value chains through crisis. 
Particularly amid the debris of state collapse, clan-based trust engenders 
a mutual dependence among actors in the chain. Such dependence can 
support resilience through economic insecurity, especially when the 
activity is informal and performed by non-state actors. But as the interest 
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in ‗trust and influence‘ tactics suggests, the interdependencies of the 
pirate value chain also leave it vulnerable to shocks that undermine its 
bonds. Of course, piracy is criminal—and it cannot be characterized by 
any single pattern of value chain governance—but it must be treated as a 
relational network of enterprises rather than an insurgency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the major discussions about social policy, in general, and poverty 
reduction strategies, in particular, is whether targeting schemes or 
universal schemes are more effective and efficient. Arguments about 
administrative costs and leakages are in the centre of the debate, 
however, arguments related with undercoverage, the politics of 
targeting, and the ‗perverse incentive‘, are gaining space among the 
discussions. In this context, the present essay seek to examine if, given 
the administrative costs of targeting, and the extent of leakages to non-
targeted groups, it is worth targeting at all. We will provide some 
arguments and evidence related with administrative costs and leakages, 
but also about the undercoverage and the politics of targeting, to suggest 
that targeting should not be taken for granted as the best way of doing 
social policy, and that universal schemes may be analyzed more 
carefully as they constitute a better option in many cases. 
The essay is structured as follows. After this brief introduction, the 
second section offers a general introduction to the debate around 
targeting. The third section discusses the arguments around the 
administrative costs and the effectiveness of targeting (in terms of 
undercoverage and leakages) questioning the assumption of the cost-
effectiveness of this type of programmes. The fourth section brings 
politics and incentives into the debate while the fifth discusses about 
the (false) scarcity of resources as a constraint to universal social policies. 
Some conclusions are presented in the sixth and last section. 
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BASICS OF TARGETING 
Until the early 80s universalism of social policy was a common practice 
in several developed and developing countries, however, during the 90s 
this scheme lost popularity vis-à-vis targeted approaches. This shift was 
a consequence of both external and internal factors of the developing 
countries. In one hand, economic mismanagement, bureaucratization, 
and corruption contributed to the move towards targeted programmes; 
in the other hand, the shift in development theory and practice pushed 
by the IFIs – changes and conditionality of aid and fiscal constraints 
related with both economic crisis and neoliberal agenda –, contributed 
even more to the adoption of targeting instead of universalism 
(Mkandawire, 2005; Dutrey, 2007). 
The ideological shifts in development (and poverty) theories and 
interventions during the late 80s and during the 90s played a 
fundamental role in pushing targeting into the mainstream approaches to 
address poverty and insecurity. Mkandawire (2005) states that behind 
the efficiency and fiscal arguments in favour of targeting lie 
fundamental questions about polity‘s values; about whose interests are 
being favoured and which is the desirable society that is being 
promoted. In the same way, Dutrey (2007) argues that it is not a 
coincidence that ―the theory of selectivity in social provision grew 
stronger along with the rise of the neoliberal ideological shift in the 
1980s and 1990s‖ (op. cit.: 1). Along these shifts in development 
theories come a change in development practices, both from the 
international financial institutions and from national donors and 
NGOs. Mkandawire (2005: 3) identifies two principal factors 
associated with the influence of the policy discourse and aid strategies 
in social policy design. The first one is that donor countries follow 
the directions of the structural adjustments of the 90s and focus their 
resources to ensure a ‗safety net of social services‘ provided to the 
‗vulnerable‘, therefore limiting the scope and extent of their funds. The 
second is more related with the discourse shift, where nowadays aid is 
understood more in terms of helping the poor that in those of helping 
developing countries. So, shifts in the development discourse, in IFI‘s 
approaches and their influence over donors and NGOs, contribute to a 
move from universal to targeting schemes of social policies. 
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The third group of external forces that pushed targeting as the main 
scheme of social policy is the fiscal constraints and the pursuit of 
‗efficiency‘ of such programmes during the 70s and 80s. The fiscal 
constraints during the 70s and the economic crisis during the 80s 
make a perfect environment to ‗legitimize‘ those arguments based on 
the (so-called) higher administrative costs and larger leakages of 
universal programmes in regard to targeted programmes. This stream 
of arguments states, against universalism, that ―targeting would result 
in more poverty alleviation with the same or lower total amount of 
social spending. Improved identification and targeting of the poor would 
then make social spending more effective without increasing the local 
tax burden‖ (Dutrey, 2007: 1). In other words, there was (and still) a 
belief that targeting will be less costly and will lead to less leakages that 
universal programmes. This argument will be the aim of the discussion 
in the next section, where we will contrast some costs of targeting 
against universalism, and we will make some comments around the 
question of our concern. 
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AND LEAKAGES 
The most cited argument in favour of targeting is its cost-effectiveness. 
However, there is large evidence suggesting that targeting not only is 
more costly than some universal programmes, but also that the former 
scheme is less effective in terms of the leakages than what it is presumed. 
In the next paragraphs we will provide some arguments and evidence 
that highlight these aspects. 
The (administrative) costs of targeting have not received a central role 
in the literature dedicated to evaluate the effectiveness of social policy 
despite several critiques, and although this data is ―often incomplete and 
seldom possible to compare systematically because of a lack of key 
information‖ (op. cit.: 8), there is no regular effort to tackle this. 
However the difficulties in dealing with the issue, some authors have 
done interesting evaluations or comparisons that allow us to get a better 
understanding of the costs of targeting. Reviewing some studies that 
question the administrative costs of targeted programmes in Asia, 
Mkandawire points out that ―the average cost of administering individual 
targeting schemes (which shows the best success rates when discussing 
targeting) is 9 per cent, varying between 0.4 and 29 per cent of total 
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programme cost‖ (2005: 11). He also raises the importance of including 
not only the costs due to leakage but also the costs of undercoverage: in 
the same studies reviewed, they highlight that although alternative 
targeting schemes such geographic and self-targeting are cheaper – 
between 6-7 per cent – they are also less effective due to higher levels of 
leakages and undercoverage (Mkandawire, 2005; Dutrey, 2007). 
Additionally, there are some authors that argue that the costs of targeting 
should not be seen exclusively in the light of identifying the poor. Once 
the phase of identification is done, there are other important costs 
related with the delivery of services to the eligible and the exclusion of 
the non eligible; the costs of fraud; and the incidence of corruption. In 
this context, there is some evidence that suggest that ―at least 20 per cent 
of the budget of an average targeted programme disappears‖ in 
administrative costs and corrupt practices (Dutrey, 2007: 8). 
The other main aspect that is focus of the discussions about targeting 
and universalism is that of effectiveness, measured by the leakages and 
undercoverage of each scheme. Any intervention that employs targeting 
is using some kind of mechanism to discriminate or select ‗beneficiaries‘. 
This kind of interventions are always subject to two kind of errors: 
exclusion error or undercoverage (Error type I), and inclusion error or 
leakages (Error type II). In a well known and cited article from Cornia 
and Stewart (1995), the authors analyzed targeting errors in food 
subsidies among eight developing countries (India, Jamaica, Pakistan, 
Egypt, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Mexico and The Philipines) that shifted from 
one scheme to another (from universalism to targeting in most of the 
cases). In their study, Cornia and Stewart (1995) suggest a preference for 
universal schemes in terms of efficiency based on the following 
conclusions: 
i) Universalism led to lower undercoverage if the subsidies are un-
restricted and rationed. 
ii) Although universal unrestricted subsidies can confer larger 
absolute benefits to the rich, since they can afford to consume 
more, universal schemes almost invariably offered much greater 
benefits to poorer groups as a proportion of income. 
iii) When moving from universal to targeted schemes, in almost 
every case there has been a large increase in undercoverage with 
only some reductions in leakages. 
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iv) Administrative costs are estimated to be higher for the targeted 
food interventions, ranging from 2 to 5 per cent of the total costs 
of the schemes (Cornia & Stewart, 1995: 93-96) 
At this point is worth making two comments about some of their 
conclusions. The first links the conclusion related with the absolute or 
relative benefit of the poor, and the one about undercoverage problems 
of targeted schemes. Even though we focus exclusively on the 
‗absolute benefits‘ transferred to the poor (and ignore that they receive 
more relative benefits), there is strong evidence that shows that targeted 
programmes have very large exclusion error (larger in most cases than 
universal schemes). Dutrey (2007) shows how several targeting 
―success stories‖ – highlighted by the World Bank for their targeting 
accuracy– have extremely large undercoverage (See Figure 1). For 
instance, the Bolsa Escola programme in Brazil canalizes almost twice 
as much resources to the poor than to the non-poor (accuracy of 
1.98), but it does so at the same time that excludes 73 per cent of the 
poor. In the case of the old age benefits in Chile, the programme 
canalizes more than 2.5 times resources for the poor but it only 
reach 16 per cent of them! This shows that targeting accuracy (based 
on the resources transferred to the poor) does not imply that all the 
poor has been benefiting from those resources, indeed we can have 
very ―accurate‖ programmes that cover less than a fifth of the poor. 
Figure 1 
Accuracy and undercoverage from selected programmes in the Americas 
Source: Dutrey, 2007: 5 
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The second comment is an extension of conclusion iv). At this 
point, one can easily argue that the fact that targeting has high 
administrative costs does not imply that they are higher than those in 
the universal schemes. Even though there is no clear and standardized 
body of evidence that compare both schemes, Cornia and Stewart recall 
that 
―Earlier comparisons between universal and targeted programmes in the 
United Kingdom indicated administrative costs of 3.5 per cent for 
universal programmes and between 5 per cent and 15 per cent for 
means-tested programmes, while studies from the United States found 
2.5 per cent versus 13 per cent for universal programmes as compared 
to means- tested programmes.‖ (Cornia and Stewart 1995: 96) 
Suggesting that, although we cannot make general conclusions, this 
evidence adds to the claim that targeting signifies substantially higher 
administrative costs. 
So far, we have mentioned some internal constraints of targeting 
(including administrative costs, high leakages and undercoverage), but 
in the context of developing countries where the most part of these 
programmes take place, there is another limitation: one of institutional 
capacity. In order to avoid or lessen targeting errors, one would require 
more accurate and sophisticated targeting mechanisms that manage to 
include the poor (low undercoverage), without including the non poor 
(low leakages), and with relatively low administrative costs. This theory-
perfect targeting mechanism is almost impossible to reach even for 
developed countries, but in the case of developing countries this is 
also true for more modest levels of targeting effectiveness. Lack of 
institutional capacity is a major limitation for developing and 
implementing targeting schemes in the poorest developing countries: 
―Programmes designed to be targeted to the poor, such as those in 
Africa, actually ―target‖ less effectively than universal schemes, even 
before the economic costs of poverty identification, targeting 
management and control have been included, and without including the 
non-economic costs and considering the levels of undercoverage of the 
poor.‖ (Dutrey, 2007: 10) 
Although there is no automatic link between institutional capacity and 
targeting effectiveness, there is some evidence that points out that less 
develop developing countries are worse able to implement efficient 
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targeting programmes. For instance, all the ―successful‖ cases of 
targeting highlighted by the World Bank come from countries in Latin 
America and other transition countries characterized with better-
developed institutions, but there are no programmes from sub-Saharan 
Africa among this group1 (ibid.). 
In this section, we have tried to show that against the main argument 
that advocates for the cost-effectiveness of targeting over universal 
schemes, targeting is often costly, has higher undercoverage and 
leakages, and requires institutional capacity hardly reachable for the 
developing countries. Even though the evaluation of both schemes is 
neither standardized, nor well-developed, there is enough evidence to 
suggest that due to the economic costs of targeting, in many developing 
countries this scheme has to be more carefully examine, and that 
universal schemes may be taken into account as a real and perhaps 
better scheme for social policy. Universal approaches have even more 
sense if we take into account not only economic costs, but also political 
costs and incentives. Some of these associated costs of targeting are 
addressed in the next section. 
BRINGING POLITICS AND INCENTIVES INTO THE DEBATE 
Along with the administrative costs and leakages arguments against 
targeting, there are other claims related with the political feasibility 
and the creation of incentives from this scheme. As argued by Sen: 
―The political economy of targeting has to be concerned not just with 
the economic problems of selection, information, and incentives, but 
also with the political support for, and feasibility of, aiming public policy 
specifically at removing the deprivation of particular groups.‖ (1995: 21) 
In this context, and taking into account that poverty alleviation 
requires long-term commitments and political sustainability, several 
authors argue in favour of universal approaches instead of targeted 
programmes. There are two arguments behind this idea. In one hand, 
social programmes based on universal criteria tend to received more 
political support by an alliance between middle classes and the poor than 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting that ―successful‖ in the way defined by the World Bank, 
allows for high level of exclusion. 
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those based of targeting mechanisms and therefore the former are easier 
to launch and sustain (Mkandawire, 2005; Dutrey, 2007; Nelson, 2003). 
In the other hand, legislatures tend to be ―more willing to approve much 
larger budgets for popular broad programmes than for targeted ones‖, 
leading to potential increases in the benefits of the poor (Nelson, 2003: 
127). 
There are two additional political arguments in favour of 
universalism vis-à-vis targeting. Firstly, programmes or institutions with 
universal basis can be a better way for governments to promote social 
capital in the form of common citizenship and solidarity (Dutrey, 2007: 
14). Moreover, these programmes are more compatible with social 
solidarity, less likely to stigmatize the poor and less likely to encourage 
mentalities disparaging them among the better off (Nelson, 2003: 
127). Secondly, targeted programmes can lead to ignore or even 
restrict ‗empowerment‘ processes at the same time that generate stigma 
among the beneficiaries of the programme (Mkandawire, 2005), as 
argued by Sen ―any system of subsidy that requires people to be 
identified as poor and that it seen as a special benefaction [...] would 
tend to have some effects on their self-respect as well as on the 
respect accorded them by others‖ (1995: 13). 
The last argument we want to mention is that of the ‗perverse 
incentive‘ underlying targeting. Targeted programmes create incentives 
for people to change their (economic) behaviour in attempts to become 
beneficiaries of them. These changes of behaviour have both 
individual consequences such as not taking a job or not saving for one‘s 
own pension (Mkandawire, 2005: 15) as well as social costs including 
―the net loss of the fruits of economic activities forgone [and] changes 
in labor supply‖ (Sen, 1995: 13). 
These political and incentive arguments reinforce the economic 
arguments (administrative costs and leakages) exposed in the previous 
section in favour of a more complete and rigorous examination of the 
‗panacea‘ of targeting programmes. Universal schemes have the 
potential, not only to lower social policy costs, but also can contribute 
to social cohesion, policy support, and the elimination of perverse 
incentives. 
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RESOURCE SCARCITY? 
Along the article we have attempted to show that targeting is not 
the panacea of social policy as many academics, governments and 
international organizations want us to believe. Contrary to the popular 
claim that targeting is less costly and more effective (lower 
undercoverage and leakages) than universal schemes, we have shown 
evidence that point several limitations of targeting schemes. But arguing 
against targeting without showing or proposing an alternative would be 
useless and naive. So, in this section we will give some general 
arguments directly in favour of universal schemes; arguments in the 
theoretical and financial stream that complement the arguments 
discussed in the previous sections (administrative costs; undercoverage 
and leakages; political feasibility and incentives). 
From a theoretical point of view, universalism, by definition, seeks to 
minimize the undercoverage by including all the population potentially 
subject of the policy. In this context, universal schemes are compatible 
with a broader definition of poverty than that based on a (static) 
poverty line used in targeted programmes. As Saith states, 
―If the objective is poverty reduction, then attention must be devoted 
no just to interventions supporting those already in poverty, but also to 
those that might not actually be in poverty, but run a serious risk of 
falling into it. There is little point in just bailing out water from a boat 
while ignoring the hole through which it is coming into the boat.‖ 
(2008: 20) 
That is to say, universal schemes are more capable to deal with 
vulnerability as they include as part of their ‗beneficiaries‘ not only the 
income poor, but all the population including the ‗middle strata‘ that 
fluctuate around the poverty line. 
One of the strongest critiques against universal schemes is about the 
financial costs of such approach to social policy. Critiques of 
universalism argue that extending social services to all the population will 
require large amount of financial resources and that those costs are 
impossible to cover for most part of developing countries.2 We agree 
                                                 
2 It is worth mentioning that when we refer to extend a specific social service to 
‗all the population‘ we mean to extend it to the population that is subject to that 
service. For instance, if we are talking about prenatal health, we are saying that 
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that universalism require large amounts of resources, but we have two 
objections about the second part of the critique. First, the fact that 
universal schemes of social policy demand large financial resources does 
not imply that targeting schemes do not. In fact, in previous sections we 
presented some evidence that suggest that in many cases targeted 
programmes are indeed more expensive that universal programmes due 
to their administrative costs, high levels of undercoverage and leakages, 
and fraud costs. Second, and following Saith (2008) and International 
Labour Office (ILO) (2008), it is not true that those costs are impossible 
to afford. Below we expand this argument giving some insights on how 
universal schemes can be financed. First we present some general 
thoughts about the sources of such resources (Saith, 2008) and then we 
will go more into details examining the estimated costs of some universal 
programmes in selected developing countries as an example (ILO, 2008). 
In one hand, Saith (2008: 30-32) presents six rejoinders to the 
argument of resource scarcity as a constraint to universalize social policy. 
First, he states, resources can be obtained through a redistribution of the 
growth component in the economy. Second, several schemes can be self-
financing in the medium term if they are judiciously and efficiently 
designed and implemented, for instance in the case of infrastructure 
development projects and the spillovers associated with them. Third, 
social protection expenditure should be seen, in most of the cases, as an 
investment rather than an expenditure. It has been widely proved that 
expenditure in health and education contributes to human development 
and provides valuable inputs for economic growth. Fourth, ―given the 
obscenely high and rising levels of inequality within many developing 
economies, only Neo-liberals could seriously claim that there is a scarcity 
of resources for meeting the basic needs of the population‖ (Op. cit.: 
31). Fifth, there will be more available resources if both rich countries 
and poor countries‘ governments change their expenditures priorities 
from armaments, for instance, to social protection. Sixth, overseas 
assistance programmes can contribute substantially by providing more 
and better canalized resources. In sum, Saith debates the validity of the 
                                                                                                                   
under a universal scheme that service may be available to all pregnant women, 
regardless of their income level, social strata, etc., but not to all the population 
(including non pregnant women, and men), which would be foolish. 
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resource scarcity for universal social policy and question ―what really is 
scarce: financial resources or humanist values?‖ (Op. cit.: 32). 
In the other hand, ILO (2008) give us some details about how 
much can cost to have a universal Basic Social Security Floor in 12 
countries from Africa and Asia.3 Even though their study is based on 
simulations with several assumptions, they do make interesting 
conclusions that can help us to exemplify the feasibility of financing 
some universal social policies. Their estimations show that a basic 
social security floor will cost, among these countries, between 3.7 and 
10.6 per cent of the 2010 GDP of each country, requiring ―a level of 
resources that is higher than current spending in the majority of low-
income countries (which rarely spend more than 3 per cent of GDP on 
health care and rarely more than 1 per cent of GDP on non-health 
social security measures)‖. Under this constraint, they examine two 
scenarios: in the first one they assume that governments would not 
change the level of spending of social protection of 2003; while in the 
second they assume a policy change. The status quo scenario (the first 
one) shows that if countries are not able to break out of the levels of 
social protection, they will not be able to implement the social protection 
package without largely dependency on external funding. But here we 
are more interested in the second scenario, where they assume that 
governments will increase the resources for the social protection floor 
until they reach one fifth of their total expenditure.4 Under this scenario, 
by 2010 four countries out of twelve ―will be able to finance 100 per 
cent of the universal basic social protection package domestically‖ while 
the rest will be able to afford between 35 and 70 per cent of the package 
                                                 
3 4 ILO (2008) defined the Basic Social Security Floor as a scheme that ensures 
that: i) All residents have access to basic/essential health care; ii) All children 
enjoy income security facilitating access to nutrition, education and care; iii) 
Some targeted income support is provided to the poor and the unemployed in 
the active age group; and iv) All residents in old age or with disabilities enjoy 
income security. The countries studied are: Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Ethiopia; 
Guinea; Kenya; Senegal; United Republic of Tanzania; Bangladesh; India; 
Nepal; Pakistan; and Viet Nam. 
4 ―This would still be below prevailing proportions of public budget spent on 
social protection in many middle and high-income countries (which is usually 
between one third and one half of government expenditure)‖ (ILO, 2008: 11) 
186 CAMILO ARDILA GALVIS 
(Ibid.). In the latter case external financial support would be needed for 
some more time, external resources that are available today but that 
need to be better canalized, as showed above by Saith (2008). 
The arguments made in this section suggest that against the common 
critique of the financial unfeasibility of universal schemes for social 
policy, the resource scarcity is more a fallacy than a reality. Financial 
resources are available but are not used for universal social protection; 
this will required a shift in governments and donors‘ expenditures 
priorities, and a conception of social protection as a ―powerful form of 
social investment‖ that can ―form a platform for accessing untapped 
sources of growth over the medium term‖ at the same time that being 
―intrinsically desirable in shaping a societal framework worth living‖ 
(Saith, 2008: 36). 
CONCLUSIONS 
One of the major discussions about social policy, in general, and poverty 
reduction strategies, in particular, is whether targeting schemes or 
universal schemes are more effective and efficient. This essay sought 
to examine if, given the administrative costs of targeting and the 
extent of leakages to non-targeted groups, is it worth targeting at all. 
We gave some arguments and evidence related with administrative costs 
and leakages, but also about the undercoverage and the politics of 
targeting, in order to examine the merits of this scheme. 
Against the main argument that advocates for the cost-effectiveness 
of targeting over universal schemes, targeting is often costly, has 
higher undercoverage and leakages, and requires institutional capacity 
hardly reachable for the developing countries. Moreover, universal 
schemes have the potential, not only for lowering social policy costs, but 
can also promote social capital in the form of common citizenship and 
solidarity; they tend to receive more political support; they help in the 
elimination of ‗perverse incentives‘; and they are compatible with 
broader definitions of poverty. 
In the same way, the resource scarcity argument against universal 
social policies is more a fallacy than a reality. Financial resources are 
available but are not well canalized and used for universal social 
protection. Changing this will required a shift in governments and 
donors‘ expenditures priorities, and a conception of social protection as 
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an investment (rather than expenditure) that can generate economic 
growth and contribute to shape a society of equal citizens. 
Even though the evaluation of both types of schemes is neither 
standardized, nor well- developed, there is strong evidence to suggest 
that due to the costs of targeting (economic and non economic), in 
many developing countries this scheme has to be more carefully 
examine, and that universal schemes may be taken into account as a real 
and perhaps better alternative for social policy and poverty eradication 
strategies. 
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